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ICT in Information Services
Traditionally, information and communication technologies (ICT)
have been considered as technologies that support business
processes. With the hype of the ‘new economy’ at the end of the
1990s ICT is increasingly more seen as a strategic asset. The question
arises what effects ICT really has had on firms. This thesis analyses
the use and deployment of ICT in the Dutch securities trade in the
period 1860-1970. It shows the role ICT has had on the level of the
firm and on the industry level. This is done by studying the range of
services which financial intermediaries provided and by studying the
structure of the Dutch securities trade. Concerning the first, ICT has
made the provision of  services enormously more dynamic. Only
think of the possibility to inform clients during trade time on the
current rates by means of ICT. Concerning the second, ICT has had a
less apparent effect. We see the rise of large of joint stock
commercial banks that control almost completely the chain of steps
necessary to execute a securities trade order. Before, several
intermediaries were involved to execute such an order. The fact that
these large players had the means to provide themselves with the
most modern and fast ICT of that time, and thus to lower transaction
costs, seems to be of overriding importance.
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Voorwoord 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zes jaar geleden besloot ik dat Geschiedenis onderwijzen op een 
middelbare school vooralsnog niet aan mij was besteed. Kinderen in die 
leeftijd zijn leuk als kinderen, niet als leerlingen. Ik werd AiO aan de 
Erasmus Universiteit. Toch een opmerkelijke stap omdat ik pas bij het 
voltooien van mijn scriptie het licht zag wat betreft het doen van 
onderzoek.  Ik kwam als historicus terecht bij de Faculteit Bedrijfskunde. 
Ook dat leek me opmerkelijk maar dat bleek wel mee te vallen. Bij deze 
faculteit lopen veel mensen van verschillende pluimage rond. In ieder 
geval heeft het er toe geleid dat het uiteindelijke proefschrift een 
interdisciplinair karakter heeft meegekregen. 
Ik heb het geluk gehad een proefschrift te kunnen schrijven in een 
goed verzorgd institutioneel kader. Allereerst was daar de Stichting 
Historie der Techniek die mijn AiO-plaats binnen het grootschalige 
nationale onderzoeksproject ‘Techniekgeschiedenis in Nederland in de 
twintigste eeuw’ heeft gecreëerd.  
 Ten tweede was ik ondergebracht bij de, destijds, piepjonge 
onderzoeksschool  van Bedrijfskunde en Economie, te weten ERIM. Al heb 
ik de cursusverplichtingen soms verfoeid, ik heb er wel de mogelijkheid 
gehad om een kijkje te nemen bij andere wetenschappelijke disciplines en 
om naar conferenties, workshops, en summerschools te gaan die in den 
vreemde plaatsvonden. 
 
Van instituties naar mensen. Gedurende mijn AiO tijd zijn veel mensen 
betrokken geweest bij mijn proefschrift die terecht bedankt dienen te 
worden. Ten eerste gaat mijn dank uit naar mijn promotor Felix Janszen. 
Vanaf het begin af aan was afgesproken dat hij op de achtergrond zou 
opereren. Ik heb dat als een prettige constructie ervaren want het schiep de 
mogelijkheid, juist omdat hij er niet zo vaak was, bij hem thuis langs te 
ii 
gaan om rosé te drinken in de achtertuin! Ten tweede bedank ik hier Jan 
van den Ende in zijn hoedanigheid van dagelijkse begeleider. We hebben 
stevige, soms onbevredigende discussies gehad. Toch, het feit dat ik dat 
hier kan zeggen, geeft wel aan dat er een open relatie is geweest. Ik mag 
van geluk spreken Onno de Wit als tweede begeleider te hebben gehad. 
Niet alleen zijn kritische, maar opbouwende commentaar is zeer 
waardevol geweest voor dit proefschrift maar ook zijn geestelijke steun is 
onontbeerlijk geweest. ‘Het is jouw proefschrift, Janneke’, heeft hij me 
vaak voorgehouden. 
 Naast deze begeleiders heb ik steun gehad aan Joost Jonker 
waarmee ik in de beginfase van dit proefschrift heb gesproken en die mijn 
verrichtingen op een afstandje heeft gevolgd. Ook de werkgroep 
Bedrijfsgeschiedenis, een groepje AiO’s die een bedrijfshistorisch 
proefschrift schrijven en die enkele keren per jaar bijeenkomen, is van 
belang voor mij geweest. Het kan soms erg prettig zijn om aan historici een 
proefschrift met een historisch onderwerp uit te leggen.  
Bij de vakgroep ‘Management van Technologie en Innovatie’ heb ik 
mijn plek wel gevonden gedurende mijn AiO tijd. Vooral na de komst van 
meer jong bloed bij de vakgroep is er een leuke club ontstaan. Deze ‘AiO +’ 
groep bedank ik dan graag voor de goede tijd die is geweest en nog gaat 
komen: Julien Mostard, Floortje Blindenbach, Koen Dittrich, Raf Jans, 
Babiche van de Loo, Sophie Schweizer, Laurens Rook, Tuan Le Anh, Tho 
Le Duc, Hans Quak, en Bob Kijkuit. Eén persoon van deze vakgroep wil ik 
apart bedanken. Ze regeert al jaren met ijzeren hand het secretariaat: 
Carmen Meesters-Mirasol.  
 
Ad Maas, Gerard Marlet en Hans Simons hebben me niet alleen de nodige 
ontspanning bezorgd in de afgelopen jaren maar hebben ook regelmatig 
met mij geboomd over (wel hele primitieve versies van) het proefschrift 
waarvoor mijn hartelijke dank! 
 
Uiteraard gaat ook mijn dank uit naar mijn vader, moeder, broers Gijs en 
Ruud, familie en ‘schoonfamilie’ die meeleefden gedurende het hele proces 
alhoewel ik niet altijd graag herinnerd werd aan ‘het boekske’. 
  
Tot slot, lieve Guido, wat gaan we morgen allemaal doen? 
 
Janneke Hermans,  
Rotterdam, september 2004 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As from the end of 2002, the trade floor at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
has no longer hosted shouting option traders that tried to execute trade 
orders. In December 2002 the option trade changed from an open outcry 
system to full screen trade. Their predecessors, traders in bonds and shares 
(securities), had already left the trade floor in 1998. These changes relate to 
technological possibilities in the area of telecommunication technologies. 
By means of modern information and communication technologies (ICT) 
face to face contact is no longer necessary to execute a securities or option 
trade order. This thesis studies exactly this subject; the use and 
deployment of ICT in the Dutch securities trade. By using ICT, we aim at 
technologies that ‘capture, transmit and display data and information 
electronically’.1 This implies the inclusion of devices such as electro-
magnetic telegraphs, telephones, radios and telexes and also the 
infrastructure such as the lines, cables and radio waves that make 
communication between the devices possible. In this, we follow the OECD 
definition concerning the ICT sector.  
Traditionally, information and communication technologies (ICT) 
have been considered as technologies that support business processes.2 
However, with the hype of the ‘new economy’ at the end of the 1990s, ICT 
is considered to be more than just a supporting technology. It was 
supposed to alter the world economy and business radically. The hype has 
quietened down by now but what remains is that ICT has transformed 
from playing a facilitating to a more strategic role in firms. ICT, 
                                                 
1 OECD, Measuring the Information Economy 2002 (OECD STI) p. 81. 
2 N. Venkatraman (1991) ‘IT-Induced Business Reconfiguration’, in: Michael S. Scott Morton (ed.) The 
Corporation of the 1990s. Information Technology and Organizational Transformation (Oxford University 
Press; New York/Oxford) pp. 122- 158, p. 122 and p. 125.   
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particularly internet applications, creates possibilities to form new 
distribution channels from a firm to its clients (business to consumer), and 
new channels for trade between firms (business to business). Furthermore, 
it is said that ICT lowers the costs of communication. By means of ICT it 
becomes easier to contact other persons and to obtain quickly relevant 
information. As a result, firms have wider possibilities to find suitable 
business partners. According to several authors, these new developments 
will result in the situation that firms will focus on their core competence 
and outsource other activities. These other activities should then be 
purchased in the market. Hence, more transactions will take place via the 
market instead of via hierarchical relations.3 Others have asserted the 
contrary. ICT offers the possibility to control and to integrate partially or 
completely, industrial columns. ICT thus favours integration of activities.4 
Clearly, ICT affects relationships between firms and between firms and 
their clients. However, different opinions exist as to what the result will be 
if ICT is actively deployed in business.  
In this thesis, this issue is explored in a historical context. Whereas 
the participants in the current discussion on the role and effects of internet 
and e-commerce mainly have to rely on information on initial effects 
combined with expectations of longer term effects, a historical approach 
offers the advantage that the outcomes of change processes are known. 
Furthermore, a historical study provides the possibility to put recent 
changes in perspective. By studying earlier modes of ICT, such as the 
telegraph, the telephone, and the telex, and their ability to change business 
processes and business relationships, a more sensible approach to the 
question of whether and how ICT influences business relationships and 
the relationships between firms and their clients, can be taken.  
 
1.2 ICT and services 
Existing literature on the impact of ICT on firms mostly involves firms that 
produce tangible products.5 In this thesis the focus is on the services sector. 
                                                 
3 Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates and Robert I. Benjamin (1987) ‘Electronic Markets and Electronic 
Hierarchies’, Communications of the  ACM, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 484-497; and John Hagel III and Marc 
Singer (1999) ‘Unbundling the Corporation’, Harvard Business Review, vol. 77, iss. 2, pp. 133-141. 
4 Joost Jonker and Keetie Sluyterman (2000) Thuis op de wereldmarkt. Nederlandse handelshuizen door de 
eeuwen heen (Sdu uitgevers; Den Haag) p. 384 (also translated into English, entitled At home on the world 
markets: Dutch international trading companies from the 16th century until the present, published in 2000 
with SDU publishers, The Hague),  and Ranjay Gulati and Jason Garino (2000) ‘Get the Right Mix of 
Bricks and Clicks’, Harvard Business Review, vol. 78, no.3,  pp. 107-114. 
5 Kathryn Rudie Harrigan (1983) Strategies for Vertical Integration (Lexington Books; Lexington); Morris 
Silver (1984) Enterprise and the Scope of the Firm. The Role of Vertical Integration (Robertson; Oxford); 
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Together with the transport sector and the press, the financial sector 
belongs to early adopters of telecom technologies in the services industry.6 
The transport sector offers the service of transporting goods, the press 
provides news, and the financial sector offers a wide range of services 
varying from cash withdrawals to concluding mortgages.  
The advantages of new ICT to the transport sector relates to the 
quantity and nature of the transported goods. By means of ICT, a firm can 
be informed on the current situation. The variety and quantity of the 
transported goods can be tailored to the needs of local markets. The 
advantage is that the risk for losses diminishes since the possibility of 
transporting too few or too many goods decreases. Furthermore, a truck, 
train, boat or other transporting vehicle can be informed ‘en route’, 
whether it has to return with another load of goods. This obviously saves 
transportation costs. The press early adopted any means to obtain news as 
fast as possible from all over the world with the aim to publish it as soon 
as possible. After all, a newspaper is most valuable when it contains the 
most current news. The same can be said concerning the financial sector; 
the one that possesses the most relevant information earlier than others, 
can make huge profits. This is especially pressing in a particular branch of 
the financial sector, the securities trade. Information relevant to securities 
trade, is of a high time value.7 Information having a high time value is 
information that is only useful for a short period of time. Although current 
information in the transport sector is important, other technologies such as 
transportation means and ways to conserve perishable goods during 
transportation also play an important role in determining the quality of the 
offered service. In order to point out effects of ICT, it is more plausible to 
focus on industries in which ICT is the main ‘cause’ of the profitability of a 
service which is the case with both the press as the financial sector. In these 
sectors the quick handling of information is of vital importance. In this 
thesis, we focus on the financial sector, particularly on the securities trade, 
because the ‘supply chain’ of the offered service is longer in comparison to 
the news sector and therefore, more communication is necessary. This 
supply chain consists of a seller, a financial intermediary of the selling 
                                                                                                                           
Yeong Heok Lee (1994) Vertical Integration and Technological Innovation. A Transaction Cost Approach 
(Garland Publishing; New York). 
6 Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983) Forecasting the Telephone: A Retrospective Technology Assessment (Ablex 
Publishing Corporation; Norwood New Jersey); R.B. du Boff (1980) ‘Business Demand and the 
Development of the Telegraph in the United States, 1844-1860’, Business History Review, vol. 54, no.4, 
pp. 459-479, p. 465. 
7 A.J. Field (1992) ‘The Magnetic Telegraph, Price and Quantity Data, and the New Management of 
Capital’, The Journal of Economic History , vol. 52, iss. 2., pp. 401-413, p. 403. 
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party, a financial intermediary of the buying party, and a buyer. 
Communication between client and intermediary and between the 
intermediaries is necessary to execute an order. With the press, 
communication between, for instance, a newspaper’s office and news 
providers such as news agencies and journalists, is inevitable but these 
actors do not necessarily have to have contact with their ‘clients’ (the 
readers of a newspaper), to offer their main service: the provision of news. 
Since the ‘communication chain’ in the securities trade is thus more 
elaborate, we expect to see earlier and more extensive results due to the 
use of ICT in this branch of business than with the press. Therefore, the 
securities trade is singled out to study effects of ICT on business 
relationships.   
 
1.3 Literature survey 
Between the telegraph and internet several modes of ICT have been 
developed, improved and implemented, such as for example the telephone 
and the telex. Several historical studies concerning the effects of these 
telecommunication technologies have been published that can be broadly 
divided into socio-cultural and economic studies. In the following two 
subsections these studies will be discussed in order to observe what work 
already has been done in this field. The third subsection deals with 
existing literature on the Dutch financial sector, with a focus on the Dutch 
securities trade. The results of the discussed studies help position this 
thesis in literature.  
 
1.3.1 Literature on consequences of ICT in general 
Representatives of the socio-cultural studies are Kern (1983), Flichy (1991), 
De Sola Pool (1977, 1983) and Fischer (1992). Kern (1983) studied new 
technologies in the period 1880-1918, among which are telecommunication 
technologies such as the telegraph and telephone, with the help of 
philosophical concepts on time and space.8 For instance, Kern cites a 
Canadian engineer, Sanford Fleming, who tried to explain why the 
telegraph was adopted in 1886: 
 
‘[the telegraph] subjects the whole surface 
of the globe to the observation of civilized 
communities and leaves no interval of 
                                                 
8 Stephen Kern (1983) The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918 (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 
Mass.). 
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time between widely separated places 
proportionate to their distances apart.’9  
 
In other words, a technology such as the telegraph, changed the existing 
notions on time and distance. Concerning distance, new 
telecommunication technologies bring closer other areas, which can be 
reached instantly. Concerning time, Kern has distinguished the concept of 
‘time’ into ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’. New telecommunication 
technologies, especially the telephone, altered the way ‘present time’ was 
experienced. The telephone makes direct communication between people 
at different locations possible who could respond to each other 
instantaneously. Kern even states that a telephone offered the possibility 
‘to be in two places at the same time’.10 The present no longer included the 
direct environment a person lived in, but also consisted of events around 
the globe. Telecommunication technologies not only accelerated business 
transactions but also affected social relationships between people. Since it 
could penetrate all places, thus also houses of people having a different 
social status, the telephone had the ability to level traditional hierarchies 
and bring to life new social distances.11 Hence, as Kern concludes, the 
telephone ‘worked to create the vast extended present of simultaneity.’12 
The conclusion appears somewhat bombastic, and the rather ‘down-to-
earth’ question arises whether telecommunication technologies were as 
widely used and adopted as Kern wants to make us believe during the 
period he covers in his book. Still, the general thought of his book holds 
well, which is that due to, amongst others, telecommunication 
technologies, the rest of the world becomes far less away and can be 
reached within a few minutes instead of within days, or even months.   
Flichy (1991) also studied the adoption and use of information and 
communication technologies, varying from optical telegraphy to radios 
and computers.13 The way Flichy built up his book already shows the 
developments these technologies underwent and what Flichy wants to 
point out. In different time periods, telecommunication technologies had 
more influence on particular spheres than in other time periods: from a 
communication means for governments to an important communication 
                                                 
9 Kern, The Culture, p. 11. 
10 Kern, The Culture, p. 69. 
11 Kern, The Culture, p. 316. 
12 Kern, The Culture, p. 318. 
13 Patrice Flichy (1991) Une histoire de  la communication moderne. Espace public et vie privée. (Éditions la 
Découverte; Paris). 
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device for trade in the period 1790 – 1870; in the period 1870 – 1930 
telecommunication technologies started to enter private spaces; in the 
period 1930 - 1990 communication technologies connected the whole 
world and were massively used on a very individual level. Radio and 
television were ‘family’ technologies: listening or watching a programme 
that provided news from the other side of the world, together with the 
whole family. During the 1980s, families possessed more than one TV set 
so that within one family different programmes could be watched. Private 
telephone conversations were done at home, in private spaces. With the 
coming of mobile communication (‘la communication nomade’) one carries 
‘the private’ into public space. Mobile communication makes the telephone 
more suited for individual use but at the same time phoning becomes 
increasingly more a public activity.14 Flichy concludes that all these 
communication technologies were not developed separately. Some of these 
technologies emanate from others. For instance, research to amplify 
telegraph and telephone signals triggered the invention of the 
gramophone. Not only their ‘hard’ technology, also the uses of the 
different communication technologies sometimes resembled each other. In 
the early phase of the telephone, it was not only seen as a device through 
which conversations took place but also as a means to listen to opera. 
Years later, the radio became the technology through which live music 
could be heard. This amalgamation of technology and use Flichy calls a 
convergence of media’s. 15 
De Sola Pool was involved in the completion of two books on the 
telephone. The first book (1977) concerns a collection of a wide variety of 
essays on the social use of the telephone.16 None of these essays deal with 
the relationship between the telephone and business activities. De Sola 
Pool (1983) also made an evaluation of the expectations of the coming of 
the telephone.17 The expectations stem from forecasts that were made in 
the period between 1876 (the year Bell patented the telephone) and 1940. 
De Sola Pool reviewed 186 forecasts on the social impact of the telephone 
system. He concluded that the majority of the forecasts were based on a set 
of economic-technical parameters. The technical parameters refer to what 
was technologically possible, the economic parameters refer to 
considerations on how a technology could effectively be marketed, if 
                                                 
14 Flichy, Une histoire, pp. 232-236. 
15 Flichy, Une histoire, p. 237.  
16 Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.) (1977) The social impact of the telephone (MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass.).  
17 De Sola Pool,  Forecasting the Telephone. 
Introduction 
 7
capital could be raised and so on. According to De Sola Pool, people who 
understood the technology best made the best forecasts.18   
Fischer (1992) investigated explicitly the social, thus ‘private’, use of 
the telephone in the United States of America.19 Although the telephone 
may have altered economic life, Fischer concludes that this was not the 
case for social life. ‘Americans apparently used home telephones to widen 
and deepen existing social patterns rather than to alter them’, as Fischer 
stated. 20 Basic social patterns are not simply changed by the use and 
deployment of new technologies. This more modest conclusion contrasts 
with the vast significance Kern subscribes to new technologies. Yet, this 
contrast may arise from the different ways Kern and Fischer have set up 
their studies. As Fischer puts it, Kern has reasoned from the properties of a 
technology that become characteristics of its users. For instance, because a 
telephone speeds up contact, it makes life ‘more tense, alert, vivid.’21 This 
way of thinking can be regarded as a sort of ‘technological determinism’; a 
way of thinking that explicitly focuses on a technology and its abilities 
without taking into account what influence it has on actual users. Fischer 
explicitly centres on the users of telephones, and not so much on the 
technology itself, to make clear what a technology really meant, in this 
case, to social society. 
Although these discussed studies recognise the importance of 
telecommunication technologies such as the telegraph and the telephone 
for business activities, the authors do not touch upon the issue in detail. 
They studied much more the use and impact of telecommunication 
technology on social life. Literature on ICT and its consequences for 
business activities are dealt with in the next section (the ‘economic 
studies’).  
 
1.3.2 Literature on ICT and its ‘economic’ consequences 
The telegraph is held responsible for changes in the opening up of 
markets, service to clients, modifications in logistical processes, vertical 
and horizontal integration and in general, for the increase in productivity, 
efficiency and effectiveness in nineteenth century America.22 DuBoff (1980, 
                                                 
18 De Sola Pool, Forecasting the Telephone, p. 155. 
19 C.S. Fischer (1992) America calling. A social history of the telephone to 1940 (University of California 
Press; Berkeley [etc.]).  
20 Fischer, America calling, p. 260 and p. 262. 
21 Fischer, America calling, p. 10. 
22 For the impact of the telegraph on business see the next reference: J. Yates (1986) ‘The telegraph’s 
effects on nineteenth century markets and firms’ in: Business and Economic History, vol. 15, pp. 149-193. 
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1983) argued that the telegraph lowered information and transaction costs 
and therefore transformed business operations. The immediate and 
accurate availability of information on prices allowed businessmen to look 
for the ‘best bargain’ and it decreased intermarket uncertainties.23 The 
telegraph also improved the functioning of markets because it removed 
obstacles such as deficient information networks that contributed to 
regional price disparities, high handling and storage costs for goods, and 
uneven dissemination of technical knowledge.24 Field stated that the 
telegraphic services in combination with the railroad formed a necessity 
for extending outlets of industries that processed perishable goods such as 
meat and fruit. Because of real-time information on demand and supply 
circumstances of local, far away, markets, the number of goods could be 
geared to the local situation or the destination of these perishable goods 
could be changed along the way.25 Jones (1996) observed another effect of 
telecommunications. In a study concerning the rise of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he 
concluded that the geographical scope of markets widened as a result of 
improvements in transport and communication, which increased the 
frequency of transactions between firms.26 
Chandler (1977) claimed that ‘modern mass production and mass 
distribution depend on the speed, volume and regularity in the movement 
of goods and messages made possible by the coming of the railroad and 
the telegraph in the nineteenth century in the United States’.27 According 
to Chandler, this caused an overall increase in the volume of output which 
in turn increased the number of transactions. Managers of integrated firms 
were able to monitor the processes of distribution and manufacturing and 
to co-ordinate the high speed and high volume flows more efficiently than 
if the monitoring and co-ordination had been left to market mechanisms. 
ICT was thus especially used to enhance communication within the 
boundaries of a firm.28 Jonker and Sluyterman (2000) came to a similar 
conclusion in their extensive study concerning the functioning of Dutch 
merchant houses during the period 1550-2000. Yet, they made a distinction 
                                                 
23 Du Boff, ‘Business Demand’, p. 477.  
24 Richard B. du Boff (1983) ‘The Telegraph and the Structure of Markets in the United States, 1845-
1890’, Research in Economic History, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 253-277, p. 254. 
25 Field, ‘The Magnetic Telegraph’, pp. 410-411. 
26 Geoffrey Jones (1996) The  Evolution of International Business. An Introduction (Routledge; London) p. 
312.  
27 Alfred D. Chandler (1977) The visible hand: the managerial revolution in American business (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass) p. 207.  
28 Chandler, The visible hand, pp. 207-208. 
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between effects of the telegraph on the one hand and the telephone and the 
telex on the other hand. Dutch merchant houses deployed the telegraph to 
improve communication within the firm.29 When it comes to the telephone 
and the telex, Jonker and Sluyterman distinguished two gradual 
developments. First, several producers started to bypass merchant houses 
as intermediaries in the trade chain and addressed the retailers of their 
products directly. The number of participants in this specific chain thus 
decreased. Second, it resulted in an emancipation of the branch offices of 
Dutch merchant houses, especially of the overseas branch offices. Until the 
1930s, these offices organised the purchase of European goods via the 
Dutch head offices because communication within Europe was cheaper 
and faster than communication between, for instance, Asia and Europe. 
However, after World War II this advantage decreased as a result of 
diminishing communication costs. It appeared to be more efficient for 
overseas branch offices to arrange the purchase themselves.30 This second 
conclusion is in contrast with Chandler who stated that managers could 
assert more control from a faraway distance by means of communication 
technologies. Hence, they actually audited all stages of the production line 
of a product or service, even though they were not present at all locations 
of the same production line. It also contrasts with their conclusion on 
effects of the telegraph. We thus see that the different telecommunication 
technologies can have different effects.  
The question arises whether the same developments appeared in the 
securities trade sector. Literature concerning the Dutch financial sector has 
paid little attention to the consequences of the use and deployment of 
information and communication technologies. Since it is clear that the 
element of timely delivery is central in the securities trade, and the 
advantage of telecom technologies compared to earlier means of 
communication is primarily related to the speed of communication, one 
would expect that this should have been an important object of study.  
Michie (1999) has discussed the role of ICT in relation to the trade in 
stocks and shares concerning the London Stock Exchange (LSE).31 He 
describes several developments that occurred due to the use of telecom 
technologies. The developments vary from an overall acceleration of the 
availability of information to the upcoming of new specialised information 
intermediaries and to the different parties who tried to bypass each other 
                                                 
29 Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, p. 382. 
30 Jonker and Sluyterman, Thuis op de wereldmarkt, p. 383. 
31 Ranald Michie (1999) The London Stock Exchange. A History (Oxford University Press; New York).  
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in selling and buying securities. 32 Although Michie’s main concern is 
describing a history of the LSE, such a study that discusses the 
communication facilities and its consequences to the organisation of the 
securities trade, does not exist for the Dutch situation. What can be 
concluded from the cultural and economic studies on effects of ICT is that 
ICT has different effects on different business sectors and that different 
means of ICT can have different effects. 
 
1.3.3 Literature on the Dutch financial sector 
Several authors have paid attention to the Dutch financial sector.33 The 
published books and articles can be broadly divided into studies that give 
a macro economic overview of Dutch financial history (‘t Hart et al., 1997), 
studies that deal with Dutch banking (Eisfeld, 1916; De Jong, 1930-; 
Brugmans, 1963; Kymmell, 1992 and 1996; Wijtvliet, 1993; Sluyterman et al., 
1998; Van der Werf, 1999; De Vries et al., 1999; Dankers et al., 2001), and 
studies that discuss the Dutch securities trade (De la Vega, 1688; Mendes 
da Costa, 1913; Brouwer 1966; De Vries, 1976; Van der Werf, 1988; Jonker; 
1996). These studies are valuable since they offer background information 
concerning the Dutch financial sector. ‘T Hart et al. (1997) provided a 
financial history from the Netherlands in the period 1550-1990 with much 
                                                 
32 Michie, The London Stock Exchange, pp. 81,116, 120-121, 180, 347, 393, 457. 
33 Literature concerning the Dutch financial sector: Josseph de la Vega (1688) Verwarring der 
Verwarringen (translated from Spanish ‘Confusion de Confusiones’, reprinted in 1996 by Gestion N.V., 
Amsterdam), J. Mendes da Costa (1913) Het A.B.C. van den Amsterdamschen Effectenhandel met 
bijzonderheden omtrent de voornaamste buitenlandsche effectenbeurzen (J.H. de Bussy; Amsterdam), C. 
Eisfeld (1916) Das Niederländische Bankwesen teil I-II (Martinus Nijhoff; Den Haag), A.M. de Jong (1930-, 
2nd edition) Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Bank dl. I–IV (De Nederlandsche Bank; Amsterdam), I.J. 
Brugmans (1963) Begin van twee banken (Rotterdamsche Bank; Rotterdam), S. Brouwer (1966, 5th 
edition) Beurs en effectenhandel (J.H. de Bussy; Amsterdam), Joh. de Vries (1976) Een eeuw vol effecten. 
Historische schets van de Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel en de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs 1876-1976  
(Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel; Amsterdam), D.C.J. van der Werf (1988) De Bond, de Banken en de 
Beurzen (NIBE; Amsterdam), J. Kymmell (1992 and 1996) Geschiedenis van de algemene banken in 
Nederland 1860-1914 dl. I-III (NIBE; Amsterdam), C.A.M. Wijtvliet (1993) Expansie en dynamiek. De 
ontwikkeling van het Nederlandse handelsbankwezen 1860-1914 (NIBE; Amsterdam), Joost Jonker (1995) 
‘Spoilt for Choice? Banking Concentration and the Structure of the Dutch Capital Market, 1900-1940’ in: 
Youssef Cassis, Gerald D. Feldman and Ulf Olsson (ed.), The Evolution of Financial Institutions and 
Markets in Twentieth-Century Europe (Scolar Press; Aldershot) pp. 187-208, Joost Jonker (1996) Merchants, 
Bankers and Middlemen. The Amsterdam Money Market during the first half of the 19th Century (NEHA: 
Amsterdam), Keetie Sluyterman et al. (1998) Het coöperatieve alternatief. Honderd jaar Rabobank 1898-1998 
(SDU Uitgevers; Den Haag); Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden (ed.) (1997) A 
financial history of the Netherlands (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge), D.C.J. van der Werf (1999) 
Banken, bankiers en hun fusies (NIBE; Amsterdam), Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom and Ton de Graaf (ed.) 
(1999) Wereldwijd bankieren. ABN AMRO 1824-1999 (ABN AMRO Bank; Amsterdam), Joost Dankers, Jos 
van der Linden, Jozef Vos (2001) Spaarbanken in Nederland. Ideeën en organisatie, 1817-1990 (Boom; 
Amsterdam). 
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attention for monetary data, such as interest rates of loans, amount of 
debts, revenues of central governments and tax burdens. The studies on 
Dutch banking can be subdivided into banking in general (Eisfeld, 1916), 
studies on specific banks which are embedded in the current 
developments in the Dutch financial sector with attention to general 
banking developments (De Jong, 1930-; Brugmans, 1963; Sluyterman et al., 
1998; Van der Werf, 1999; De Vries et al., 1999; Dankers et al., 2001), and 
studies on joint stock commercial banking (Kymmell, 1992 and 1996; 
Wijtvliet, 1993). Eisfeld described Dutch banking in general, starting with 
its underpinnings to the latest development at that time, being the 
concentration of Dutch banks. This development is one of the central 
issues in this thesis. De Jong has written an extensive history consisting of 
five parts of the Dutch Central Bank. The volumes are not so much an 
institutional history of the Dutch Central Bank but De Jong paid much 
attention to developments such as the extent of provision of credits, 
circulation of money, interest rates of loans and so on.  Brugmans studied 
two banks (Rotterdamsche Bank and the Nationale Handelsbank) who 
started to co-operate in 1961 and which were both founded in 1863. 
Sluyterman et al. studied the origination and development of the 
Rabobank, De Vries et al. have done the same for the ABN AMRO bank 
and Dankers et al. researched the rise and stabilisation of Dutch savings 
banks. Van der Werf discussed the mergers of four large banks into two 
banks in 1964. Since banks are also participants in the securities trade, 
these studies are useful to provide background information on Dutch 
banking and on some banks in particular. These studies however lack 
attention for ICT or the daily practice of the services provided.  
The first study that gave insights into the Dutch securities trade was 
written by a Spaniard, Josseph de la Vega, in 1688. He wrote Confusion de 
Confusiones in which several dialogues between a merchant, a trader, and a 
philosopher are displayed. The dialogues provide us with an idea how 
trade in securities was executed at that time. Mendes da Costa (1913) and 
Brouwer (1966) provided information on the Dutch securities trade on a 
very practical level. They make clear how trade works, what the official 
trade time was, what the involved parties do, when and who has to deliver 
securities to who, and so on. Jonker (1996) described which type of traders 
and institutions were active at the Amsterdam money market of the first 
half of the nineteenth century. The study is valuable since it offers an 
overview of the involved parties in the Amsterdam financial sector, and 
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their activities.34 De Vries (1976) and Van der Werf (1988) focused more 
specifically on the securities trade. They paid attention to two important 
stockbroker organisations that were for a large part responsible to the 
organisation of the Dutch securities trade.  De Vries studied the securities 
trade from the perspective of the Amsterdam association for securities 
trade (Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel), established in 1876.35 Van 
der Werf wrote a study from a ‘provincial’36 point of view since it centred 
around the association which represented the stockbrokers from outside 
Amsterdam.37  
Except for De la Vega, these studies aimed at informing (Mendes da 
Costa, Brouwer) and describing the Dutch securities trade from an 
institutional point of view (De Vries, Van der Werf, Jonker).  Just as with 
the banking studies, the authors did not focus on the daily activities. 
Brouwer, De Vries, Van der Werf, and Jonker gave some attention to the 
deployment of information and communication technologies but they did 
not specifically concentrate on how ICT affected this trade. This thesis aims 
to fill that gap in literature. 
 
1.4 Research questions  
From existing literature, we learn that ICT can have different effects on 
business. Information and communication technologies bring the outside 
world closer, through which information, whether it concerns social, 
political or economic information, from distant regions is quicker 
available. This results in, on the one hand, the possibility to assert more 
control on a firm’s internal activities (Chandler) while on the other hand, 
ICT enables the bypassing of parties that were formerly necessary to 
produce commodities and services resulting in a shortened trade chain 
(Jonker and Sluyterman, Michie). Literature also observes that use and 
deployment of the different means for telecommunication does not always 
result in the same effects. A conclusion from the literature survey of, 
especially historical literature is that several aspects are left for research. 
The ‘aspects’ refer to questions such as how the daily practice of the 
services in the Dutch securities trade were processed, and to what extent 
ICT played a role in providing these services. If these questions are 
answered, we will be able to pinpoint whether any changes in organisation 
                                                 
34 Jonker, Merchants. 
35 De Vries, Een eeuw. 
36 ‘provincial’= outside Amsterdam 
37 Van der Werf, De Bond. 
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and services in the Dutch securities trade, can possibly be attributed to 
ICT. These aspects are the centre of this thesis. 
 In the introduction of this chapter, relationships between firms and 
between firms and their clients were mentioned which may be affected by 
the use and deployment of ICT, and eventually affect the industrial 
organisation of a sector. By industrial organisation of a sector we refer to 
the involved parties and how they interrelate. The questions arise what 
changes in the organisation or structure of a sector, and how these changes 
are set in motion. We could think of cooperation between firms in a sector, 
which becomes so tight due to the use of ICT (how) that a merger (what) is a 
logic result. The change is that one of the involved parties disappears and 
another becomes bigger. Yet, the reversed situation could also occur. ICT 
offers the possibility to co-operate perfectly well and efficiently over 
distance (how) so why not divestiture (what) a department of a firm to a 
location where costs for transportation or salaries can be kept low. The 
change in this situation is that new parties arise in a sector. In both cases, 
ICT affects business relations on a firm level, and consequently, the 
organisation of a sector changes.  
The key question of this thesis thus will be: how did the use and 
deployment of telecom technologies affect the daily practice of firms in relation to 
the goods and services these firms produce, and consequently how did that affect 
the industrial organisation of a sector? More specifically, how did the use and 
deployment of telecom technologies affect the daily practice of firms, which offer 
services in relation to the trade in securities, and consequently how did that affect 
the industrial organisation of the Dutch trade in stocks and shares during the 
period 1860-1970. In order to find an answer to the key question, the 
following research questions are formulated: 
• In what way did new telecom technologies facilitate changes in the 
organisation of the Dutch securities trade? 
• In what way did changes in the organisation of the Dutch securities 
trade facilitate the adoption of telecom technologies? 
• What kind of new services originated from the adoption of telecom 
technologies in the trade of stocks and shares? 
The result of this study is a longitudinal analysis, which contributes to 
theory on effects of ICT and to the understanding of what the use of ICT 
means to relationships between parties involved in securities trade.  
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1.5 Methodology 
The main question of this study is a ‘how’ question. According to Yin 
(1994), ‘how’ questions can be researched by means of experiments, 
histories and case studies. An experiment requires control over 
behavioural events and focuses on contemporary events. Experiments thus 
imply settings in which the researcher has control over behaviour of the 
studied subjects. This is clearly not the case in this thesis. A choice between 
histories and case studies thus has to be made. With histories and case 
studies control over behavioural events is not necessary. The difference 
between the two research strategies is the focus on contemporary events. A 
case study focuses on contemporary events, a history does not. If we 
strictly look at the research question of this thesis, the choice for history as 
a research strategy is evident. The choice for a history is even more evident 
if we consider that case studies have two additional research instruments: 
direct observation and systematic interviewing.38 Indeed, the main 
research question of this thesis focuses on developments in history, thus 
direct observation and systematic interviewing are not possible. Still, the 
research questions are inspired from present-day developments on the use 
and deployment of ICT. Thus we have a mix of contemporaneous and 
historical aspects to our central research issue. Therefore and because 
histories and case studies largely overlap, we will conduct historical case 
studies in order to obtain an answer to the research questions. Because the 
changing organisational structure of the Dutch securities trade is the centre 
of attention, it is necessary to study the actors and institutions involved. A 
number of historical case studies will be performed to investigate their role 
in the Dutch financial markets and the Dutch telecom services during the 
period 1850-1970. The selection of cases is discussed in section 1.6. 
Yin states that case study research does not lead to generalisations 
on the level of large populations, or in case of management research, to 
applied management tools for several business sectors at the same time 
(‘statistical generalisations’). Yet, case study research does lead to ‘analytic 
generalisations’ which implies that one or several theories are used as a 
‘template’ which will be compared with the outcomes of case study 
research.39 If two or more cases (multiple-case studies) show the same 
results as theory, one may claim ‘replication’. In other words, the 
                                                 
38 Robert K. Yin (1994) Case Study Research. Design and Methods (Sage Publications; Thousand oaks etc.)  
pp. 6-8.  
39 Yin, Case Study Research, p. 31 and pp. 45-46. See also J.M. Hutjes and J.A. van Buuren (1992) De 
gevalsstudie. Strategie van kwalitatief onderzoek (Boom; Meppel) pp. 63-65. 
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discussed theory(ies) are valid. If two or more cases do not correspond 
with theory, this theory needs to be adjusted.40 Since theories usually claim 
to be generally applicable, case study research is thus indirectly valid for 
larger populations.  
In this study, we use theories as a tool to help us understand and 
explain the consequences as a result of use and deployment of ICT. The 
choice for these theories is based on considerations that are a result of the 
research question. The research question aims at studying the 
consequences of ICT on services (the firm level) and on the organisation of 
the securities trade (the industry level). As concerns ICT and services, the 
value of the provided services is for a large part based on information. 
Therefore, the first theory relates to the importance of the early possession 
of relevant information and how ICT can contribute to that. The part of 
ICT in relation to the organisation of securities trade relates to integration 
and/or disintegration processes. Transaction costs economics (TCE) puts 
central the issue of why firms would want to integrate or disintegrate. 
Malone, Benjamin and Yates (1987) have related ICT to transaction costs 
economics. Therefore, TCE is primarily used to find an explanation 
concerning changes on the industry level.  
The empirical material is derived from historical archives. These 
primary sources consist of minutes of a board, annual reports, brochures, 
leaflets, circulars and staff magazines. Using historical archives as primary 
sources to attain the empirical research material, always involves a ‘risk’ 
because one can never be sure what to expect. Certainly, it is possible to 
diminish this risk by consulting the inventories of these archives before 
going over to the ‘research action’, but this still does not completely rule 
out the danger of not finding anything useful. It can also turn out to be the 
other way around, that one finds much more than expected, or that useful 
information is found in documents in which one did not expect to find 
anything.  
A consequence of this ‘risk’ is that the found information is not 
sufficient to fully apply or test a theory. This will especially be the case 
with general theories that aim at providing law-like explanations (when A 
then B). It often occurs, that A or B cannot be exactly established. More 
likely, it will come close (say Aa or Ab) but not precisely A. Maybe, this is 
inherent to historical research or even to social sciences in general. The 
question arises whether it makes sense to try and apply such ‘law-like 
                                                 
40 Yin, Case Study Research, p. 46.  
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theories’ in historical or social sciences research. This issue will be looked 
at further in chapter two. 
Almost none of the archives of the studied cases contained 
documents about the exact use of telecommunication technologies in the 
day-to-day practice of supplied services. Also, it appeared to be hard to 
detect what the studied organisations exactly had in-house when it comes 
to the number of telephones or telexes, appeared to be hard. Still, 
consulting different archives has led to a ‘triangulation of sources’, and 
thus to a fairly representative overall picture. Literature has functioned as 
a secondary source. Literature has been consulted concerning the securities 
trade in general, actors and institutions involved in the trade in stocks and 
shares and formed a basis for a general description of the financial sector. 
With the results of these case studies, structures of the organisation of the 
Dutch financial markets can be detected and how they have changed over 
time, how the cases organised their services in the securities trade and how 
they made use of information and communication technologies to execute 
these services.  
Consequently, the conducted research will not lead to a study in 
which the relation between quantitative aspects of securities trade (profits 
ASE, number of traded shares and bonds, rates, etcetera) and ICT is 
explained. The volume of trade in securities indeed increased in the 
twentieth century.  The widespread use of ICT has most certainly played a 
role in this development. Yet, ICT is only one of the factors. For instance, 
we could have made a graph in which the profits of the ASE and number 
of traded securities at the ASE over time are plotted. In this graph, we can 
also indicate at which point in time important information and 
communication technologies were introduced in the Dutch securities 
trade. The question arises of which year should be taken. For instance, 
should it be the year that the telephone was introduced in the 
Netherlands? In 1881, the first public telephone network opened in 
Amsterdam with 48 subscribers. 1884 is a second year that could be put 
into the graph because in that year a telephone bureau was opened at the 
Amsterdam Exchange building. The year 1888 can also be considered. In 
that specific year, the first trunk line between Amsterdam and Haarlem 
was put into use.  Another point of time that can be taken into account 
relates to the diffusion of the telephone.  For example, the year that the 
majority of the Dutch possesses a telephone connection can be put in the 
graph. However, only in 1985, did 40 to 100 inhabitants of the Netherlands 
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have a telephone connection.41 Suppose profits and number of traded 
securities decrease or increase in these years,  it could be a result of the 
telephone but many other circumstances also influence these numbers 
such as the in- or decrease of listed firms, of stockbrokers, periods of 
booms or recessions and so on. In other words, to pinpoint the influence of 
ICT on quantitative data of the ASE requires a different type of study. A 
second, very practical, restraining factor to draw up such a graph is that 
the profits of the ASE are only known as from 1940.42  
 
1.6 Selection of cases and sources 
Because our intention is to research the networks and relationships 
financial intermediaries set up to facilitate securities trade, it is necessary 
that the selected cases had built up such relationships or were at least part 
of such a network. Another, rather down to earth, consideration plays a 
part in the decision for the selection of cases: did the actors and institutions 
leave an accessible archive and is the time period of the archive long 
enough to cover all generations of communication technologies that are of 
importance to the trade in stocks and bonds?  
Before we go on discussing the actual selection of cases, it is useful 
to provide some information on the Dutch securities trade. The details will 
be described in chapters three and four. Trade in securities mainly 
consisted of the execution of orders which was done by financial 
intermediaries, and everything that goes with it, such as the provision of 
information and administrative activities. These financial intermediaries 
were commission traders, sworn brokers, merchant houses, bankers, joint 
stock commercial banks and specialists, or in general, stockbrokers. The 
commission traders have long functioned as the most important 
intermediaries who were divided into Amsterdam and provincial 
commission traders. A case study of both an Amsterdam and a provincial 
commission trader can of course not be missed in a thesis whose goal is to 
describe and to explain the structure of the Dutch securities trade. An 
example of an important Amsterdam financial intermediary is Hope & Co 
(1762-1966). However, the public archives of Hope & Co did not provide 
the information needed. The same problem occurred with other 
Amsterdam commission traders that left accessible archives, such as 
Ketwich & Voombergh (1790-1881), Labouchère, Oyens & Co (1881-1913), 
                                                 
41 G. Hogesteeger (1989) Van lopende bode tot telematica. Geschiedenis van de PTT in Nederland (PTT 
Nederland; Groningen) p. 230.  
42 see www.cbs.nl 
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Van Loon & Co (1885-1938) and Wed.43 W. Borski (1816-1966). This also 
applies to an active provincial intermediary, F. van Lanschot (1850 until 
now) from ‘s Hertogenbosch. An archive of another provincial commission 
trader from Utrecht, Vlaer & Kol (1691-1975), did give more insights into 
their daily practices. Information concerning provincial and Amsterdam 
commission traders is also gathered with the help of other primary 
sources. The archives of the Amsterdam association for securities and the 
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce appeared to be useful information 
sources. The parts in this thesis on commission traders are completed by 
making use of secondary sources.  
More adequate information could be derived from archives of large 
joint stock commercial banks. Concerning the joint-stock commercial 
banks, there is consensus in literature about the five largest banks: 
Rotterdamsche Bank, Twentsche Bank, Amsterdamsche Bank, the 
Nederlandsch-Handelsmaatschappij and the Incasso-Bank.44 Except for the 
Rotterdamsche Bank, they all started their activities in Amsterdam because 
its founders were already embedded in the Amsterdam financial sector or, 
in case of the Twentsche Bank, its founders found it necessary to establish 
an office in the financial centre of the Netherlands. For a long time the 
Rotterdamsche Bank was only located in Rotterdam. This bank had to 
contact an Amsterdam commission trader to execute its securities orders. 
Therefore, the Rotterdamsche Bank is one of the selected cases. The other 
joint stock commercial bank that is taken, is the Twentsche Bank, 
established by the family Blijdenstein. This family had its origins in the 
eastern part of the Netherlands. The Blijdensteins already had several 
offices that provided financial services. One of these offices was located in 
London. However, the first office that bore the name ‘Twentsche Bank’, 
was stationed in Amsterdam. Because it is to be expected that the 
Twentsche Bank often contacted their offices in the eastern part of the 
Netherlands, the Twentsche Bank is selected as a second case.  
Stockbrokers were organised in associations that defended their 
interests. From 1876, the Amsterdam commission traders were organised 
in the ‘Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel’ (Association for the Securities 
Trade; further abbreviated as VvdE). From 1903, the provincial 
commission traders were organised in the ‘Bond voor den Geld- en 
                                                 
43 the abbreviation ‘wed.’ stands for ‘weduwe’ which means widow. A firm that carries this 
abbreviation in its name is run by the widow of the deceased owner of that company.  
44 J.L. de Jager (1999) ‘De harde leerschool, 1914-1950’, in: Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom, and Ton de Graaf 
(red.), Wereldwijd bankieren. ABN AMRO 1824-1999 (ABN AMRO; Amsterdam) pp. 241-298, pp. 254-257. 
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Effectenhandel in de Provincie’ (Union for trade in money and securities in 
the Province). The archives of both organisations were studied. The 
archive on the VvdE especially provided much relevant information. An 
organisation to which the VvdE could appeal to, was the Amsterdam 
Chamber of Commerce. Hence, the archive of this organisation was also 
taken into account. Finally, the provider of telecommunication material, 
infrastructure and services is studied which is the national post, telegraph 
and telephone service, the PTT.   
 
1.7 Structure and period thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, the theoretical basis 
for this study is laid down. As was mentioned earlier, two theoretical 
approaches are discussed. The first relates ICT to the concept of 
information and the second contains transaction costs economics which 
links ICT to the organisation of an industry. These theories function as 
tools to help explain any changes in securities traffic services and changes 
on the level of the industry level. The chapter closes with a discourse on 
the use of general theories in historical research. The third chapter 
provides an historical overview of the Dutch securities trade. The chapter 
supplies of the necessary background information on an industry level. It 
pays attention to the upturn, organisation, institutions and several central 
issues to the Dutch securities trade over time. Chapter four gives an 
analysis of the main participants of the Dutch securities trade on a firm 
level. By participants we aim at actors who perform the actual trade such 
as commission traders, bankers, joint stock commercial banks and so on. 
The aim of the chapter is to come to an overview of relationships between 
the involved actors over time. Chapter four ends with several schemas that 
picture the different structures of the Dutch securities trade. These 
schemas thus help to point out what changes have taken place on the 
industry level. Chapter five centralises the available means of 
telecommunication in the Netherlands in general, and especially in the 
Dutch securities trade. The chapter ranges from the electro-magnetic 
telegraph to the telex. This chapter thus makes clear which 
telecommunication technologies were available at what point in time.  
Chapter six links chapters three, four and five together. It discusses how 
the involved actors organised their services related to securities traffic and 
how they made use of telecommunication technologies to facilitate or even 
set up these services. The aim is to establish whether any changes in these 
services can be linked to the use and deployment of ICT. In chapter seven, 
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theory and empirical material is combined, and therefore, functions as the 
conclusion of this thesis. 
 The core of this thesis will focus roughly on the period between 
1860 and 1970. The choice for this period stems from the following reasons. 
First, from the year 1860, we see a boom of establishments of joint stock 
commercial banks (Twentsche Bank 1861; Rotterdamsche Bank 1863; 
Amsterdamsche Bank 1871). Joint stock commercial banks play a large role 
in this study since these were for a large part responsible for the 
integration movement that changed the structure and organisation of the 
Dutch financial sector. They mainly integrated with provincial financial 
intermediaries that almost disappeared in 1970. In 1947, the union that 
represented the interests of provincial stockbrokers, counted 239 
independent financial intermediaries. In 1973, their number had decreased 
to 34.45 Not surprisingly, this union ceased to exist in the same year. 
Furthermore, as from the 1970s (and even before) digital communication 
services become more and more visible in securities trade. These 
developments will not be studied in this thesis. Several chapters cover a 
longer period than 1860-1970. This is necessary to be able to include 
relevant developments that occurred before 1860 or after 1970, or to 
include developments that start before 1860/1970 and continue after 
1860/1970.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 262. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to embed the research questions 
theoretically. With the use of theories, we aim at understanding and 
structuring what we see happening in the organisation of the Dutch 
securities trade. We are specifically interested in explaining any changes in 
this trade. The changes can manifest themselves in an altered provision of 
services or in the rise or disappearance of actors involved in the securities 
trade.  
By introducing telecommunication technologies in securities trade 
services, firms innovate; they use a new technology to enhance their 
services. When firms innovate, they aim at reaching two goals: (1) creating 
extra value for their customers, and (2) decreasing costs of producing a 
good or service.1 These two goals can be separate goals, or the first could 
result in the second. Participants in the securities trade can profit from 
prior knowledge of important information. Firms that provide services in 
the securities industry, create value for their clients by acquiring this 
information in an early stage. ICT can speed up this process, that could 
result in a changed range of services. This also affects the costs a firm 
needs to make to provide these changed services. A changed outline of 
costs might influence the organisational mode of firms, and thus the 
structure of a complete sector.  
In order to structure the organisation of the securities trade, the 
notion on value systems of Porter (1990) will be used.  Next to that, it is a 
                                                 
1 Michael E. Porter and Victor E. Millar (1985) ‘How information gives you competitive advantage’, 
Harvard Business Review, vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 149-160; Michael E. Porter (1990) The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations (MacMillan Press; London) pp. 40 –47;.David J. Teece, Gary Pisano and Amy Shuen (1997) 
‘Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management’, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 18, no. 7, pp. 509-
533. 
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useful concept to divide activities of both a firm and an industry. By 
making a value system of the Dutch securities trade on different moments 
in time, it is possible to detect any changes in the structure of this trade. 
The notion on value systems obviously provides no explanation for these 
changes. Two main directions for explaining are explored that clarify why 
changes in a value system may occur. To the first, we will refer as the 
‘information view’ and the second is transaction costs economics (TCE). 
The information view draws from information economics which, amongst 
others, pays attention to information asymmetry and imperfect 
information. ICT has the ability to decrease or increase information 
asymmetry, and thus to affect the value creating ability of a firm which has 
consequences for the services and organisation of a firm. In TCE, the 
general line of reasoning is, simply said, that high transaction costs lead to 
hierarchy and low transaction costs to market. Several variables, which 
will be discussed in detail in the sixth section of this chapter, influence the 
height of transaction costs. In this field a discussion has evolved regarding 
the question whether ICT reduces or increases transaction costs, thereby 
influencing the choice of firms for market or hierarchy. The choice for 
market or hierarchy influences the organisational structure of a firm. This 
could lead to a change in the pattern of trade since the choice for hierarchy 
means that integration of services or of a firm takes place. The choice for 
market implies that a firm has decided to purchase a product or service on 
the market instead of producing it in-house.  
The information view uses the aspect of creating extra value as a 
starting point (referring to the first reason to innovate) with decreased 
costs as a desired consequence. TCE starts from the aspect of decreasing 
costs (referring to the second reason to innovate). The question to be 
answered in the assessments on both the information view and TCE is 
what variables are distinguished, how they can be applied to the subject of 
this thesis and to what extent the two reasons for a firm to innovate are a 
consequence of each other. 
These theories are general economic theories. This characteristic 
seems to conflict with historical research since the latter usually studies 
changes and processes of specific events. The question arises to what 
extent general theories are applicable to history. This issue is explored in 
further detail in section 2.2. Section three deals with value systems. Section 
four discusses the importance of information and how ICT can influence 
the availability of information. In section five, the information view is 
made operational for this study. In section six and seven, the basics of TCE 
Theoretical Framework 
 23
are dealt with.  Sections eighth and nine explore how in TCE integration 
and disintegration of firms is explained and how ICT plays a role in that 
issue. The tenth section provides the operational factors of TCE while the 
eleventh section concludes. 
 
2.2 Economic theories and history 
Since this thesis focuses on organisations and the way a specific part of the 
financial sector is organised, we have come to look at economic 
organisation theories such as new institutional economic theories. These 
theories aim at providing an explanation on what activities a firm should 
or should not perform (‘the boundaries of the firm’) which ultimately has 
consequences on the way an industry is organised. If a firm decides to 
integrate new activities via a merger or take-over, the consequence for a 
sector is that another firm disappears. If this firm sets up the new activity 
itself in such way that serious competition could be given to other 
participants in the same industry, it also may lead to the disappearance of 
firms. The same argument can be given for divestiture. If a firm hives off a 
business activity it may lead to a new firm that starts to perform the 
disintegrated activity or if it is taken over by an existing firm, the size of 
the latter increases. Institutional economics, that deals with these issues, 
often provides a much more general law like explanation for phenomena 
than historical theories that are, in general, more based on the explanation 
of a specific event in history or finding facts of this event. The advantage of 
a general theory is that it is applicable to many events. On the other hand, 
since such a theory is extrapolated to a high extent (otherwise, it could not 
function as a general theory) important details can be missed.  
Hodgson (2001) explicitly doubts the usefulness of general theory in 
relation to studying the past. According to Hodgson a general theory is 
‘any substantial explanation or model of the principal characteristics and 
behaviour of human economies and societies, largely or wholly in terms of 
features that are assumed to be common to most conceivable social or 
economic systems’.2 He doubts the usefulness of general theories in 
relation to history because he sees a problem in the ‘historical specificity’ 
of the past. In the following, Hodgson clarifies the problem of ‘historical 
specificity’. 
  
                                                 
2 Geoffrey M. Hodgson, (2001) How Economics forgot History. The problem of historical specificity in social 
science (Routledge; London) p. 6. 
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‘[I]t first acknowledges the fact that there are different 
types of socio-economic system, in historical time and 
geographic space. The problem of historical specificity 
addresses the limits of explanatory unification in social 
science: substantially different socio-economic 
phenomena may require theories that are in some 
respects different. If different socio-economic systems 
have features in common, then, to some extent, the 
different theories required to analyse different systems 
might reasonably share some common characteristics. 
But sometimes there will be important differences as 
well. Concepts and theoretical framework appropriate 
for one real object may not be best suited for another. 
The problem of historical specificity starts from a 
recognition of significant underlying differences 
between different objects of analysis. One theory may 
not fit all.’3   
   
Hodgson does not reject generalisations, abstractions, unifications or 
simplifications. On the contrary, he states that science cannot function 
without some universal statements and that these are respectable 
objectives if causal mechanisms are explained. However, generalisations 
are often not able to sufficiently explain ‘concrete particulars’.4 According 
to Hodgson, the issue of historical specificity evokes the question of which 
unifications are ‘appropriate’ and which are not. Hodgson specifies the 
question to the core assumptions of economic science. Are these suited to 
explain all types of socio-economic systems or only a few or even just a 
part of a socio-economic system?5 What is the value of general economic 
theories to history or/and historical qualitative empirical data that is 
derived from historical archives? The problem that Hodgson discusses is 
certainly not an issue specific to historical data. Actually, it goes for all data 
derived from research in social sciences. We will regard this problem as a 
meta issue underlying this thesis. The main aim is to study and to explain 
changes in services and organisation of the Dutch securities trade with the 
help of two theoretical views. In the end, a reflection on that attempt will 
be made. 
                                                 
3 Hodgson, How economics, p. 23. 
4 Hodgson, How economics, p. 39-40. 
5 Hodgson, How economics, p. 38-39. 
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2.3 Value systems and creation of value 
According to Porter, firms create value for their clients through performing 
primary and secondary activities. The primary activities consist of 
production, marketing, delivery and servicing of the product. Support 
activities consist of purchased inputs, technology, human resources, and 
the overall firm structure. This network of activities is called the value 
chain of a firm. The notion on value chains can thus be used to distinguish 
a firm’s value creating activities. A firm’s value chain is part of a value 
system; a larger stream of activities in a particular industry that includes 
the suppliers, distributors or retailers, and the buyers of the produced 
goods or services.6 Another word that is used for value system is an 
industry’s value chain.7  
In the value system of securities trade, several services are 
transferred. Intermediaries provide these services. We assume that ICT 
makes the transfer of services easier, and thus affect the way these services 
are provided. For example, it becomes easier to pass on buy and sell orders 
and it becomes easier to receive and transmit relevant information for a 
buy or sell decision on securities. The possibilities for obtaining 
information clearly improves with the introduction of information and 
communication technologies. As a result, much more information is more 
easily available to more people. A consequence of this development might 
be that intermediaries no longer profit from the services they provide. We 
especially think of information services since ICT is particularly useful in 
gathering information. In theory, ICT provides the possibility for firms or 
end consumers to find information themselves without the mediation of 
intermediaries. Intermediaries might disappear or find new ways to justify 
their existence.  
In the above paragraph, three elements are linked to each other; 
how ICT (1) influences information services (2) and thus, the composition of 
a value system. We will discuss their interrelationships in more detail in the 
following sections. First, some theory on information will be dealt with 
and, second, ICT and information are linked to each other.  
 
                                                 
6 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, pp. 40-43.  
7 Robert Benjamin and Rolf Wigand (1995) ‘Electronic Markets and Virtual Value Chains in the 
Information Superhighway’, Sloan Management Review, vol. 36, iss. 2, pp. 62-72, p. 63.  
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2.4 Information and ICT 
In financial markets, the acquiring of relevant information is essential; 
particularly the timing of acquiring relevant information. The one that 
possesses the ‘hottest’ information earlier than others, might gain the most. 
For example, the alleged possession by Nathan Rothschild of early news 
concerning the outcome of the battle of Waterloo in 1815, created a myth 
around him.8 Rothschild would have greatly profited from the fact that he 
knew earlier than his competitors who had won this battle. Ferguson 
(1998) who has made an extensive study on the Rothschild family, has 
demythologised the story by now. Maybe Rothschild gained from prior 
knowledge on the outcome of the battle of Waterloo but these profits can 
never have been very great.9 Although the example of Nathan Rothschild 
appeared to be a heavily exaggerated story, still it shows what enormous 
value is ascribed to the early possession of relevant information.  
Stigler (1961) and Arrow (1973; 1985) have stressed the economic 
value of information. To these authors, the economic value of information 
is obvious. Stigler states that ‘knowledge is power’10 and Arrow declares 
that the economic value of information is no great mystery in itself.11 The 
one that possesses ‘information can make greater profits than would 
otherwise be the case’.12 Around the concept of the value of information 
scholars like Joseph E. Stiglitz, George J. Stigler and Kenneth Arrow have 
developed a separate branch of economics, information economics. 
Information economists set out to denounce several basic assumptions of 
classical economics such as efficient markets and perfect information. The 
efficient market hypothesis holds that prices in the stock market convey all 
information. However, as Stiglitz states, if that were the case, no one 
would spend money on collecting information because it is already 
represented in the prices and prices are publicly available.13 A market is 
                                                 
8 Robert A. Schwartz (1993) Reshaping the Equity Markets. A Guide for the 1990s (Business One Irwin; 
Homewood, Ill.) p. 393. 
9 Niall Ferguson (1998) The World’s Banker. The History of the House of Rothschild (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson; London) pp. 102-107. 
10 George J. Stigler (1961) ‘The Economics of Information’, The Journal of Political Economy vol. 69, no. 3, 
pp. 213-225, p. 213.  
11 Kenneth J. Arrow (1973) Information and Economic Behavior (Svanbäck & Nymans Boktryckeri; 
Stockholm). 
12 Kenneth J. Arrow (1985) ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in: 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Production and Capital. Collected papers of Kenneth J. Arrow vol. 5 (Harvard University 
Press; Cambridge Mass.) pp. 104-119, p. 110.  
13 Joseph E. Stiglitz (2001) ‘Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics’, Prize Lecture 
for Nobel Prize, 8 December 2001, http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/papers.cfm, pp. 
472-540, p. 485.  
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fully informationally efficient if information is distributed to all 
participants at the same time. Again, if such a situation occurs, no one 
would bother to gather information if that incurred costs.14 However, in 
reality, people do collect information against a certain price.  
The notion on perfect information relates to the situation that a 
decision maker always aims to gather all information relevant for making 
a decision; he or she wants the information to be perfect in order to make a 
sound decision. However, in real life, information is never perfect.15 The 
information acquired never communicates all relevant aspects.  
Information economists have developed the concepts of imperfect 
information and information asymmetry that are opposite to efficient 
markets and perfect information. Imperfect information refers to the 
quality of the information which can never be perfect. Information 
asymmetry bears on information the involved actors possess. Information 
asymmetry occurs if a person knows more or different things than others.16  
The next question is, how information asymmetry and imperfect 
information originates. Clearly, it is related to unequal availability of 
information. Unequal availability might be a result of a difference in use 
and deployment of ICT; a firm might have the disposal over more and 
better ICT devices and infrastructure than another firm. An advantage can 
be gained over competitors that do not possess, for instance, a telephone 
and thus cannot obtain relevant information at the same speed. Yet, one 
has to keep in mind several considerations before adopting a new 
technology. New communication technologies need a ‘critical’ mass of 
users to be valuable to its users. Simply said, if you are the only one with a 
telephone, there is no use in deploying it. If more people start to adopt a 
telephone, it is more valuable to have one yourself. Apart from that, costs 
of using a new communication technology also play a role in the decision 
of adopting this technology. In the initial phase of a new communication 
technology costs are usually high. We only have to think of the newest, 
state of the art notebooks that are very expensive when these appear on the 
market for the first time. However, after a few months, prices drop 
considerably because its ‘newness’ has disappeared and more people start 
to use the new technology.17 
                                                 
14 Stiglitz, ‘Information and the Change’, p. 491.  
15 Joseph Stiglitz (2002) ‘Graaiende managers brengen economie enorme schade toe’, Het Financieele 
Dagblad, 25-11-2002 (translation). 
16 Stiglitz, ‘Information and the Change’, p. 488.  
17 Mark Casson (1997) Information and Organization. A New Perspective on the Theory of the Firm (Oxford 
University Press; Oxford) p. 293. 
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In the first phase of a new communication technology the main 
advantage will thus be increased speed for transmitting and receiving 
information and not lower costs. The obtaining of information earlier than 
others, provides competitive advantage. The less others know what you 
know, the higher the value of your knowledge. In its initial phase, a new 
ICT has competitive value because it contributes to information 
asymmetry and thus to the competitive advantage of firms. Logically, 
competitive advantage is lost if all involved actors in the securities trade 
possess a telephone due to decreasing costs of ICT. The value of 
information then even diminishes; if everyone can acquire the same 
information at the same speed, everyone can use this same information at 
the same time. In this case, ICT diminishes information asymmetry and its 
competitive value decreases. This process starts all over when a new 
communication technology is developed and adopted (see figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Stylised representation of competitive value of ICT 
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Could we think of new services or disappearance of services provided by 
intermediaries in securities trade, as a result of ICT and information 
asymmetry? The situation could occur that a client starts to perform a part 
of the services him or herself because he or she feels that the received 
information of the financial intermediary is not sufficiently accurate. The 
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client can switch to another financial intermediary or, after costs of ICT 
decrease, clients of professionals can end up in the position to purchase 
communication technologies with which they can gather information 
themselves. The information service itself persists, but disappears with an 
intermediary as a value creating activity. If more of its clients begin to 
gather their own information, an intermediary may disappear or has to 
find new ways to remain attractive as an intermediary. The disappearance 
(or appearance) of intermediaries shows itself as a change in the structure, 
or ‘value system’ of the Dutch securities trade. Services and structure can 
thus not be regarded as two separate entities; most likely a change in 
services leads to a change in the structure of trade.  
 
2.5 Operational factors information and ICT  
Value systems will function as a means to structure the Dutch securities 
trade which gives the insight of involved actors and their value creating 
activities; ICT and information form the two basics to indicate a change in 
services. The next step is to formulate how to point out ICT and its 
influence on information with the help of historical empirical material. In 
the following, several questions are formulated that will help to make that 
influence visible, thus operational.  
First of all, we need to focus on the industry’s value chain. Therefore, 
the following questions need to be answered:  
a. what actors form the value systems in the Dutch securities trade?; 
b. what are their activities?; 
c. what value do they create?; 
With this information, possible imbalances in an industry’s value chain can 
be distinguished. To answer these questions, a and b should not incur any 
problems. Question c, however, will be more difficult to answer. First of 
all, how is ‘value’ assessed and second, from whose perspective? It is to be 
expected that, in the securities trade, the creation of value strongly relates 
to information and the means to acquire that information. Therefore, these 
two aspects need to be assessed in more detail. 
Thus secondly, the following questions must be answered as concerns 
the means to acquire information (ICT): 
d. what are the available means of ICT in general and in the 
Netherlands in particular; 
e. what means of ICT were used in the Dutch securities trade and; 
f. how the involved actors of the value system deployed ICT in the 
securities trade.   
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Third, a closer look has to be taken to information. The basic thought is 
that uneven availability of information, whether or not caused by the use 
and deployment of ICT, can lead to information asymmetry, and thus to 
extra value for clients. In securities trade, time plays a decisive factor. 
Information of which its value is dependent on the moment it is received 
and transmitted, is very valuable in securities traffic. As is stated earlier, an 
early possessor of information, might gain from this knowledge simply 
because he has obtained it earlier than others. So, we need to know: 
g. what types of information are of importance?; 
h. what are the different means of telecommunication per actor?; 
i. at what time (during stock exchange hours, the same day, the day 
after?) did they receive the information?; 
j. did the timing of the transfer of information change over time?  
However, not only timing and content are of importance as it comes to 
determining the value of information, also the costs of acquiring 
information matters. Costs can be a factor in the decision to purchase new 
ICT. In order to determine the height of information costs, one has to find 
out: 
k. the costs of making use of information sources such as sending a 
telegram, telephone calls, the subscription rates to the telex and 
ticker service. Annual reports are mostly free of charge, and 
naturally it is impossible to measure the costs of ‘informal’ 
information. The sources of such information can be found on the 
floor of the Stock Exchange; the commission traders and specialists.  
The answers to this list of questions, needs to provide information to 
support the argument that use and deployment of ICT by actors in a value 
system leads to unequal availability of information in a value system. This 
causes a situation in which some actors in a value system know more or 
less than other actors in the same value system.  
 
2.6 Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) 
In the introduction of this chapter, we stated that another aim of firms to 
innovate is to decrease costs and that TCE is mostly related to this aspect 
since it focuses on the consequences of changes in costs, especially 
transaction costs. The costs we mentioned in relation to the second reason 
for firms to innovate, relate to the costs of ‘producing’ and transferring a 
service. A change in these costs, may lead to an altered governance 
structure of a firm, and eventually to a changed organisational structure of 
a whole sector. This line of reasoning stems from transaction costs 
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economics. Transaction costs economics belongs to new institutional 
economics. Institutional economics especially focuses on the meaning and 
influences of institutions in the economy. In general, new institutional 
economics aims at explaining why institutions (governance structures) 
appear and alter as a result of individual actions and interactions.18 TCE 
‘indicates how and why transactions can be matched with institutions in a 
discriminating way’.19 The changes on the organisational level of both a 
firm and a sector manifest themselves in appearance (extension of a value 
system) or disappearance (contraction of a value system) of actors, or, in 
terms of TCE, market or hierarchy. Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987) 
have, as one of the firsts, slipped in the factor of ICT that influences 
transaction costs and thus, the governance structure of a firm.20 The 
reasoning is that due to ICT, it is more easier to search for information on 
suppliers and prices, and to negotiate on contracts. ICT reduces transaction 
costs, and therefore more transactions will be done via the market. Before 
this hypothesis is discussed in further detail, we will first deal with the 
basics of TCE. It is necessary to understand these basics in order to 
comprehend the possible influence of ICT on transaction costs.   
 
2.7 Basics of TCE 
In his famous article ‘The Nature of the Firm’, 21 Coase (1937) discerned 
four types of transaction costs:  
1. searching costs: costs of discovering the relevant trading partners and 
their prices; 
2. costs of contracting: costs of negotiating and concluding an agreement; 
3. costs of enforcement: costs of making specifications of the agreement 
depending on the duration of the contract: the shorter the contract the 
more the contract is specified, the longer the contract the less the 
contract is specified; 
4. monitoring costs: when a contract is concluded, both parties are eager 
to see that the opposite party fulfils the commitment. Therefore the 
parties will watch each other’s moves closely.22  
                                                 
18 Jack J. Vromen (2002) ‘The Economics of institutions – what has evolution got to do with it?’ EIPE- 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, unpublished paper, pp. 1- 26, p. 2.  
19 Oliver E. Williamson (1979) ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 233-261, p. 234. 
20 Malone et al., ‘Electronic’. 
21 R.H. Coase (1937) ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica  IV, pp. 385-405. 
22 Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, pp. 390-391 and 394-395. 
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These costs explicitly refer to concluding a contract and everything that 
goes with it. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1991, 1998) further 
elaborated on TCE. Williamson stated that TCE aims ‘to match governance 
structure to the attributes of transactions in a discriminating way’.23 The 
‘governance structure’ refers to the way transactions are governed; within 
a market or a hierarchical relation. The attributes are related to human 
behaviour and to the environment of the transaction.24 A transaction itself 
is a ‘transfer across a technologically separable interface.’25 
The first category of attributes, concerning human behaviour, refers 
to bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality relates to 
the notion that human beings are in fact rational but we are physically 
unable to comprehend everything that is relevant for a certain 
transaction.26 Another possible trait of humans is that they behave 
opportunistically. Opportunism is defined as ‘self-interest seeking with 
guile’.27  
The second category of attributes, concerning the environment of a 
transaction, relates to asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty. Asset 
specificity is a crucial aspect of TCE. It refers ‘to the degree to which an 
asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users 
without sacrifice of productive value’.28 Note that ‘asset’ does not refer to a 
product or service but to the ‘devices’ necessary to produce a good or 
service. Asset specificity, then, entails the specificity of investments needed 
to fabricate a product or service.29 An asset is very specific if its use is 
limited and therefore hard to re-use. The extent to which an asset is 
specific depends on several factors: (1) location (site specificity), for 
example an irremovable natural resource such as a mine; (2) physical 
factors (physical asset specificity), for example a specialised machine or 
tool required to produce a unique component; (3) human factors (human 
                                                 
23 Oliver E. Williamson (1981) ‘The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, vol. 19, iss. 4, pp.1537-1568, p. 1544.   
24 John Groenewegen (1996) ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond; Why and How’ in: John 
Groenewegen (ed.), Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond (Kluwer Academic Publishers; Dordrecht) 
pp. 1-9, p. 1.  
25 Oliver E. Williamson (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting (The Free Press; New York) p. 1. 
26 Oliver E. Williamson (1975) Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications (The Free 
Press; New York) p. 21; see also Bart Nooteboom (1999) Inter-firm alliances: analysis and design 
(Routledge; London) p. 17. 
27 Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, p. 26.  
28 Oliver E. Williamson (1991) ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 269-296, p. 281. 
29 Nooteboom, Inter-firm alliances, p. 18. 
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asset specificity) for example specified knowledge; (4) brand name capital; 
(5) dedicated assets which are defined as discrete investments made to 
meet the demands of a single customer; (6) ‘temporal specificity’, which 
can be regarded as a sort of site specificity ‘in which timely responsiveness 
by on-site human assets is vital’.30  
Finally, frequency and uncertainty affect transaction costs. 
Frequency relates to the number of transactions transferred within a certain 
time period. Uncertainty refers to the (un)expected behaviour of the 
contracted parties. 31  
 
2.8 TCE and integration 
The issue of make-or-buy is explicitly dealt with in TCE. Williamson even 
calls the issue ‘the archetypal problem for transaction cost economics’.32 
The make-or-buy decision especially depends on the condition of asset 
specificity.33 If an asset is highly specific, obviously high investments have 
to be made to produce this asset. In such a situation, internal organisation 
is favoured. High asset specificity brings about a relation in which both 
parties are highly dependent on each other. The relation is characterised by 
one buyer and one supplier. According to Williamson, in such a relation 
vertical integration is the most efficient solution.34  If asset specificity were 
not present, market contracting would be the most appropriate governance 
structure in every situation while ‘neither party has a transaction-specific 
interest in the continuity of the trade’. If asset specificity enlarges, internal 
organisation of a transaction will be more likely.35 As was discussed in the 
previous section, Williamson distinguished six types of asset specificity: 
site specificity, physical asset specificity, human asset specificity, brand 
name capital, dedicated assets and temporal specificity. Especially the first 
five forms of asset specificity mentioned above lead to vertical integration 
because it creates bilateral dependency.36 
The attributes of frequency and uncertainty play a less conclusive 
role in the decision whether to integrate or not. With respect to frequency, 
Williamson states the following: recurrent transactions of asset specific 
goods or services are likely to take place within a firm whereas occasional 
                                                 
30 Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization’, pp. 281-282.  
31 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, pp. 73-79.  
32 O.E. Williamson (1998) ‘Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It Is Headed’, De 
Economist vol. 146, no. 1, pp. 23-58, p. 30.   
33 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 86. 
34 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 91. 
35 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 90. 
36 Williamson, ‘Comparative Economic Organization’, p. 114. 
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transactions of asset specific goods or services can be transferred in either a 
hierarchy or a market, but more likely within the boundaries of a 
hierarchy. If assets are slightly specific, products or services will be 
purchased in a market relation no matter whether these transactions are 
recurrent or occasional.37  
With respect to uncertainty, Williamson assumes that uncertainty is 
present in such a degree that it poses a problem on the decision whether or 
not to integrate.38 If uncertainties accompanying transactions are high, the 
choice for hierarchy is more likely. Next to markets and hierarchies, 
Williamson has also distinguished mixed modes of organisations since a 
dichotomy into markets and hierarchies is highly oversimplified. These 
hybrid forms of organisations are referred to as bilateral and trilateral 
governance. High asset specificity leads to hierarchies, low asset specificity 
leads to markets, and average asset specificity leads to a hybrid 
organisation of the transaction.39  
 In the background, the human factors of opportunism and bounded 
rationality also affect transactions. Lindberg et al. (1991) have made a 
comprehensive description of how all attributes relate to each other within 
TCE: 
‘[W]hen actors feel that the financial costs of 
engaging in and monitoring transactions become too 
uncertain, because transaction-specific investments 
are great and it is difficult within the limits of 
bounded rationality to control an exchange partner’s 
opportunism, they will develop hierarchically 
integrated, corporate organizations to supplant the 
market as the primary forum for exchange’.40 
 
2.9 ICT, integration, and TCE 
Coase claimed that inventions that lead to a lessening of spatial 
distribution, tend to increase the size of the firm. The telephone and the 
telegraph tend to reduce the costs of organising spatially, thus firms will 
enlarge.41 In this case, Coase reasoning is not based on transaction costs 
                                                 
37 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, pp. 60-61. 
38 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 79. 
39 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 79. 
40 Leon N. Lindberg, John L. Campbell, and J. Rogers Hollingsworth (1991) ‘Economic Governance and 
the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy’ in: John L. Campbell, J. Rogers 
Hollingsworth, Leon N. Lindberg Governance of the American Economy (Cambridge University Press; 
Cambridge) pp. 3-34, p. 9.  
41 Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, p. 397. 
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economics but on efficiency, especially efficiency of scale. The telephone 
and the telegraph make it more convenient to manage a firm. Of course, 
we have to keep in mind that this statement was made in 1937. Today’s 
information and communication technologies are in some respects 
different from earlier modes of ICT. The computer era had not yet entered 
in the 1930s. A computer has the distinctive characteristic that it is able to 
store information and, with the help of the appropriate infrastructure, 
transmit information. The telegraph, the telephone and the telex only 
transmit information. Electronically storing information reduces the need 
for time and space consuming paper work.  
Modern modes of ICT and derivatives of it such as Internet, 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), electronic mail, and so on, are attributed 
to have the opposite effect in comparison to their predecessors, such as the 
telephone and the telegraph, namely disintegration. Malone et al. (1987) 
argue that modern ICT will lower transaction costs. Since TCE predicts 
that high transaction costs favour hierarchies and low transaction costs 
favour markets, Malone et al. conclude that as a result of ICT an increase of 
economic activity will be co-ordinated by markets.42 According to Malone 
et al., two specific factors, that can be altered by ICT, determine the 
organisational structure of a transaction: asset specificity and complexity 
of product description. Note that they do not pay attention to frequency 
and uncertainty, and that the aspect of complexity of product description 
does not refer to the attributes of Williamson. The authors claim that 
especially new, computer-based information technologies lower asset 
specificity and that ICT can make the product description less complex so 
that ‘an overall shift from hierarchies to markets’ will take place.43  
As we learn from the overview Koppius (2002) gives, the line of 
thought of Malone et al. has been much criticised.44 The criticism includes 
amongst others that there is simply no evidence for the statement of an 
overall shift from hierarchies to markets due to the use of ICT. On the 
contrary, empirical data of several authors rather suggests the opposite; 
namely, a shift towards (electronic) hierarchies. Another type of criticism 
claims that more factors than asset specificity and complexity of product 
description alone determine the governance mode of firms. Furthermore, 
the rather strict choice for either electronic markets or electronic 
                                                 
42 Malone et. al., ‘Electronic’, p. 489. 
43 Malone et. al, ‘Electronic’, p. 489. 
44 Otto R. Koppius (2002) Information Architecture and Electronic Market Performance (ERIM; Rotterdam) 
pp. 18-19.  
Chapter 2 
 
 
36 
hierarchies has been criticised since more organisational modes exist such 
as a combination of the two, or a firm might even have these two 
relationships at the same time. 45 Thus contradicting opinions exist on the 
role of ICT as a stimulator of both vertical integration and vertical 
disintegration. 
  A solution to the problem might be by adding the notion of ‘time’. 
The governance structure of market or hierarchy may succeed each other 
as the impact of ICT may change over time. By introducing a time element, 
TCE gains dynamism. The lack of dynamics is exactly what TCE is much 
criticised for. Historians especially have problems with the comparative-
static method of TCE.46 In many cases, history is about changes, 
disruptions, and discontinuities in the past. Historians try to describe and 
explain these ruptures. In a strict sense, the comparative static method, and 
therefore TCE, is thus not useful for studying the past.  
Several authors such as Lazonick (1991), Langlois and Robertson 
(1995) and Casson (1997) actually set out to construct a dynamic theory of 
the firm, drawing from TCE, which is applicable to explain historical 
processes. In Lazonick’s view, Williamson’s transaction costs economics 
focuses on the adaptive firm and makes it therefore unsuited for 
explaining dynamic processes.47 Langlois and Robertson phrased 
‘historians’ doubts on the use of TCE in the long run quite adequately: ‘The 
reigning transaction-cost theories of vertical integration provide 
illuminating snapshots of possible institutional responses to a momentary 
situation. But they do not place those responses in the context of the 
passage of time.’48 Williamson himself definitely sees possibilities to apply 
TCE to business history although he remarks that a mix with evolutionary 
economics then needs to be assessed.49 This is exactly what Langlois and 
Robertson have attempted.50 They introduce dynamic transaction costs; 
                                                 
45 Koppius, Information Architecture, pp. 18-19.  
46 See e.g. Gregory K. Dow (1987) ‘The Function of Authority in Transaction Cost Economics’, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 13-38; William Lazonick (1991) Business 
Organizations and the  Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) p. 195; 
Mark Casson and Mary B. Rose (1997) ‘Institutions and the evolution of modern business: 
introduction’, Business History, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1-8, p. 1;  John Groenewegen and Jack Vromen (1997) 
‘Theory of the Firm Revisited: New and Neo-institutional Perspectives’ in: Lars Magnusson and Jan 
Ottoson (ed.)  Evolutionary Economics and Path Dependency (Edward Elgar; Cheltenham(UK)/Brookfield 
(US) pp. 33-56, pp. 41-42.  
47 Lazonick, Business Organization, pp. 197-198. 
48 Richard N. Langlois and Paul L. Robertson (1995) Firms, Markets, and Economic Change. A Dynamic 
Theory of Business Institutions (Routledge; London/New York) p. 30. 
49 Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, p. 394. 
50 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 1.  
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these are the costs of persuading, negotiating, co-ordinating, and teaching 
outside suppliers. Actually these are costs a firm makes if it does not have 
the necessary capabilities. The reason why these costs are dynamic is 
because they occur when alterations in the economic environment of the 
firm take place, such as a changed demand for a product or service. If the 
market cannot provide the ancillary capabilities at the right time, vertical 
integration may occur. If a firm cannot provide the ancillary capabilities at 
the right time, vertical specialisation may result.51 
 Stigler (1968) and Teece (1986) also provide dynamic view on TCE. 
They have put forward the idea that the introduction of new products and 
services involves insecurities for a firm if it uses new technologies or 
whether it offers a new product or service since success in the market. In 
order to cope with these uncertainties and to be sure that the profits gained 
from these new products and services are appropriated by the innovating 
firm, firms need to incorporate all means and knowledge necessary to 
produce a new product or service. If the situation has stabilised, the level 
of integration decreases and a part of the activities may be outsourced. In 
other words, if ICT leads to new products and services, ICT temporarily 
results in the disappearance of links in the value chain of an industry. 
Hence, in several phases of an innovation process, market relations make 
way for hierarchical relationships. If such a situation occurs, we expect to 
see an evolution of different modes of organisation of a particular value 
system. Nooteboom however suggested that such a rigid solution need not 
be necessary. Instead of a movement towards integration and 
disintegration, outside collaboration might be an option to acquire the 
necessary complementary assets. Furthermore, such an alliance is much 
more flexible than a complete merger.52 What we thus can conclude is that 
ICT can have temporal effects on value systems of industries. 
 
2.10 Operational factors of TCE 
The next step is to make the discussed TCE based theories operational. 
How do we research the raised issues? A possibility is to discern the key 
variables of TCE based theories used and to design a tool to measure them. 
If TCE is dealt with, we need to look at the degree of asset specificity, 
frequency of transactions and the degree of uncertainty, the key attributes 
                                                 
51 Langlois and Robertson, Firms, p. 35. 
52 Bart Nooteboom (2003) ‘An integrated survey of theory on sourcing, inter-firm collaboration and 
networks’, unpublished paper, p. 5.  
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of TCE. This is the hard part. Measurement tools for asset specificity53 exist 
but they are based on surveys and interviews. The data necessary to 
perform surveys are not present in the researched archives. It is simply 
impossible to perform a survey because the target population does not 
exist any more. As it comes to interviews, largely the same problem occurs 
although some people that were involved in the Dutch securities trade in 
the second half of the twentieth still live. We need to follow another road 
to discern the key attributes of TCE.   
The extent of asset specificity is fixed by the investments in the 
devices necessary to produce a certain good or service and, moreover 
whether these devices can be employed for other uses or users. A security 
in itself is not very asset specific; it is just printed by printing presses that 
can also be used to produce other printed matters. The services related to 
the securities trade are perhaps more asset specific. For this study, we need 
to look for investments that were necessary to facilitate the securities trade, 
and the securities trade only. If these investments were highly asset 
specific, then integration of involved parties in the securities trade 
probably would have taken place. For sure, ICT was needed to facilitate 
securities trade. Although the investments in an ICT infrastructure for a 
single firm were considerable during the starting period of telegraphs and 
telephones, this is no proof for asset specificity because a telephone can 
also be used for other purposes or clients than the securities trade. What 
can be a proof for asset specificity are the investments in the capacity of 
ICT, such as infrastructure (just the lines and cables), devices (telephonic 
apparatus) and personnel. Especially if this capacity is purchased to 
maintain a particular relationship in securities trade. Hence, the question: 
l. what investments are made in ICT by the actors in the concerned 
value system? 
needs to be answered. The securities business itself is a highly volatile one. 
Sometimes it is busy, sometimes it is not. Yet, if a firm wants to be able to 
serve all clients at busy times, a firm invests to meet this need. This 
concerns an investment in capacity that is only addressed at certain 
periods during a day or even a week. Hence, the investments in capacity of 
a sufficient ICT infrastructure could be an indication of asset specificity in 
the securities trade, and thus an indication for vertical integration.  
The volatile nature of the securities trade not only affect asset 
specificity but also the other two factors of frequency and uncertainty. 
                                                 
53 See dissertation Michael J. Mol (2001) Outsourcing, Supplier Relations and Internationalisation: Global 
Sourcing Strategy as a Chinese puzzle (ERIM; Rotterdam) and Nooteboom, Interfirm alliances.  
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According to TCE, high frequency and high uncertainty, especially in 
combination with high asset specificity, lead to integration of firms. It is 
hard to predict (=uncertainty) whether clients will place many or few buy 
and sell orders in a couple of hours, today, tomorrow or in a week. The 
question thus is 
m. to what extent is uncertainty present concerning the number of 
orders? 
In theory, the factor of frequency should be made operational by counting 
the number of transactions. The question would thus be: 
n. how many transactions have taken place? 
In practice, this will not be easy to discern and it may even be impossible. 
Before counting them, we have to establish what it is we count. According 
to Williamson, a transaction takes place if a ‘good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface’.54  So, for this purpose we have 
to distinguish the services offered in the securities trade. The answer to 
subquestion b should provide that information. The subsequent stage 
would then be to establish how many times these services were provided 
over a period of 110 years. This is no option since the type of information 
required, is not available. Conceivably, we have to reason from both a high 
and low number of transactions. With the help of theory and the empirical 
material, we can establish the most likely scenarios. Since the outcomes are 
known, the scenario that fits can thus be seen as the representative of ‘what 
happened’ and thus, it can be established whether the frequency of the 
transactions was high or low. 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to discuss theories that deal with relevant 
issues for this thesis: how to study changes in information services and 
how to explain alterations in the organisational structure of the securities 
trade. Theory is thus used on two levels; first as a tool to structure and 
second as a tool to explain. The choice for a theory depended on the extent 
it helps to answer the question in what way ICT influences the structure or 
pattern of the securities trade. The way trade can be structured will be 
studied with the help of Porter’s value systems. The notions on value 
systems and value chains are thus used to structure the Dutch securities 
trade, and second, it forces to make clear who performs what activities in 
                                                 
54 Oliver E. Williamson (1981) ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’, The  
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 87, no. 3, pp. 548-577, p. 552. 
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the Dutch securities trade. Clearly, it is a way to sort out empirical 
material.   
Changes in these value systems will be explained with the help of 
two theoretical perspectives: degree of information asymmetry and 
transaction costs economics because the influence of ICT on securities 
trade is viewed from two aspects: the services provided and the 
organisational structure. In discussing these theories, we particularly 
centred on the role of ICT. Furthermore, an attempt was made to make 
them operational; what factors are of importance to the different 
approaches and how can these factors be detected? We have to remark 
here that this is done in such a way that it fits historical research. We 
realise that the picked theories impose difficulties on historical research. 
First, we have to deal with general economic theories to explain the 
particularity of history. Second, quantitative research is necessary to detect 
variables of, for instance, asset specificity. This type of research requires 
data that are often hard to extract from historical archives unless the 
subject of study is recent enough to perform a survey among ‘the living’. 
The different way of how those theoretical approaches are assessed, shows 
via the formulation of questions (a to n) to which the data should give 
answers to. With the answers obtained, we aim at matching theory with 
empirical historical data.  
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3. Dutch Securities Trade  
Upturn, Accommodations, Stockbroker Organisations and Central Issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a historical overview of the Dutch securities trade. This 
knowledge is needed to understand the mutual relations of the involved 
parties in the Dutch securities trade that is the subject of chapter four. 
These relationships largely shaped how the trade and its related services 
were organised and executed. The Dutch securities trade developed from a 
wide open market in which practically anyone could participate, into a 
closed institutionalised one, and again to a slightly more open market. The 
closed character was a result of a professionalisation of its practitioners as 
well as their attempts to organise trade more efficiently. 
The chapter starts with a description of the upturn and 
establishment of the Dutch securities trade. Section 3.3 touches upon the 
different accommodations in which securities trade took place. After that, 
the focus is on stockbrokers organisations which were established to 
organise securities trade more orderly. These organisations have dealt 
explicitly with three issues that kept recurring; the tariffs for commissions, 
the issues on quotations and on the mid-rate. These issues will be further 
elaborated in sections 3.5 and 3.6 before the conclusion is drawn up.  
 
3.2 Upturn financial services  
In Europe, at the end of the Middle Ages, a separate financial sector started 
to take shape as a result of increased economic activities during that 
period. Specialised financial intermediaries started to appear due to the 
variety of coins that circulated. They were able to value and exchange 
these different coins. Such ‘money changers’ first showed up in Italy in the 
tenth century; around 1250 they were also spotted at Brugge, located in the 
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present Belgium.1 Besides the valuating and exchanging of coins, travelling 
merchants started to deposit money at local financial intermediaries such 
as moneychangers and cashiers. A cashier basically paid creditors and 
collected from debtors under order of a client.2 Both moneychangers and 
cashiers were called private exchange banks. In return for a money 
deposit, clients received a certificate which they could use as a ‘bill of 
exchange’, a sort of trade document. A bill of exchange was an order for 
paying a debt that arose from a trade transaction. Financial intermediaries 
all over Europe co-operated in this system of bills of exchange. For 
instance, an Italian merchant from Milan instructed a correspondent (a 
financial intermediary) who was located elsewhere in Europe and by 
whom he had built up a balance, to pay a creditor from this balance.3 Bills 
of exchange made capital very liquid, it speeded up the circulation of 
money, and it functioned as an international means of payment.4  
Private exchange banks soon realised that not all deposits needed 
to be kept in house; a thirty to forty percent should be sufficient to meet 
the claims of their clients. The rest was used to invest in commercial 
operations and industrial activities, or for cash credits to loyal customers. 
Some private exchange banks started to offer more ‘bank-type’ services 
such as the transfer of money from one account to another (= giro, which is 
Italian for circulation) which implied the start of a financial services 
industry that handled time deposits and bank giro. These banking 
activities were practised in Italy already before 1200. Southern Europe, 
especially Italy and Spain, were ahead of the field as it concerned the 
providing of financial services in the Middle Ages. Their leading position 
probably originated from their large scale sailing activities to explore the 
world outside Europe. From Italy and Spain, banking activities spread 
throughout the rest of Europe. At Brugge the same banking activities took 
place at least as from 1320. In order to protect the public against 
bankruptcies of these private exchange banks, city councils of Spanish and 
Italian cities established communal exchange banks in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth century. These initiatives were copied by North European cities. 
                                                 
1 Herman van der Wee and Erik Aerts (1991) De economische ontwikkeling van Europa, 950-1950 
(Uitgeverij Acco; Leuven/Amersfoort) p. 55. 
2 Pit Dehing and Marjolein ‘t Hart (1997) ‘Linking the fortunes: currency and banking, 1550-1800’ in: 
Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden, A financial history of The Netherlands 
(Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) pp. 37-63, p. 43.   
3 Johan de Vries (1992) ‘Het Nederlandse financiële imperium. Schets van het Nederlandse bankwezen’ 
in: Bankwezen. Een geschiedenis en bronnenoverzicht (NEHA; Amsterdam )pp. 13-58, p. 14. 
4 Carlo M. Cipolla (1981, 2nd edition) Before the Industrial Revolution. European Society and Economy, 1000-
1700 (Methuen; London) p. 197.  
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For instance, in 1609, the ‘Amsterdamsche Wisselbank’ (Amsterdam 
Exchange Bank) was established. This Bank was founded as an alternative 
to cashiers. The local authorities suspected that Amsterdam cashiers 
deliberately disturbed the circulation of currencies. This could cause an 
overtrading of trade documents which would lead to financial instability. 
Another reason for the establishment of this Bank were the complaints of 
several merchants concerning the confusion on the different currencies 
that circulated in the city. The Amsterdam Exchange Bank had to bring 
some clarity and unity to that situation.5 
The supremacy of the Italians and Spanish as financial 
intermediaries started to subside as from around 1500. An important 
money market grew in Antwerp, which attracted merchants from all over 
Europe. A specific development in financial transactions occurred in 
Antwerp due to bankruptcies of private exchange banks and the absence 
of city banks. This development refers to the transition of ‘transferability’ 
to ‘negotiability’ of trade documents.  A trade document was transferable, 
if it could be handed over from one party to another by which the debtor 
did not have to pay to the original creditor at the expiration date of the 
document, but to the one who had received it from the original creditor. In 
such a situation, one had to trust, and thus know, one another personally 
because if the debtor was in default, the party that had received the 
acknowledgement of debt could not pursue any legal nor financial charges 
to the debtor. In the Exchange of Antwerp, established in 1531, merchants 
from all over Europe met. In order to do business, guarantees, other than 
personal ties, for the financial credibility of merchants became necessary. 
The involved parties of the Antwerp money market succeeded in the 
realisation of a renewed trade legislation in which financial and legal 
guarantees for the keeper of a trade document were acknowledged. It was 
this development which led to the negotiability of trade documents, and 
thus to the actual trade in these documents.6  
Travelling merchants, who deposited money at local financial 
intermediaries, eventually built up a widespread system of trade 
documents that facilitated trade. The financial intermediaries involved, 
formed a network to provide and execute several financial services. A 
network consisted of several persons or firms that maintained 
                                                 
5 Van der Wee and Aerts, De economische ontwikkeling van Europa, pp. 55-56 and p. 99;  De Vries, ‘Het 
Nederlandse financiële imperium’, pp. 14-16; Dehing and ’t Hart, ‘Linking the fortunes’, p. 43 and p. 
45.  
6 Van der Wee and Aerts, De economische ontwikkeling van Europa, pp. 98-99.  
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relationships to execute their (business) activities. Next to the ‘human’ 
intermediaries, also ‘physical’ intermediaries arose that facilitated trade. 
For instance, entrepots in which commodities were stored and which 
functioned as central places for the commodities trade that involved many 
parties such as merchants, carriers, bankers and insurers.7 Also, Exchange 
buildings, where buyers and sellers met, formed a central place for trade. 
Exchanges were to become large hubs of national and international 
communication networks.  
Not only physical goods were traded at these Exchanges, also 
valuable papers like trade documents became important trading objects at 
the end of the Middle Ages. Trade documents not only represented bills of 
exchange but also shares and bonds. Shares and bonds, securities, are 
issued with the goal to gather capital to finance business activities. If you 
buy a share, you have become one of the owners of a company, or if you 
possess all or the majority of the issued shares, then you may call yourself 
the owner of a company. Each shareholder receives a percentage of the 
company’s profits. This is called ‘dividend’. The percentage is fixed per 
period the dividend is disbursed. The oldest known shares are 
participations in the Bank of Venice and the Bank of Saint George at 
Genua, from around 1400.8 The ‘Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie’ 
(VOC: Dutch East Indies Company) issued the first known Dutch shares or 
‘actiën’ (literally; actions) at the very beginning of the seventeenth century 
(1602). The VOC needed to raise a large amount of capital in order to 
finance their activities for trade in the East Indies.9 
A bond is in fact an acknowledgement of a debt. The buyer of a 
bond accepts per fixed period interest that function as a redemption for the 
debt. Bonds are issued by companies but also by governments. Bonds and 
shares have a nominal value; that is the price that is paid for when they are 
issued for the first time, in a so-called initial public offering (IPO). 
Dependent on the economic situation, the price of securities fluctuates to a 
large or small extent. This is the real value of a security. The fluctuations in 
real value form the basis for the trade in bonds and shares.  
 
                                                 
7 Jonker, Merchants, p. 32. 
8 Brouwer, Beurs, p. 1. 
9 L. D. Westera (1992) ‘Boekhouding en management bij de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie’, 
Economisch en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek, vol.  55 (NEHA; Amsterdam) pp. 75-104. 
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3.3 Dutch securities trade and its accommodations 
In general, Amsterdam was the centre for trade in the Netherlands. For a 
long period, trade took place at fixed places in the open air spread over the 
city of Amsterdam. For instance, the ‘Warmoesstraat’ has long functioned 
as a gathering place for merchants, and later on also the ‘Nieuwe Brug’. In 
bad weather, churches as the ‘Sint Olofskapel’ and the ‘Oude Kerk’ 
accommodated the traders. As from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, the Amsterdam City Council decided to build an Exchange 
building, designed by the architect Hendrik de Keyser in which securities 
traders, next to other branches of trade, found their niche. This Exchange 
building opened in 1611 and was located in the centre of Amsterdam, at 
the ‘Rokin’.10  
On a modest scale, trade in valuable papers also took place in 
Rotterdam. The first Exchange building in Rotterdam, that served trade in 
general, was established in 1598.11 Several publications exist from the year 
1720 in which an active gambling trade in shares of a company took place 
in Rotterdam. However, before and even after the year 1720, little is known 
on the Rotterdam securities trade.12  
The Amsterdam Exchange was one of the first in the world that 
accommodated trade in securities.13 In London, a securities market existed 
as from the end of the seventeenth century. The creation of the Stock 
Subscription Room in 1801, marked the beginning of a more formally 
organised securities trade in Great Britain.14 The New York Stock Exchange 
was officially established in 1792 with the so called ‘Buttonwood 
Agreement’; in this year a small group of stockbrokers agreed under a 
buttonwood tree at Wall Street, on a sort of organised securities trade.15  
The Amsterdam Exchange was a public building which implied 
that anyone could pay a visit to this centre of trade. A disadvantage of free 
entrance to the Exchange building became the many people that just 
wanted to take a look at the traders and, probably unintentionally, 
hindered the brokers. Another problem with free entrance was that less 
bona fide traders could participate in securities trade as well. An example 
out of the year 1825 shows what consequences this could have. In this year, 
                                                 
10 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 20.  
11 Arie van der Schoor (1999) Stad in aanwas. Geschiedenis van Rotterdam tot 1813 (Waanders Uitgeverij; 
Zwolle) p. 181. 
12 A.J.W. Camijn (1987) Samen effectief. Opkomst, bloei en overgang van de Vereeniging van 
Effectenhandelaren te Rotterdam (Stichting Historische Publicaties Roterodamum: Rotterdam) pp. 18-19. 
13 Charles R. Geisst (1997) Wall Street. A History (Oxford University Press; New York) p. 9.  
14 Michie, The London Stock Exchange, p. 15 and p. 36.  
15 Walter Werner and Steven T. Smith (1991) Wall Street (Colombia University Press; New York) p. 20. 
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an Englishman posed as a representative of the non-existant ‘Republic 
Poyais’, in order to place bonds of this fictive South American state. Before 
the deceit was discovered, the British agent had disappeared together with 
the money of some naïve Dutch investors.16  
After it had served as a centre for trade for over two centuries, the 
Exchange of De Keyser had had its best. In 1845, a new Exchange building 
designed by J.D. Zocher, was put into use.17 The Zocher Exchange was 
situated on the Dam square. The trading floor was surrounded with 
numbered pillars, of which each was allotted to a different type of trade. 
The stockbrokers gathered around pillar number thirty-three for their 
specific branch of trade. A gate closed off the Exchange by the time trade 
began. If one was too late, one had to pay an entrance fee of 25 cents.18  
For a long time during the nineteenth century, the official exchange 
hours were from 15.00-16.00 hrs. There have been discussions on this trade 
time. In 1845, merchants from the province ‘Noord Holland’ (the same 
province in which Amsterdam is situated) who travelled three times per 
week to Amsterdam to do business, wanted to advance the exchange 
hours. Their request was not honoured. 19 Nevertheless, that did not put an 
end to the issue. Twenty-five years later, the whole discussion started all 
over again. Just as in 1845, the advanced time schedule of the postal 
service formed the stimulus for a group of financial intermediaries to 
request an advance in trade time. If not, firms could not be ready in time 
for this specific post service.20 A counter current of local financial 
intermediaries recurred. The opponents consisted of bankers, sworn 
brokers and commission traders in the securities trade, all practising their 
affairs in Amsterdam. They argued that the Amsterdam Exchange only 
had any meaning if its traders could make use of the closing prices of 
foreign Exchanges such as those of London, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt and 
Vienna. This information came in around three o’clock in the afternoon. 
                                                 
16 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 35.   
17 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 38. 
18 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 38. 
19 Gemeente Archief Amsterdam (Municipal Archive Amsterdam; further abbreviated as ‘GAA’), 
archief Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken Amsterdam (archive Chamber of Commerce and 
Factories Amsterdam; further abbreviated as ‘KvKA’), entrance no. 5287, inv. nr. 200, Ingekomen en 
minuten van uitgaande stukken 1845 (Minutes incoming and outgoing documents 1845), Brief van 
Burgemeester & Wethouders aan Amsterdamse Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken (Letter from City 
Council Amsterdam to Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and Factories), no. 72, dd. 28 August 1845. 
20 GAA, archive KvKA, entrance no. 5287, inv. nr. 252, Minuten ingekomen stukken (Minutes incoming 
documents) 1872, Brief van Burgemeenster & Wethouders van Amsterdam aan Amsterdamse Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabrieken (Letter from City Council Amsterdam to Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce and Factories), no. 186, dd. 4 September 1872. 
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The brokers stressed the fact that they did not want to thwart their fellow 
traders of other branches but noticed that the advancing of the postal time 
table for foreign destinations was not an issue to securities traders since 
they used the telegraph for passing on the necessary information (such as 
price information, and concluded affairs) to their clients outside the 
Netherlands.21 Despite the arguments of the stockbrokers the official 
exchange hours changed to 13.30 to 15.00 hrs.22 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, securities listed on 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE) were mostly foreign bonds and 
shares. The Dutch were especially keen on American and Russian bonds.23 
Only one quarter of the total quotations on the ASE, referred to Dutch 
securities.24 In 1880, trade took place in 222 foreign, and 66 Dutch quoted 
stocks of which 11 originated from the Dutch East Indies.25 As from 
around 1895, Dutch companies started to enter the ASE and this appeared 
to be successful. The number of Dutch and Dutch colonial securities 
augmented from 243 to 956 in the period between 1890 and 1915. The total 
possession of securities of the Dutch increased from 3600 million guilders 
to 6000 million guilders in the same period.26 Apparently, the Netherlands 
had entered a favourable economic period that yielded investments and 
one was willing to take more risks in investments. According to Van der 
Werf, one of the causes of this economic growth was that the Dutch 
profited from the growing German economy (export to Germany) and 
from the exploitation of the resources of the Dutch East Indies.27   
Despite the gate that closed off the Exchange during exchange 
hours, impostors or ‘tourists’ kept recurring, just as the chaotic situations. 
                                                 
21 GAA, archive KvKA, entrance no. 5287, inv. nr. 252, Minuten inkomende stukken (Minutes incoming 
documents) 1872, Brief van Burgemeenster & Wethouders van Amsterdam aan Amsterdamse Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabrieken (Letter from City Council Amsterdam to Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce and Factories), no. 186, dd. 18 September 1872. 
22 GAA, archive KvKA, entrance no. 5287, inv. nr. 253, Minuten uitgaande stukken (Minutes outgoing 
documents) 1872, Brief van Burgemeenster & Wethouders van Amsterdam aan Amsterdamse Kamer 
van Koophandel en Fabrieken (Letter from Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and Factories to City 
Council Amsterdam), no. 91, dd. 7 October 1872.  
23 Joost Jonker (1997) ‘The alternative road to modernity; banking and currency, 1814-1914’, in: 
Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden,  A financial history of The Netherlands 
(Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) pp.94-123, p. 113.  
24 J.A. de Jonge (1988) ‘Het economische leven in Nederland 1844-1873’, in: J.C. Boogman (red.) 
Geschiedenis van het moderne Nederland. Politieke, economische en sociale ontwikkelingen (De Haan; Houten) 
pp. 11-27, p. 21.  
25 Cherelt Kroeze and Ton Nillissen (eds.) (2000) Beursplein 5…Een kapitaal monument (Stichting 
Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel; Amsterdam) p. 31.  
26 Van der Werf, De Bond, pp. 27 and 52. 
27 Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 45. 
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Already in 1870, stockbrokers strove for a secluded place for the securities 
trade in order to overcome these problems. However, on advice of the 
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, the Amsterdam City Council opposed 
this plan.28 In the years hereafter, a long lasting discussion (almost thirty 
years!) took place concerning the Exchange building. This discussion 
became known as the ‘beurskwestie’ or ‘exchange issue’. The discussion 
centred around the question how to alter the existing Exchange building, 
in such a way that it satisfied all involved parties. Several alteration plans 
were drawn up, yet none of the plans met the needs of the traders. The 
Amsterdam City Council tried to end the whole issue by calling an 
international design contest in 1883. Architects were asked to think of a 
new Exchange building. Designs were sent in, only, nothing was done 
with the results. Finally, in 1896, the Amsterdam City Council appointed 
the Dutch architect H.P. Berlage to design a new Exchange building.29  
In 1903, the Berlage Exchange was put into use. This new Exchange 
building consisted of three trading floors; one for the commodities trade, 
one for the grain trade, and one for the securities trade. Again, gates closed 
off these trading floors. Only now, the trading floors were solely accesible 
for the traders. The securities trade floor was equipped with booths that 
the stockbrokers could hire. Such a booth consisted of a small bench and 
some, dependent on the size, were also fitted up with a small table. A 
booth afforded the possibility to sit down for a moment, to make notes, or 
to confer with colleagues. In the middle of the trade floor, the ‘Guidebank’ 
was situated. The employees of this Guidebank, the ‘guides’, kept up all 
transactions as well as the prices against these transactions were closed. 
The data these guides gathered were published on boards that hung on the 
Guidebank so that everyone who walked around on the stock exchange 
floor, could see them. Furthermore, after the official trading hours, the 
editorial staff of the ‘Officieele Prijscourant’ (official list) received the data 
on the concluded transactions and prices. The Officieele Prijscourant was 
printed after the official stock exchange hours that was by now advanced 
                                                 
28 GAA, archive KvKA, entrance no. 5287,  inv. nr. 248 , Ingekomen stukken 1870 (Incoming 
correspondence 1870), Een adres van de de Kommissie benoemd in de Vergadering van Handelaren, 
Makelaars en Kommissionairs in Effecten (Address of Traders, Sworn Brokers and Commission traders 
in securities), 28 September 1870; and inv. nr. 249, Uitgaande stukken 1870 (Outgoing correspondence 
1870), Brief van KvkA aan Burgemeester en Wethouders van Amsterdam (letter from KvKA to City 
Council Amsterdam) dd 8 December 1870; Archive Euronext, Jaarverslag ‘Vereeniging voor den 
Effectenhandel’ 1903  (Annual report 1903) dd. 28 April 1904, p. 6. 
29 Kroeze and Nillissen,  Beursplein 5, pp. 30-31. 
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from 13.30 until 14.45 hrs., and distributed on the same day. 30 Apart from 
a separate stock exchange floor, the stockbrokers had the disposal over 
several other spaces in the Berlage building.  
Between 1900 and 1910 the Dutch securities trade expanded even 
more. The number of quotations rose from 1324 to 2014.31 This rise affected 
the number of stockbrokers. The increase of stockbrokers, from 581 to 669 
and especially of their servants, from 227 to 736, caused a severe lack of 
space at the trade floor.32 Furthermore, the stockbrokers complained about 
the defective heating and poor ventilation. As a result, the stockbrokers 
demanded their own stock exchange building.  Now, their wish became 
reality. The architect J.Th. Cuypers designed this building that opened its 
doors at the end of 1913. The new building was located at the ‘Beursplein’, 
very near the Berlage Exchange.33 In this building, securities trade 
flourished further on although World War I threw a spanner in this 
development in spite of the Dutch aloofness in this international conflict. 
To prevent public panic, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange closed its doors 
as from 29 July 1914, and only reopened after six months, on 9 February 
1915.34 Trade got into its normal stride quite soon. The total number of 
quotations in 1914 amounted up to 1918, in 1918 to 2011 and in 1935 it had 
increased to 3201.35 World War II caused a more severe setback for the 
Dutch securities trade. The ASE had only been closed from 10 May 1940 to 
15 July 1940 but trade could only continue under many restrictions posed 
by the Germans.36  
The Cuypers Exchange remained the location for trade in securities 
up till this day although by now, the actual execution of orders passes on 
via computer terminals. The so-called ‘screen trade’ was introduced in 
Amsterdam in 1988. Ten years later, the security traders left the trading 
floor of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. The specialists took up residence 
in a room at the first floor of the ASE, the traders moved to the dealing 
rooms, located in the offices of their own firms.37 As from 1998, traders in 
future securities (futures and options) took over the trade floor.38 Their 
                                                 
30 W.A. Paap (1908) De doodsklok van Damrak (Uitgevers-maatschappij ‘Vivat’; Amsterdam) p. 36.; in this 
book from 1908, the official trade time is indicated from 13.30-14.45 hrs.  
31 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 87. 
32 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 105. 
33 Kroeze and Nillissen, Beursplein 5, pp. 38-39.  
34 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 132 and p. 135.  
35 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 126.  
36 De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 184-185.   
37 In chapter four, the different types of  stockbrokers are discussed. 
38 Educatiepakket Euronext Amsterdam, www.euronext.com/nl. 
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stay however, only covered a short period. At the end of 2002, the trade in 
options also changed to full screen trade and left the trade floor in the ASE. 
The intention is that the trade floor of the ASE becomes a financial 
information centre for people interested in trade in valuable papers. 
 
3.4 Stockbroker organisations 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, first attempts were made to 
organise the Dutch securities trade more orderly. An issue that caused 
disorder to the securities trade, concerned the problems on how and which 
prices were made public. Often, inaccurate quotations were published 
from which stockbrokers tried to benefit. As a client of a stockbroker, it 
was almost impossible to retrieve the real prices against which a security 
was bought or sold. In 1789, a stockbroker’s organisation was founded in 
Amsterdam, named ‘Collegie tot Nut des Obligatiehandels’ (in short 
‘Collegie’). The ‘Collegie’ also contributed to an official price list 
(‘Prijscourant der Effecten’). This newspaper was certainly not the only 
journal that attempted to publish correct quotations. For instance, already 
since 1723, the editorial board of the ‘Amsterdamsche Courant’ issued a 
price list which was put together by a committee of sworn brokers.39  
The list of the ‘Collegie’ did not lead to a more accurate publishing 
of prices. Because of that, a group of stockbrokers left the ‘Collegie’ in 
1833, and set up a second stockbroker’s organisation, called the ‘Nieuwe 
Handel-Sociëteit’. Actually, this ‘Nieuwe Handel-Sociëteit’ did not differ 
that much from the ‘Collegie’; it created its own social meeting place and 
passed stock exchange quotations to an existing newspaper ‘Algemeen 
Handelsblad’. Yet, the ‘Nieuwe Handel-Sociëteit’ did not succeed in 
becoming recognised as a full representative of the Amsterdam securities 
trade. In 1856, the ‘Collegie’ and the ‘Nieuwe Handel-Sociëteit’ merged 
into the ‘Effectensociëteit’. The ‘Effectensociëteit’ merely functioned as a 
private club for Amsterdam stockbrokers. More important appeared to be 
the formation of the ‘Algemeen Beurscomité voor Publieke Fondsen’ (in 
short: Beurscomité). The Beurscomité intended to give the securities trade 
a different complexion since it was always surrounded by the smell of 
deceit and heavy losses due to malicious stockbrokers. Additionally, the 
‘Beurscomité’ wished to make the securities trade attractive for a wider 
public. The Beurscomité implemented several rules for exchange 
transactions, acted as an arbitrator in disputes, judged whether a new 
security was suited to be listed on the ASE and so on. The ‘Beurscomité’ 
                                                 
39 Jonker, Merchants, pp. 148-149; see also De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 45-46.  
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established itself as an organisation that worked hard for a more regulated 
and better circumstances for the securities trade. For the maintenance of 
these rules and to be recognised as a body that arranged everything related 
to the securities trade, the Beurscomité was dependent on the benevolence 
of stockbrokers and several official institutions as the City Council and 
Chamber of Commerce. Yet, since the Beurscomité did not impose any 
penalties, it lacked the means to exercise real power. Also, the City Council 
and Chamber of Commerce seemed to pay no attention to opinions of the 
Beurscomité concerning an improved or even a separate accommodation 
for securities trade, and of the exchange hours. The decreased importance 
of both the ‘Beurscomité’ and the  ‘Effectensociëteit’, these stockbrokers 
associations decided to merge into the ‘Vereeniging voor den 
Effectenhandel’ (VvdE: Association for Securities Trade), in 1876.40In 
Rotterdam, stockbrokers also started to organise themselves. During the 
1850s and 1860s Rotterdam stockbrokers formed an association. In 1898, 
the Rotterdam ‘Vereeniging van Effectenhandelaren’ (Association of 
Stockbrokers) received a Royal Approval that was necessary to be 
recognised as a legal personality. Hence, the year 1898 is generally taken as 
the official starting point of the Rotterdam ‘Vereeniging van 
Effectenhandelaren’.41 
As its predecessors, the Amsterdam ‘Vereeniging’ aimed at 
organising the securities trade more efficiently. One of the aims of the 
VvdE was to create a reliable price newspaper which was realised with the 
‘Officieele Prijscourant’ (official list). Every day after the official exchange 
hours, a member of the Quotations Committee (established by the VvdE), 
checked all quotations and authorised them. The approved quotations 
were published in the ‘Officieele Prijscourant’.42 In the nineteenth century, 
a writing press that exclusively dealt with the securities trade started to 
emerge, although modestly, so as to inform the public about certain listed 
(foreign) companies or (foreign) government loans.43  
A second step which the VvdE undertook to organise an orderly 
and decent trade, was to set very strict rules for membership in order to 
get rid of malicious stockbrokers.  To become a member, a firm had to 
                                                 
40 Jonker, Merchants, pp. 153-154, and Camijn, Samen effectief, p. 32. 
41 Camijn, Samen effectief, pp. 28-29, and p. 35. 
42 Brouwer, Beurs, p. 77; De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 78.   
43 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 40; Jan Luiten van Zanden and Arthur van Riel (2000) Nederland 1780-1914. 
Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling (Uitgeverij Balans; Amsterdam) p. 270.  
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practice trade in securities from an office in Amsterdam.44 Yet, this did not 
imply that all Amsterdam stockbrokers could obtain membership. A 
potential member had to be nominated by ten members and if at least ten 
members opposed the nomination, a ballot meeting was held which could 
refuse a potential member.45 Another consequence of the admittance policy 
of the VvdE, was that provincial46 financial intermediaries could not trade 
any longer on the Amsterdam Exchange directly. They had to make use of 
the mediation of an Amsterdam financial middleman. Provincial 
middlemen would visit the Amsterdam Exchange a few days per week or 
even maybe daily. We know this from the discussions on the trade time in 
1845 and 1872, and because of a protest of the director of the company that 
exploited the state railways. In this protest, the director opposed the 
intended advance of the time the Amsterdam Exchange would start in 
1872. The time schedule of the railways was arranged in such a way that 
business people from all over the country (Leeuwarden, Groningen, 
Maastricht, Middelburg) could be in Amsterdam around two o’ clock (one 
hour before the official exchange would start).47 The establishment of the 
VvdE was the start of the disappearance of the physical presence of 
provincial stockbrokers at the Amsterdam Exchange. Probably, they still 
came as long as trade took place in the public Zocher Exchange although 
the VvdE made it difficult for provincial intermediaries to execute orders 
by forbidding their members to trade with non-members.  
The majority of the members of the VvdE consisted of stockbrokers 
whose main activity was to trade in securities. Banks could also become a 
member of the VvdE.48 As a matter of fact, not every stock exchange 
organisation allowed banks to become a member.49 For instance, the 
stockbroker organisation of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) demanded 
that if a firm wished to become a member, the securities trade had to be 
the only activity of a firm.50 Since a bank provided several financial 
services, they were not allowed as a member to the LSE.  
                                                 
44 Brugmans, Begin van twee banken,  p. 152;  Kymmell, Geschiedenis II-A, p. 100; Kymmell, Geschiedenis II-
B, p. 298. 
45 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 95. 
46 Here ‘provincial’ refers to all areas in the Netherlands, located outside Amsterdam. 
47 GAA, archive KvKA, no. 5287, inv. nr. 252, Ingekomen stukken  1872 (Incoming documents 1872), 
Brief Directeur General der Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Staatsspoorwegen aan KvkA (letter 
Director Company for Exploitation of the National Railways to KvKA), dd 4 September 1872. 
48 Mendes da Costa, Het A.B.C., p. 8. 
49 Brouwer, Beurs, pp. 70-71. 
50 Michie,The London Stock Exchange, p. 40. 
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Amsterdam stockbrokers functioned as mediators between private 
and institutional clients and the ASE. As from the end of the nineteenth 
century, another type of intermediary entered the Dutch securities trade; 
the ‘specialist’ or ‘market maker’ (de hoekman). Specialists gathered the 
buy and sell orders of a particular security in which they were specialised.  
In chapter four, we will discuss these intermediaries in more detail.  
The VvdE clearly tried to seize and monopolise the organisation of 
the trade in stocks and shares. Their attempts became more effective as 
from the moment the VvdE had the disposal of an own stock exchange 
floor in the Berlage Exchange building. Only members of the VvdE were 
allowed on this floor. Non-members from Amsterdam tried to continue 
trading in securities in another part of the Berlage building that was 
labelled as a public Stock Exchange. This did not work out; they were too 
few and the VvdE had forbidden their members to trade with non-
members. Hence, Amsterdam stockbrokers that could not comply with the 
demands for membership, were deprived from executing their activities. 
Several financial intermediaries complained about the, from their point of 
view, unfair course of events with the Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce.51 The board of directors of the Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce agreed with their complaints. The only thing that could 
formally be done to break through the VvdE’s pursuit for monopolising 
the Dutch securities trade, was to change the ‘Wetboek van Koophandel’ 
(Code for Commerce; created in 1838). However, the whole board of the 
Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce considered this a step too far. One of 
the members of the board proposed to support and to strengthen the 
public stock exchange by accommodating it with all the comforts needed 
to execute the trade properly such as telegraphs and telephones.52 This 
advice was probably not put into practice or, if it was, it did not succeed in 
giving a impetus to the public stock exchange. A similar discussion arose 
when the Cuypers Stock Exchange was put into use in 1913. The VvdE had 
to comply with the legal demand of public accessibility of this Exchange 
building. To meet this demand, a Public Exchange was created in a corner 
at the first floor of the new Amsterdam Stock Exchange. This Public 
Exchange could be reached via a footbridge passage (‘passerelle’), which 
linked the Berlage Exchange with the Cuypers Exchange. In this way, 
                                                 
51 GAA, archive KvkA, no. 5287, inv. nr. 31, Notulen Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken Amsterdam 
1903 (Minutes Board 1903), 16 October 1903, pp. 265 and  267;  20 November 1903, p. 287.     
52 GAA, archive KvKA, no. 5287, inv. nr. 32, Notulen Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken Amsterdam 
1904 (Minutes Board 1904), 17 June 1904, p. 106.   
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traders of both buildings could walk quite easily up and down to the other 
building. The Public Exchange was used for auctioning stocks; a practice 
that disappeared later on.53  
As from 1903, the provincial securities traders could be effectively 
banned. In this year, the provincial stockbrokers organised themselves in 
the ‘Vereeniging voor den Geld- en Effectenhandel in de Provincie’ 
(Association for the Money and Securities Trade in the Province) in order 
to cope with the VvdE’s pursuit for a monopoly on the Dutch securities 
trade and its strict rules. This provincial association was called in short the 
‘Bond’ (Union).54  
Apparently, several stockbrokers from The Hague had had a 
bellyful of the VvdE: they had set up their own stock exchange. It started 
in a room above a store in 1905.  In 1912, The Hague opened its own Stock 
Exchange building. The The Hague Exchange was primarily meant for the 
local stockbrokers. The The Hague stockbrokers waited until the prices of 
the ASE became known. They used these prices to settle their own orders 
with each other (order clearing).55The The Hague stockbrokers especially 
made use of the ‘mid-rate’. In the next section, we will elaborate 
extensively on the mid-rate. Sufficient here is to state that the mid-rate 
represents the average between the highest and lowest price of concluded 
orders of a particular security.   
Hence, the VvdE had made the Dutch securities trade their 
business. Yet, the board of the VvdE realised securities trade could not 
function without the world outside. After World War II, the VvdE started 
to see the ‘education’ of the public concerning the ‘works’ of the securities 
trade as their mission, not in the least to generate orders. In 1952, a 
committee was set up to inform interested public. Next to brochures and 
leaflets, a more vivid way to make clear what securities trade contained, 
appeared to be the guided tours in the Cuypers building that started in 
1952.56  
Also, the strict rules for membership were loosened at the 
beginning of the 1970s. Due to the ongoing concentration process in the 
Dutch financial sector, the VvdE faced the problem of diminishing 
participants in the securities market, and thus a decrease of trade 
transactions. This is shown in the decreasing number of members of the 
                                                 
53 Kroeze and Nillissen, Beursplein 5, pp. 43-44.   
54 Van der Werf, De Bond, pp. 39-40.  
55 Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 72; P.A. Geljon (1998) Een zeer persoonlijk effectenhuis. Het Haagse Lissa & 
Kann 1800-1966 (NIBE; Amsterdam) pp. 93 and 178. 
56 De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 237-238.  
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VvdE. In 1940 the number totals up to 1507 (including the servants), in 
1960 to 1007 and in 1970 to 829.57 The VvdE decided to reorganise and as 
from the start of 1973, membership was opened to firms all over the 
country. The VvdE slightly changed its name, instead of the more old 
fashioned Dutch of ‘Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel’, it became 
‘Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel’. 58 As a result, provincial stockbroker 
organisations such as the provincial ‘Bond’, The Rotterdam ‘Vereeniging 
van Effectenhandelaren’, and the The Hague stockbroker organisation 
ceased to exist in 1974. Also the The Hague and Rotterdam Stock 
Exchanges stopped functioning.59 The Rotterdam association turned into a 
foundation (Stichting Organisatie van Effectenhandelaren te Rotterdam). 
This foundation aimed at stimulating the money and securities business in 
Rotterdam in the broadest sense.60 Another reason for the dissolution of 
the provincial stockbroker organisations, related to the abolishment of the 
mid-rate; the provincial stockbrokers lost their guiding hold to clear 
orders. As a result, this practice gradually diminished which made the 
local stock exchanges insignificant.61  
In the 1970s and 1980s securities professionalised onward. The 
VvdE became an organisation which began to hire paid workers. Before, 
members ran the VvdE voluntarily. This led to a division in 1990; the VvdE 
and the ASE became separate organisations. In 1996 the VvdE liquidated 
itself and turned into a foundation. Due to an increased international 
competition as a consequence of the formation of the European unification, 
the ASE decided to merge with the Amsterdam Options Exchange. As 
from 1997, the organisation that resulted from this merger, became known 
as the Amsterdam Exchanges N.V. (AEX). It aimed at establishing an 
attractive market for Dutch investors since the danger existed, they would 
easily start trading at other European exchanges.62 Apparently, that did 
happen. In 2000, the stock exchanges of Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam 
merged into one large stock exchange market, under the name of 
‘Euronext’. It was decided that the French trading system was going to be 
used as a standard on every location of Euronext. This actually implied the 
                                                 
57 VvdE (1998) 120 jaar beurshandel in vogelvlucht. Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel 1876-1996 (VvdE: 
Amsterdam) p. 22. 
58 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 232; Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 268. 
59 Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 72; Geljon, Een zeer persoonlijk effectenhuis, pp. 93 and 178. 
60 F.J. Brevet (1978) ‘De effectenbeurs te Rotterdam en haar einde’, in: R.A.D. Renting (red.) Rotterdams 
Jaarboekje 1978 (Stichting Historische Publicaties Roterodamum: Rotterdam) pp. 187-193, p. 192.  
61 As stated by B. van Marken former director of Pierson, Heldring & Pierson, telephone conversation 
18 February 2003. 
62 VvdE, 120 jaar beurshandel in vogelvlucht, pp. 35-37. 
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disappearance of an intermediary on the ASE, namely the ‘hoekman’ or 
specialist since this function is not known in the French trading system. In 
this system, demand and supply find each other without the mediation of 
a specialist. The intention was that the specialists should turn into 
‘animateurs’; firms that keep trade of securities or of several firms alive, 
against payment of these same firms.63 
  
3.5 Commission rates 
The VvdE not only physically barred provincial commission traders from 
the securities market in 1903, it also set minimum commission rates (in 
general, a third part of the total transaction costs) for executing securities 
orders. Commission rates were small percentages that clients paid to their 
financial intermediaries for the execution of securities orders. For the 
provincial stockbrokers, several disadvantages were attached to the 
introduction of these minimum commission tariffs. First of all, before 1903 
provincial stockbrokers had better control over the height of a commission 
fee because potentially, they could carry out the orders themselves on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. If they did not, and decided to engage an 
Amsterdam stockbroker, mutual arrangements could be made concerning 
the height of the commission fee. By introducing these minimum 
commission rates, the provincial commission traders lost control over the 
height of commission tariffs. Second, the chance now existed that 
provincial investors turned directly towards Amsterdam securities traders. 
Third, it created opportunities for provincial branch offices of Amsterdam 
financial intermediaries.64 For all three disadvantages applies that the 
profit margin of a provincial stockbroker diminished. The provincial 
traders ran the risk of loosing their clientele to their Amsterdam 
competitors if they charged their clients for their own losses due to the 
minimum commissions of the Amsterdam stockbrokers. If a provincial 
securities trader would want to compete with his Amsterdam colleagues, 
he was forced to lower his own commission rates.65 
Immediately after its foundation in 1903, the ‘Bond’ tried to fix an 
official arrangement with the VvdE concerning the mutual tariffs on 
commissions. The negotiations passed off stiffly. Within the Bond, a 
                                                 
63 Annemarie van der Tuijn, ‘Rol hoekman op beurs wordt zwaar onderschat’, NRC Handelsblad, 24 July 
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September 2002. 
64 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 98; Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 37.  
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growing body was of the opinion that the establishment of their own 
institution where provincial stockbrokers could clear their orders amongst 
each other, was absolutely necessary. The VvdE only thwarted the 
provincial stockbrokers in regaining a foothold in Amsterdam so why not 
establish their own ‘provincial’ clearing house? Amsterdam stockbrokers 
that were shut out from the VvdE, could participate too. An existing 
financial intermediary, probably a bank, would then fulfil the function of 
such a clearing house. This bank would receive all securities orders from 
intermediaries that were barred from the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and 
would clear the orders. The ‘Amsterdamsche Liquidatiekas’ was willing to 
fulfil the function of ‘provincial’ clearing house. When the VvdE heard 
about these plans, it renewed contacts with the Bond. An obstacle for the 
VvdE was the representativeness of the Bond. The VvdE demanded that 
the Bond had to gain a sufficient number of provincial stockbrokers as 
members, before it would continue talks about the commission rates. The 
reason why the VvdE made this demand was that it wanted to be sure that 
all, or at least the majority of the provincial stockbrokers, would comply 
with and stick to the commission rates agreement. The ‘sufficient number’ 
was set at 400; at that moment (April 1904) the Bond had 240 members. 
The total number of provincial stockbrokers in the Netherlands was 600. If 
the number of 400 could be reached, it also implied an increase of the 
credibility of the Bond as a representative of provincial stockbrokers itself. 
It could then claim to speak for the greater part of the provincial 
stockbrokers. Probably against the expectations of some Amsterdam 
stockbrokers, the number of 400 was reached quite fast; in December 1904 
the Bond registered the 400th member. Finally, the VvdE and the Bond 
settled the issue concerning the commission tariffs in 1905. It had taken 
two years before the parties at last agreed on an arrangement that satisfied 
both sides.66  
 
Table 3.1: Commission rates securities traders 190567 
  
1905 Commission rates 
To members of one of the 
‘Vereenigingen’* 
(correspondents tariffs) 
½ ‰ (0,0005) 
To private persons 1/8 % (0,00125) 
                                                 
66 Van der Werf, De Bond, pp. 72-73.  
67 Van der Werf, De Bond, p. 313. 
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* The ‘Vereenigingen’ are: the Rotterdam ‘Vereeniging van Effectenhandelaren’ and the Provincial 
‘Bond’. Note that the arrangements between Rotterdam and Amsterdam commission traders remained 
open. They were not obliged to stick to the provision of a ½  ‰. 
 
In 1910, the issue on commission rates revived. Members of the VvdE 
protested against the 1905-agreement while they felt that they did the most 
important part of the securities trade; namely, the carrying out of the 
actual securities orders on the ASE. Hence, the Amsterdam stockbrokers 
were of the opinion that they should receive more commission than their 
provincial colleagues. After many deliberations, a new arrangement was 
concluded at the end of 1913 and became effective per January the first 
1914 (see table 3.2).68  
 
 
Table 3.2:  Commission rates in 191369 
    
1913 Over the nominal 
value of stocks 
quoted beneath    
25 % 
Over the nominal 
value of stocks 
quoted from 25 % 
to 105 % 
Over the real value 
of stocks quoted 
above 105 % 
To members of 
one of the 
‘Vereenigingen’ 
(correspondents 
tariffs) 
½ ‰ (0,0005) 1/16 % 
(0,000625) 
1/16 % 
(0,000625) 
To Amsterdam 
investors 
1/16 % 
(0,000625) 
1/8 % (0,00125) 1/8 % (0,00125) 
To provincial 
investors 
1/8 % (0,00125) 3/16 % 
(0,001875) 
3/16 % 
(0,001875) 
To provincial  
investors who 
lived in the same 
place as ‘their’ 
provincial 
commission 
trader and who 
also paid income 
taxes in 
Amsterdam 
1/16 % 
(0,000625) 
1/8 % (0,00125) 1/8 % (0,00125) 
                                                 
 Van der Werf, De Bond, pp. 71-73 and 79-82. 
69 Van der Werf, De Bond, p.  315. 
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The first table can best be compared with the third column of the second 
table (‘Over the nominal value of stocks quoted from 25 % to 105 %’).  In 
this column probably most transactions took place because column two 
and four represent the extremes. What we see is that the tariffs that the 
Amsterdam stockbrokers could charge to provincial stockbrokers were 
raised from 0,0005 (½ ‰) to 0,000625 (1/16 %). Also, a division was made 
between Amsterdam clients, provincial clients and commuters who lived 
in the province but worked in Amsterdam. The provincial clients had to 
pay the highest commission tariffs. Apparently, provincial clients entailed 
more costs than Amsterdam clients and commuters. Probably, these extra 
costs were generated due to higher communication costs since Amsterdam 
clients and commuters were, literally, closer to the ASE. Also the costs for 
execution and administration should have been the same for any client so 
therefore we suspect that the extra costs were a result of higher 
communication costs.  
After years of struggle on the commission tariffs, the hostility 
between the different stockbroker organisations slowly disappeared. They 
constituted a permanent consultative body which regularly discussed the 
height of the commission tariffs.70  
 
3.6 Quotation issue and mid-rate 
One of the main problems the VvdE had to deal with was the question of 
the quotations. Newspapers often published wrong quotations. The 
journalists depended on the stockbrokers for the quotations. Some 
mistakes were made by accident, however: it regularly happened that 
stockbrokers deliberately passed on the wrong prices in order to fool their 
clients or their stockbroker colleagues, or to influence the quotation of a 
certain share or bond.71 For instance, in 1893, a member of the VvdE 
complained in a letter that another stockbroker deliberately wrote down a 
wrong quotation.72 Information on prices was thus often blurred. The 
VvdE established a Quotations Committee whose members had to 
superintend the quotations. If a deal had been closed, the involved parties 
were obliged to give note of this deal to one of the members of the 
Quotations Committee. Also, the highest and lowest price per day of a 
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security needed to be made known to this Committee. Unfortunately, the 
problems concerning the quotations remained. The Committee disciplined 
the offenders with warnings and fines but the complaints did not decline.73  
With the help of the highest and lowest price the so-called 
‘middenkoers’ or mid-rate was established. The mid-rate is the 
arithmetical average of the highest and lowest (executed) bid. Clients 
could give limited and ‘bestens’ (unlimited) orders. With a limited order, a 
client indicated the range (minimum and maximum) for the sell or buy 
price. If a ‘bestens’ order was given, a client wanted his order to be 
executed as soon as possible, regardless of the price. Yet, the majority of 
the public eventually wanted to be charged with the mid-rate and not with 
the price the stockbrokers actually had paid. The popularity of the mid-
rate with the large public happened to be a result of malicious 
stockbrokers. Clients did not trust the prices these commission traders 
claimed to have paid. While the highest and lowest price was published in 
newspapers, clients could see for themselves what the mid-rate must have 
been. The mid-rate appeared to be not always the most advantageous 
price, but at least clients knew what to expect. However, the mid-rate 
brought about other modes of deceit. For instance, if specialists and 
commission traders bought securities lower than the mid-rate, they created 
extra incomes for themselves while the client paid the mid-rate. On the 
other hand, the risk also existed that the mid-rate would be lower than the 
price against which an intermediary had just bought securities. In such a 
case, specialists or commission traders did not refrain from making up 
fictitious concluded orders to keep the mid-rate artificially high.74   
In 1905, protests were heard against the mid-rate. A member of the 
VvdE, Jacques Krijn, proposed the idea that a system of time periods 
should be introduced, amongst others to stop the usage of the mid-rate. 
The Quotations Committee agreed with this point of view. The Committee 
even suggested going a step further; it argued for an extension of the 
official stock exchange hours while that would result in the situation that 
clients could be kept informed about the prices by telegram, and that they 
could choose the moment themselves when their orders should be 
executed. However, these ideas were rejected by the majority of the 
members of the VvdE.75  
                                                 
73 De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 110-111. 
74 O.B.W. de Kat (1932, 3rd edition) Effectenbeheer. Rechtskundig, economisch en administratief handboek (De 
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 Still, the system of the mid-rate, or rather the abolishment of it, 
remained an issue during most of the twentieth century. In 1907, two 
members published a leaflet in which they raised the issue about the 
quotations and the mid-rate again. As a consequence, the ad hoc 
Committee for the Quotation Issue (Commissie voor het 
Noteeringsvraagstuk) was established. This Committee carried out a 
survey among the members of the VvdE. Clearly, different opinions about 
the mid-rate existed. Some of members, notably the commission traders, 
condemned the mid-rate, others, especially the specialists, wished to keep 
it. Another conclusion was that the mid-rate actually resulted in a 
deprivation of orders executed on the floor of the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange. Banks, and also provincial intermediaries used the mid-rate to 
enclose the orders they received from their clients themselves without 
bringing these orders to the ASE. These intermediaries waited until the 
mid-rate became known for that day, and tried to match the orders they 
had received, in-house or among each other.76 This was called order 
clearing. In this way, transaction costs were avoided. The members of the 
VvdE naturally disapproved of the situation while this implied a missed 
chance for functioning as an intermediary, thus a lack of provision, thus 
fewer incomes. Another, more economic, ground for rejecting this practice 
is that, if not all supply and demand is brought together, the price can 
never be ‘pure’ or a realistic reflection of the market. On the basis of these 
results, the Committee for the Quotation Issue once again put forth the 
idea of lengthening the trade hours and to divide the lengthened trading 
time into periods (tijdvakken), aiming at more transparency concerning 
realised prices. The members of the Committee believed that this 
transparency would automatically lead to the abolishment of the mid-rate 
while the public could see for themselves what price was best for them. 
The suggested plans caused a tumultuous meeting in which the majority 
did not accept the plans. The Committee tried to launch their plans once 
more with the opening of the Cuypers building in 1913 while this new 
environment, equipped with the newest telephone and telegraph devices 
and infrastructure, was excellently suited to animate trade by extending 
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the stock exchange hours and by transmitting prices during the trade. 
However, it failed once again.77  
 The discussion re-opened in the 1920s. The board of the VvdE 
followed the standard procedure of the establishment of an ad hoc 
committee, Committee Revision Regulations of the Quotations (Commissie 
herziening Noteeringsreglement) which had to formulate a plan 
concerning time periods. When the board of the VvdE presented the 
concepts of this Committee in 1923, they acted very carefully, trying to 
avoid clashes with the persevering advocates of the mid-rate. In 1924, a 
first experiment was approved with separate time periods during official 
stock exchange hours. 7 November 1924, the experiment started in Dutch 
government bonds. Four time periods were distinguished: (1) 13.30 – 13.40 
hrs; (2) 13.40-14.00 hrs; (3) 14.00-14.30 hrs; (4) 14.30-14.45 hrs. At the end of 
each time period, the specialists determined the quotations on the basis of 
ongoing trade. These quotations were distributed to the ‘outside world’ by 
means of VvdE’s radio service. In due time, the experiment was extended 
with other active funds, and with more time periods (7). Nevertheless, the 
mid-rate survived. A stockbroker could decide for himself when to execute 
the orders that were given before the stock exchange had opened.78 
Possibly, he waited to detect the tendency of a certain stock, trying to 
estimate the mid-rate, and then sell or buy higher or lower to profit from 
the margin between the mid-rate and the price he really received or paid.  
 Another Committee, Committee Bernhard (Commissie-Bernhard; 
‘Commissie belast met het onderzoek op welke wijze de beurs te 
reorganiseeren is’), established in 1930 with the aim to design a plan for 
reorganising the Exchange in general, advised introducing the so-called 
‘call system’. Within this system, all demand and supply for a particular 
fund must be made known by all parties at the same time, that is at the 
‘call’. At this ‘call’ the stockbrokers gathered around the specialists. The 
stockbrokers told the specialist which orders they had. Out of all these buy 
and sell orders, the specialist formed an official rate. This official rate 
functioned as the sole quotation for that particular fund for the rest of that 
day. Hence, all orders that came in after the call, were settled with the 
official rate. The calls should be done each day, in a fixed order. According 
to the advice of the Committee, a fixed order of the calls offered the 
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advantage that more members of the VvdE could be present than before; 
they knew exactly when a specific stock would be handled. Besides, the 
Committee expected that it would cause a widening of the securities trade. 
What the Committee meant by ‘widening’ is not completely clear but one 
could think of more orders. Seeing that the quotations were determined at 
the beginning of the official trading hours, the stockbrokers could inform 
their clients about the execution of their orders in an early stadium, which 
should result in more orders. A ‘call’ contains practically all buy and sell 
orders from that moment, hence, the official rate can be viewed as a real 
and pure reflection of the market. Besides the widening of trade, two other 
advantages of the call system should be that it: (1) diminished trade 
outside the official corner of a certain security because no one would run 
the risk of not being able to execute an affair: and, (2) that it abolished the 
mid-rate while the official price was the price determined at the ‘call’. As 
another means to break down the mid-rate, the Committee suggested 
expanding the official trading hours even though this request had been 
done earlier without any results. The same reasoning as twenty ears before 
was followed, namely that longer trading hours offered larger possibilities 
to inform clients during the opening hours of the ASE, thus, a client could 
decide to buy or sell on a real time basis.79  
 The summed up advantages of the call system did not convince the 
board of the VvdE. The idea that stockbrokers had to expose themselves 
already at the beginning of trade, was merely seen as a disadvantage 
instead of a favourable circumstance. The VvdE feared that the official rate 
indicated a particular tendency (buying or selling) and that the larger part 
of the public just followed this tendency without thinking. An economic 
crash (note that the world was just recovering from the 1929 crash) would 
then occur much more easily than it would in the existing situation. 
Accordingly, the suggestion for the introduction of the call-system already 
fell with the board of the VvdE. The board of the VvdE approved of the 
idea for more stock exchange hours. It is not known why the board was 
attracted to this idea but it was probably due to the expectation that a 
longer trade time provoked a larger number of orders, and thus a larger 
volume of the Amsterdam, or Dutch, securities trade. The board launched 
another idea in addition that aimed at animating and expansion of trade, 
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namely to publish bid and asked prices of securities in the ‘Officieele 
Prijscourant’ next to the real prices.80 A bid price was a recommended 
price for securities that were wanted, given by the specialist. An asked 
price was a quotation for securities that were for sale, also given by the 
specialist. In both cases, sellers respectively buyers had not yet presented 
themselves. Conceivably, the board hoped that, with the publication of bid 
and asked prices of particular securities, potential buyers and sellers could 
see what was offered and what was asked and thus, that they would be 
triggered to give order to their intermediary to buy or sell. Hence, 
transparency should lead to more orders and a larger volume of trade. The 
above discussed recommendations that were written down in the ‘Scheme 
for Reorganisation’, drawn up by the 1930 Committee, did not make it. In a 
meeting, the majority of the members of the VvdE rejected once again 
plans to change the set up of the Dutch securities trade.81   
 After World War II, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange reopened on 7 
January 1946. The stock exchanges of Paris, Brussels and even those of 
Frankfurt am Main and München opened shortly after the war in 1945. 
Apparently, the Dutch showed some reluctance to start up one of the 
central drivers of the economy. Currency reform and reorganisation of 
public finances needed to be arranged first. After the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange had opened its doors again, trade was very limited. Order 
clearing was prohibited and trade was only allowed in domestic bonds.82 
The board of the VvdE probably figured that this was the time to abolish 
the mid-rate and order clearing once and for all. In March 1947, the VvdE 
introduced the system of the ‘hoofdkoers’ or ‘main quotation’. This system 
worked as follows: at two o’ clock the specialist of the concerned security 
made up a main quotation out of the orders he had received until five 
minutes before two o’ clock (note that the stock exchange hours still ran 
from 13.30 to 14.45 hrs)83. On two ‘o clock, a break of ten minutes started. 
After this ten minutes break free trade began, divided into three tapes in 
which orders other than ‘main quotations’ orders were executed. In fact, 
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the complete trade time was split up in three parts; the first (13.30-14.00), 
in which at the end a main quotation was established, the second (14.00-
14.10) which was the break, and third (14.10-14.45) in which “free” trade 
took place during three time periods, the so-called tapes. The stockbrokers 
who gave their orders to the specialist before 13.55 hrs., had to indicate 
whether their clients wished the order to be executed against this main 
quotation. If this was not the case, stockbrokers waited until the free trade 
period and tried to find a match for their clients there. Furthermore, a 
client could give a limitation to a main quotation order, for instance 359 % 
(the percentage represents the real value of a security). If the main 
quotation was, for instance 360 %, the order could not be executed. The 
stockbroker could use the ten minute break to contact his client to inform 
him on the possibilities; either wait until the main quotation of the next 
day, or execute the order in the free trade period. This system only applied 
for the active securities, thus the securities that were traded over seven 
tapes before the war.84 The system of the main quotation lasted less than a 
year. In November 1947, it was abolished again. Also, the embargo on 
order clearing was lifted. The VvdE decided to return to quotations in 
seven tapes for the active securities.85 
In 1954, the VvdE established the Committee Mandersloot. The 
Committee was amongst others, assigned to investigate the factors that 
hindered the securities trade and to advise on possible solutions. With 
these hindering factors, one aimed at the mid-rate and, inextricably related 
to that, at order clearing. The members of the Committee considered once 
again to lengthen the official trade hours, namely from 10.30 to 15.30 hrs. 
The Committee expected that the effect of this prolongation should not 
only be an increase of orders, but also that the orders, given at different 
moments in time, should be sent to the ASE, as well as the balances of the 
orders that were passed through at the same time. Apparently, the 
members of the Committee saw a longer trade time as a remedy to 
clearing. It gave room to more diversified quotations of securities which 
could be more advantageous than the mid-rate. Still, the Committee also 
saw disadvantages to the system of continuous trade; the need for extra 
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personnel, insecurity for the specialists, and the attachment of the large 
public to the usage of the mid-rate.86 Concerning the need for extra 
personnel: since the stock exchange hours were only an hour and a quarter 
of an hour, the personnel involved could easily perform other tasks, like 
administrative actions that came along with the securities trade. Hence, if 
the trade time was lengthened, extra personnel was needed to perform the 
tasks, the stock exchange employees normally would do. Concerning the 
insecurity for the specialists: by accepting orders, specialists committed 
themselves to the execution of these orders. In fact, they warranted that the 
orders were carried out. Specialists thus ran the risk for one hour and a 
quarter of an hour that no suitable buyer or seller would present himself. If 
that would happen, the specialist had to act as buyer or seller himself. A 
longer trade time would imply that the specialist had to run that risk even 
longer. Concerning the attachment of the large public to the usage of the 
mid-rate: to settle against the mid-rate was a common use. The majority of 
the public did not know any better. They even demanded to settle their 
orders against the mid-rate. It would be hard to change this practise.    
 After weighing the advantages and disadvantages, and having 
consulted several specialists the Committee decided not to urge on a 
lengthened trade time. Instead of this, the Committee advised the 
prohibition of order clearing. The Committee did not talk to other parties 
involved in the securities trade thus, the opinion of the specialists strongly 
influenced the Committee’s advice. The report of the Committee 
mentioned that the prohibition of order clearing should be worked out 
very carefully.87 However, that was not done in the report and, according 
to my knowledge, the VvdE did not comply with the advice of the 
Committee Mandersloot. Once again a Committee was established to bring 
up a solution for the mid-rate and order clearing, and once again it 
appeared to be a failure. The failure did not spring out of the mismatch 
between the conservative members and a too progressive committee and 
members but it was due to the fact that the Committee hanged its ears too 
much to one party, namely the specialists.  
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 As from the 1960s, the board of the VvdE once again started the 
discussion concerning the organisation of the securities trade, amongst 
others, on how to reorganise the realisation of quotations. After consulting 
different parties, new regulations were introduced in 1967. First of all, the 
mid-rate was abolished. Strangely enough, after more than half a century 
of discussion the prohibition on the mid-rate seemed to be complied with. 
Apparently, all parties involved agreed that the age of the mid-rate was 
over. The reason for this agreement remains unclear. Second, the stock 
exchange hours for inactive securities were divided into two time periods, 
namely from 11.30 to 12.15 hrs. and from 12.45 to 13.15 hrs (note that the 
stock exchange hours were advanced from 13.00-14.1588 to 11.30-13.15 hrs). 
Normally, at the end of the trade time, a quotation was made up for 
inactive securities. By dividing the stock exchange hours for inactive 
securities with a thirty minute break, the VvdE aimed at animating trade in 
these valuable papers. After the first time period, the concerned specialist 
had to come up with a quotation which could be made known to parties 
outside the building of the ASE. In the thirty minute break, financial 
intermediaries could seek contact with clients and inform them, or 
interested people could pass through orders after hearing this first 
quotation. The stock exchange hours for active securities remained divided 
into seven time periods. What changed was that trade started with an 
opening quotation around 11.30 hrs that the specialist made up out of the 
orders he received before the official trade time. After that, trade continued 
into seven time periods. A stockbroker had to indicate to the specialist 
whether his client wished his order to be executed against the opening 
quotation. This way of trading resembled very much the system of the 
main quotation in 1947. The difference was that the opening quotation was 
formed at the beginning of the stock exchange hours and the main 
quotation after one half hour of trade. Besides the abolishment of the mid-
rate, the stockbrokers were obliged to pass through all their orders 
although some of these orders could be compensated with others (thus, 
clearing). 89 It seems that as from now the ban on the mid-rate and the 
injunction to notify specialists of all orders persisted. 
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archive), inv. nr. 1604B, Circulaire no. 66-32 van het bestuur van de VvdE aan de leden (Circular no. 66-
32 from the board of the VvdE to its members), 9 augustus 1966 (9 August 1966); and, idem, een 
schrijven van de Commissie van de Noteering betreffende een evaluatie en voorstellen tot verbetering 
van de reorganisatie die in januari 1967 is ingegaan (a document of the Committee for Quotations 
concerning an evalution and proposals for enhancement of the reorganisation that is introduced in 
January 1967), 18 januari 1968 (18 January 1968); see also De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 251-257. 
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 In 1970, one of the members of the Quotations Committee proposed 
the idea for continuous quotations for active securities. The tapes had lost 
their meaning since the mid-rate was abolished in 1967. After all, the tapes 
were introduced to get rid of the mid-rate. The board of the VvdE adopted 
this idea. On 1 July 1971 the ASE switched over to continuous quotations 
for active securities. The advantage of this new system should be that 
continuous quotations gave a good insight in the price range, and thus, it 
would entail more securities orders. In order to obtain that goal, it was 
necessary that an adequate telecommunication system would be installed 
which could relay these prices continuously.90 Through the years, the 
number of securities that was continuously quoted, increased.  
 Above, we have mentioned several times the official stock exchange 
hours. This already implies that there was also unofficial stock exchange 
hours. Indeed, before and after the official stock exchange hours, trade in 
securities also took place. Probably, this ‘unofficial’ trade has taken place 
since the start of securities trade in the seventeenth century. The status of 
the ‘pre- and post’ Exchange (voor- en nabeurs) gradually became more 
official. This is shown by the discussion in the 1930s concerning the 
question whether the results of a transaction done during the pre or post 
Exchange, should be made public. The board of the VvdE opposed the idea 
while no control mechanism existed to check these quotations.91 Yet, the 
VvdE could not escape from the growing importance of the pre- and post 
exchange. Quotations made up during the pre-Exchange started to be used 
as a direction for the official quotations. Gradually buy and sell decisions, 
were taken on the basis of pre-Exchange quotations.92 Stockbrokers started 
to appear that solely focused on trade in the pre- and post exchange.93 
                                                 
90 Archive Euronext, Beleidsportefeuilles in het Fondsenarchief (Policy portfolios in the Securities 
archive), inv. nr. 1604B, Verslag van de vergadering van de Commissie voor de Notering d.d. 1 
december 1970. (Minutes meeting Committee of the Quotations, 1 December 1970). 
91 Archive Euronext, Beleidsportefeuilles in het Fondsenarchief (Policy portfolios in the Securities 
archive),  inv. nr. 1990, Dossier Voor- en Nabeurs (dossier pre- and post exchange), , no. 1, Brief van het 
bestuur van de VvdE aan de redacties van de kranten “De Telegraaf” en het “Algemeen Handelsblad” 
(Letter board VvdE to editorial board of two newspapers, “De Telegraaf” and the “Algemeen 
Handelsblad”),  9 oktober 1936 (9 October 1936);  Brief van het bestuur van de VvdE aan de Twentsche 
Bank N.V. (kantoor te Leiden) (Letter board VvdE to Twentsche Bank N.V. (branch office at Leyden)), 3 
maart 1938 (3 March 1938).  
92 Archive Euronext, Beleidsportefeuilles in het Fondsenarchief (Policy portfolios in the Securities 
archive),  inv. nr. 1990, Dossier Voor- en Nabeurs (dossier pre- and post exchange), , no. 1, Bijeenkomst 
van het Dagelijks bestuur van de VvdE en eenige leden der Noteeringscommissie betreffende 
voorbeurs (Meeting board of the VvdE and the Committee for the Quotations), 30 oktober 1930 (30 
October 1930). 
93 Since when these specialised pre- and post exchange stockbrokers exist is not quite clear. We know 
from a note concerning the pre- and post exchange, dated 11 November 1960, that an arrangement with 
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During the 1970s, the pre- and post exchange became more and more 
involved in the continuous trade of active securities. In 1985, the pre- and 
post exchange was added to the official stock exchange hours which 
resulted in a start of trade in active securities as from 10.00 until 16.30 
hrs..94 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, buying and selling of securities started to grow with 
the establishment of the VOC in 1602. At the time, trade had an open 
character which sometimes led to chaotic situations. Clearly trade became 
more organised during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Several 
stockbroker organisations were established to create some order in the 
often chaotic way securities were traded. The stockbroker organisations 
particularly focused on producing a reliable official list. The VvdE 
succeeded in becoming the stockbroker organisation that appropriated the 
domain of the organisation of the Dutch securities trade. It established itself 
as the voice for the securities traders, in particular for the Amsterdam 
securities traders. Traditionally, traders from all parts of the country could 
participate in the securities trade at the ASE. However, the VvdE turned 
the securities trade into an in crowd happening for Amsterdam financial 
intermediaries. The Exchange buildings strengthened the ‘emancipation’ of 
the stockbrokers. In the Zocher Exchange, the stockbrokers were fed up 
with the commotion. In the Berlage Exchange, the stockbrokers who were 
a member of the VvdE disposed of a secluded trade floor. The Cuypers 
building was solely destined for the securities trade. 
One of the main issues the VvdE had to deal with were the 
problems concerning the quotations. First, a reliable price list needed to be 
drawn up and second a solution to the dominance of the mid-rate needed 
to be found. Both practices were unwanted since it could lead to deceit. A 
reliable price list appeared as the Officieele Prijscourant. The prices were 
checked before published. Eventually, an end was put to the mid-rate 
although it took over fifty years to realise the abolishment. Attempts to 
                                                                                                                           
with pre- and post stockbrokers is concluded on 26 March 1954. However, since the pre- and post 
exchange existed much longer, we suspect that these specialised pre- and post exchange stockbrokers, 
also appeared earlier than 1954. The question however is since when they were regarded as a separate 
group.  
94 Archive Euronext, Beleidsportefeuilles in het Fondsenarchief (Policy portfolios in the Securities 
archive), inv. nr. 2116C, VvdE, Publikaties, map ‘Historie Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs’ (dossier History 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange). 
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dissolve the mid-rate led to changes in the securities trade such as the 
introduction of tapes. 
After World War II, the closed character of the Dutch securities 
trade, slowly started to become more open again. The opening up of 
membership of the VvdE to intermediaries from outside Amsterdam 
especially affirmed this development. Within two centuries, the securities 
trade had switched from a wide open market to a closed institutionalised 
one, to open again. Yet, the openness as we saw in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century did not return. This openness related specifically to 
persons who were involved professionally to securities trade. The only 
way to see a glimpse of the securities trade as a private person, was to take 
a guided tour through the Cuypers Exchange.  
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4. Value Systems of the Dutch Securities Trade  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The origination and backgrounds of the Dutch securities trade are now 
known; the next step is to discern the main participants and whether any 
new participants appear or disappear. With this knowledge, we can put 
together a value system of the Dutch securities trade and thus answer 
subquestion (a) which actors constitute the value systems in the Dutch securities 
trade? The aim is to come to several value systems over time. These value 
systems will be compared and by means of this comparison, the changes in 
the organisation of the Dutch securities are distinguished. 
 Section 4.2 gives a general overview of the main participants in the 
Dutch securities trade. Section 4.3 focuses especially on joint stock 
commercial banks that, as will be indicated, dominated as service 
providers in the Dutch securities throughout the twentieth century. Two 
banks in particular are studied in more detail: the Rotterdamsche Bank/ 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging and the Twentsche Bankvereeniging 
/Twentsche Bank.1 The reason to focus on these two banks lies in the fact 
that their origin was from outside Amsterdam and therefore they 
constitute interesting cases to see how they organised their services in 
relation to the securities trade. As concerns the TB, its first office was 
established in Amsterdam. However, the founders of the TB were from the 
eastern part of the Netherlands. Therefore, it is expected that the TB 
actively stayed in contact with its roots. In this chapter, the Rotterdamsche 
Bank and the Twentsche Bank are discussed in general. After the 
                                                 
1 1863-1911: Rotterdamsche Bank; 1911-1947: Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging; 1947-1964: 
Rotterdamsche Bank. 
1861-1917: Twentsche Bankvereeniging; 1917-1964: Twentsche Bank. 
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discussion on the different participants, the value systems for the Dutch 
securities trade will be drawn up in section 4.4.   
  
4.2 Actors Dutch securities trade 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth century Dutch trade in securities 
professionalised. Distinct groups of traders that engaged in securities came 
up such as commission traders, sworn brokers, merchant bankers, 
specialists2 and bond administration offices that executed orders for their 
clients and all administrative acts that came with it. ‘Commissionairs’ or 
commission traders functioned as the key figures. They can be regarded as 
the ‘wholesalers’ of the securities trade. Their chief activity was made up 
of the trade in securities in name of their clients against a certain 
percentage (=commission) of the quotations of the traded securities. In 
addition to that, commission traders were part of underwriting syndicates3 
and issues, intermediated between lenders and borrowers on 
‘prolongatie’4, and were active in arbitrage trade. Furthermore, they took 
initiatives in trying to organise the trade in an orderly way. Commission 
traders were driving the force behind the establishment of the Vereeniging 
voor den Effectenhandel.5 Makelaars or ‘sworn brokers’ stood one step 
beneath the commission traders in the hierarchy of stockbrokers. They had 
to stick to pure intermediation between buyers and sellers while 
commission traders were allowed, besides the intermediation business, to 
take a position in the market. As Jonker puts it, ‘commission traders had a 
distinct status’.6 For their intermediation business, the sworn brokers 
received ‘courtage’ or brokerage.7 Another step below came the rest; 
traders without any official status that just hoped to gain from price 
differentials such as day-traders.8  
The merchant bankers formed a different group while the securities 
trade was only one of their activities and not their principal activity. 
Actually, merchant bankers were true middlemen; they offered financial 
services related to bills of exchange, insurances, commodities, securities, 
                                                 
2 The generic term for commission traders, sworn brokers and merchant bankers that will be used in 
this book is stockbrokers or securities traders.  
3 A syndicate is a temporary group of financial intermediaries that supports a issue. 
4 ‘Prolongatie’ will be explained on pages 77 and 78 of this chapter.  
5 Jonker, Merchants, p. 146. 
6 Jonker, Merchants, p. 146. 
7 J.P.B. Jonker (1997) Schakel tussen verleden en toekomst. 275 jaar traditie en vernieuwing in het Nederlandse 
bankwezen (MeesPierson; Amsterdam) p. 14. 
8 Jonker, Merchants, p. 147. 
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guaranteeing payments and money.9 Examples of merchant bankers that 
also acted as commission traders in securities were the old Amsterdam 
firm Hope & Co, Vlaer & Kol from Utrecht, F. Van Lanschot in ‘s 
Hertogenbosch, Lissa & Kann from The Hague and R. Mees & Zoonen 
from Rotterdam.10  
The hierarchy of the stockbrokers was also reflected in the way 
they acted. For instance, in the eighteenth century the different groups 
gathered in separate cafes. In the nineteenth century the merchant bankers 
could be recognised as the gentlemen that stood next to the jostling crowd 
of traders. These gentlemen engaged other brokers to execute their and 
their client’s orders. The commission traders did mingle in the crowd but 
for the reasons mentioned above, it was clear to anyone that they 
functioned as the central figures in the securities trade.11 Nonetheless, at 
the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the commission traders increasingly left the execution of orders to 
their employees.  
It seems that as from the end of the nineteenth century, a new 
intermediary entered the securities trade, although it is not entirely clear 
when the ‘specialists’ or ‘market makers’ (hoekman) precisely entered the 
scene or why they appeared. According to De Vries, in 1890, the different 
spaces in the Exchange building where the various securities were traded, 
were called ‘corners’. In these corners, certain persons became specialised 
in the trade of the shares or bonds of one company or one loan. That 
explains the term ‘specialists’. The activities of these specialists were new, 
but the specialists themselves were usually stockbrokers that were trained 
in securities trade. Specialists actually functioned as stockbrokers for the 
stockbrokers. They gathered the buy and sell orders of a certain security. 
By doing this, they obliged themselves to execute these orders even if a 
suitable buyer or seller did not appear. Hence, a specialist ran the risk that 
he had to buy or sell himself, at his own costs, to meet the obligation which 
he had imposed on himself, of executing an order, without a direct 
repayment.12 Gradually, specialists consolidated their position in the 
Dutch securities trade and even set up their own association in 1922.13 The 
question arises why this new type of intermediary entered. A plausible 
explanation is that since the number of traded securities rose at the end of 
                                                 
9 Jonker, Merchants, p. 187. 
10 De Vries, Een eeuw,  p. 39.   
11 Jonker, Merchants, pp. 145-146. 
12 Brouwer, Beurs, p. 213.  
13 De Vries, Een eeuw,  p. 109. 
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the nineteenth century, the need for intermediaries who were specialised 
in certain securities appeared. 
Dutch investors were very much interested in Russian bonds and 
American railway bonds in the second half of the nineteenth century due 
to a lack of domestic securities. The market for American railway bonds 
was especially very speculative. Yet, due to the large distances, 
information asymmetry played a large role. The interests of investors from 
overseas were often at stake because they always heard relevant news later 
than their counterparts on the spot. Bankers and merchant bankers started 
to establish ‘administratiekantoren’ or bond administration offices in order 
to cope with this information asymmetry. Bond administration offices tried 
to defend the interests of their clients and to inform them as good as 
possible. It appeared to be a unique Dutch institution. In addition to that, 
bond administration offices managed the original shares or bonds and the 
accompanying rights such as the supervising and the right to vote for their 
clients. The clients received certificates that stated they were the owners of 
a certain amount of securities. Rights, attached to the ownership of 
securities, such as the right to vote on shareholders meetings and to 
supervise a company, were left to the administrators of the bond 
administration offices. Another task the administrators performed, became 
the payment of interest, in case of bonds, or dividend, in case of shares, 
against a small fee.14  
Earlier, several merchant houses were mentioned as intermediaries 
in the securities trade such as Hope & Co, Vlaer & Kol from Utrecht, F. 
Van Lanschot in ‘s Hertogenbosch, Lissa & Kann from The Hague and R. 
Mees & Zoonen from Rotterdam. None of them, except for Van Lanschot 
which is still an independent bank, kept existing as independent 
intermediaries. In 1978 Van Lanschot became a limited liability company 
and its official name turned into F. van Lanschot Bankiers N.V.15 In 1940, 
Hope & Co from Amsterdam obtained all shares of Lissa & Kann from The 
Hague. These measures were dictated by the fear of the German 
occupation of the Netherlands brought with since Lissa & Kann origins 
were Jewish.16 The take-over was formally arranged in 1947. In 1942, 
Heldring & Pierson, originally from The Hague, started to collaborate 
more closely with Pierson & Co from Amsterdam to support each other in 
                                                 
14 Jonker, Merchants, p. 157;  Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland, pp. 269-270. 
15 Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw: balansreeksen en naamlijst van handelsbanken, 
DNB Statistische Cahiers Nr. 3 (NIBE/SVV; Amsterdam) p. 113.  
16 Geljon, Een zeer persoonlijk effectenhuis, p. 160. 
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those hard times. The two involved ‘Piersons’ were brothers. This 
collaboration converted into a complete merger in 1958 and became known 
under the name Pierson, Heldring & Pierson. The merger was instigated 
by the fact that Royal Shell wanted to initiate a large international issue. 
Pierson & Co possessed the best contacts abroad but Heldring & Pierson 
was more familiar with Royal Shell. In order to prevent confusion in name 
in case both would participate in the issue, these two banks decided to 
merge. Vlaer & Kol from Utrecht was taken under the wings of Pierson, 
Heldring & Pierson in 1967. A same construction as between Heldring & 
Pierson and Pierson & Co, was seen between Mees & Zn from Rotterdam 
and Hope & Co from Amsterdam. In 1962, Mees & Zn and Hope & Co 
joined forces. In this year these two banks started to cooperate which 
ended in a merger in 1966, resulting in Mees & Hope. Mees & Hope 
further expanded through a merger with the Nederlandse Overzee Bank in 
1968, from then known as Bank Mees & Hope. The latter sold itself to the 
ABN17 in 1975, while in the same year Pierson, Heldring & Pierson went 
over to the AMRO Bank18. They became subsidiary companies. Three years 
after the merger between the ABN and AMRO Bank in 1990, Pierson, 
Heldring & Pierson formed MeesPierson together with Bank Mees & 
Hope. In 1997, the Fortis Bank took over MeesPierson from ABN AMRO.19 
The places of residence from these different intermediaries were 
mentioned several times. This however does not always imply that they 
only had one office in that city. For instance, Heldring & Pierson had taken 
over Broekman’s Effectenkantoor from Amsterdam in 1922. Although, 
Broekman’s Effectenkantoor kept its own name in the beginning, it meant 
that Heldring & Pierson from 1922 onward owned an office in 
Amsterdam.20  
The overall movement in the financial sector was clearly towards 
integration. As from the 1940s, the merchant bankers merge with each 
other, and as from the 1970s, these merchant bankers come under the 
wings of a joint stock commercial bank as a subsidiary company or they 
completely merge with their new owners. 
 
 
                                                 
17 ABN stands for Algemene Bank Nederland and is the result of a merger between the Twentsche 
Bank and the Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij in 1964 as will be discussed in section 4.3.4.  
18 AMRO stands for Amsterdamsche Bank and Rotterdamsche Bank; a merger that took place in 1964 
which will be further elaborated on in section 4.3.2.  
19 Jonker, Schakel tussen verleden en toekomst, p.79, p. 86, pp. 96-99.  
20 Jonker, Schakel tussen verleden en toekomst, p. 77.  
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4.3 Joint stock commercial banks 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, a new type of intermediary 
entered the financial sector. Several joint-stock commercial banks were 
founded such as the Twentsche Bank (1861), the Rotterdamsche Bank 
(1863) and the Amsterdamsche Bank (1871). It is remarkable that the 
emergence of these banks occurred in the same period. Some authors even 
speak of a completely new development in the financial sector and use 
terms as ‘Gründungswelle’ (German for ‘founding wave’) and ‘revolution’ 
to typify that period.21  What catches the eye is their juridical form - a joint 
stock company or limited liability company -, the size of their starting 
capital, - many millions -, and their primary objective, - the providing of 
credits.22 The juridical form of a limited liability is remarkable since this 
type of business organisation stood under strict control of the Government 
since Napoleon’s Code du Commerce (1811). As from then, an approval by 
the Government was required (‘Koninklijke Bewilliging’) before a firm 
could establish itself as a limited liability company. Apparently, 
entrepreneurs were not very eager to submit themselves to Government 
control. Although Napoleon’s influence disappeared after a few years, the 
Government’s approval was preserved in the new commercial code 
(Wetboek van Koophandel) in 1838. Actually, the Dutch Government did 
not acquiesce in several requests for joint stock banks in 1837 and in 1857.23 
The alternative for Dutch firms was a private limited company 
(commanditaire vennootschap). Within such an organisational form,  
‘sleeping partners’ supply capital and are only accountable for the sum of 
money that is staked. A small group of active partners ran the business.24 
The advantage of a private limited company was that the sleeping partners 
did not interfere with the way a firm was managed; this was the sole 
domain of the active partners.  
Although the big wave of the establishment of limited liability 
companies still had to come, the new joint stock commercial banks 
founded around the 1860s, received the required Government’s approval. 
The governance structure of a limited liability company became a more 
popular option for financial institutions as from the rise of ‘Crédit 
Mobilier’. The idea of Crédit Mobilier developed in France and constituted 
the thought that as a consequence of laws of inheritance, means of 
                                                 
21 Kymmell, Geschiedenis I, p. 135; Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland 1780-1914. p. 270. 
22 Kymmell, Geschiedenis I, p. 107. 
23 Jonker, Merchants, pp. 61-62. 
24 Jonker, Merchants, p. 61.  
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production had not always ended up in competent hands. Banks were 
needed to distribute the means of production in such a way that capable 
manufacturers, farmers and merchants would receive it. Therefore, banks 
needed to gather capital from investors or capitalists and make it available 
in the form of credits. In this way, credits would bring prosperity to the 
country.25  
The advantage of joint stock commercial banks in comparison to 
other financial institutions was that they were better able to gather large 
amounts of (starting) capital within a short period of time for sizeable 
credits due to being a limited liability company. According to Kymmell, 
the expectation was that large credits would be necessary for the 
upcoming capital intensive industry at that time.26 This idea blew over 
from other European countries as France and Germany.27 However, the 
idea of the needs for large credits did not apply to the Netherlands. Due to 
the open and sophisticated character of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 
capital could be raised quite easily in the Netherlands.28 As Jonker puts it: 
‘No need here, as elsewhere in Europe, for new institutions to 
accommodate the flotation of capital-intensive projects like the railways. 
The existing arrangements sufficed, and between 1837 and 1860 railway 
issues totalling 52 million guilders were usually taken up with ease’.29 The 
open and sophisticated character of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and 
the ‘existing arrangements’ refer to the ‘prolongatie stelsel’ or putting 
money on-call. Jonker defines ‘prolongatie’ ‘as a short term advance for a 
month against shares, bonds, or debentures, tacitly prolonged at the end 
until cancellation by either side’.30 People could easily offer their spare 
money as an advance to other people who wanted to borrow it in exchange 
for securities in order to invest it, again, in securities. Because of that, 
securities were as liquid as hard cash. The market for prolongatie credits 
came up in the nineteenth century, and due to the telegraph, it soon 
became a national market for credits. A national ‘prolongatie’ system 
required quick and reliable information from all over the country 
concerning shortages and surplus of liquid assets, or in other words, 
demand and supply. The telegraph met this need.31 
                                                 
25 Kymmell , Geschiedenis I¸ p. 116; Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland, p. 271. 
26 Kymmell, Geschiedenis I, p. 107. 
27 Kymmell, Geschiedenis I, pp. 112-119;  Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland, p. 271. 
28 Jonker, Merchants, p. 164. 
29 Jonker, Merchants, p. 164. 
30 Jonker, Merchants, p. 90. 
31 Van Zanden and Van Riel, Nederland, pp. 268-269.  
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Joint stock commercial banks also started to offer other services, 
including services in the trade in stocks and shares.32 The majority of these 
banks started to act as commission traders to profit from the ever-growing 
interest in the securities trade.33 Hence, the joint-stock commercial banks 
offered more and more the same services as the existing financial 
intermediaries. The difference might have been that they could provide 
larger credits and that they could offer a greater variety of services but the 
services itself were not new. Therefore, there was no question of revolution 
in the financial sector.34 
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, Dutch banking had 
been relatively small. The joint stock commercial banks that were almost 
all founded in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly provided 
short term credits for national and international trade. This pattern started 
to change while the manufacturing industry gradually obtained a foothold 
in the Dutch economy. For instance, banks were more and more prepared 
to underwrite issues of industrial firms. Banks and other financial 
intermediaries often jointly issued an initial public offering. Such a joint 
co-operation between financial intermediaries is called a syndicate. 
Another possibility to issue shares was a ‘guichet issuing’. In this case, a 
financial intermediary only mediated by offering shares to interested 
people without guaranteeing yield of the issue to the issuing institution. A 
financial intermediary merely put its counter (=guichet) and its 
accompanying administrative facilities at the disposal of the issuing 
company.35  
The number of listed industrial firms at the ASE rose from 24 to 108 
in the period 1900 – 1914. According to De Jonge, the introduction of 
preferent shares in the same period also played a role in the rise of listed 
industrial firms, apart from just the expansion of the industrial sector. A 
preferent share insured an investor of a fixed percentage, although limited, 
of the profit the firm had gained. If you were a ‘normal’ shareholder, you 
always had to wait and see whether you would receive dividend.36  
Due to the widespread prolongatie system, joint-stock commercial 
banks had a hard time attracting deposits. These banks initially aimed at 
                                                 
32 Jonker, Merchants, p. 64. 
33 Kymmell, Geschiedenis II-B, p. 298. 
34 Jonker, ‘The alternative road to modernity’, p. 117. 
35 J.A. Gons en C. de Pee (1994) Geld, Banken & Financiële Markten. Praktische inleiding in de economie 3 
(Stenfert Kroese; Leiden) p. 48. 
36 De Jonge (1988) ‘Het economische leven’, pp. 262-263; W.H. Berghuis (1967) Ontstaan en ontwikkeling 
van de Nederlandse beleggingsfondsen tot 1914 (Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V.; Assen) p. 115.  
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gathering large sums of deposits in order to use this capital for credits.37 
Actually, World War I created opportunities for banks in attracting 
deposits. Since the Amsterdam Stock Exchange had to close in July 1914, 
the use of the ‘prolongatiestelsel’ diminished. Companies and private 
persons saw a lucrative possibility to offer their spare money as loans on 
the securities trade market, disappear. It appeared to be the safest option 
to store their redundant money with banks. Although the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange re-opened its doors after a few months, in February 1915, 
the idea of leaving money with a bank had become less fearsome.38 The 
‘Nederlandse Overzeese Trustmaatschappij’ (NOT) (Dutch Overseas 
Trustcompany) demanded a bank guarantee if companies wanted to 
import commodities. The NOT formally was a private company that 
arranged international trade for Dutch companies during WW I but had 
become more and more an institute that took over and carried out Dutch 
economic policy.39 Consequently, the role of banks became firmly fixed in 
the international trade of Dutch companies. Other evidence that showed 
the growing importance of banks, was the increasing number of 
commissionerships (commissariaten) of Dutch bankers with large firms. In 
the period 1910 - 1923 the number had risen from 200 to 431. Banks used 
these commissionerships as a means to supervise their long-term 
investments in industrial firms and to strengthen the mutual relationships. 
Yet, in the beginning of the 1920s it seemed that supervision by means of 
commissionerships did not always lead to flawless management with the 
supervised firms. Lack of knowledge concerning long term financing of 
industrial activities, seemed to be a major problem. Banks collected their 
loans and the number of commissionerships decreased.40 Particularly the 
Rotterdamsche Bank had to take some beatings. Managing director Willem 
Westerman had given a credit of 25 million guilders to a large shareholder 
of the RB. This amount of money was as much as the total of the bank’s 
reserves. Due to the economic malaise, people started to recollect the 
money they had deposited. The RB could not cope with these recollections 
since it had spent its total reserve to this enormous loan. The Minister of 
                                                 
37 Jonker, Merchants, p. 91. 
38 Jan Luiten van Zanden (1997) ‘Old rules, new conditions, 1914-1940’, in: Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost 
Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.) A financial history of The Netherlands (Cambridge University 
Press; Cambridge) p. 124.  
39 H.W. von der Dunk (1988) ‘Nederland ten tijde van de Eerste Wereldoorlog’ in: J.C. Boogman e.a., 
Geschiedenis van het moderne Nederland. Politieke, economische en sociale ontwikkelingen (De Haan; Houten) 
p. 353.  
40 Jan Luiten van Zanden (1997) Een klein land in de 20e eeuw. Economische geschiedenis van Nederland 
1914-1995 (Het Spectrum; Utrecht) pp. 139-140 and p. 146. 
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Finance had to intervene to ensure RB’s future; the Minister guaranteed 
the Dutch Central Bank (de Nederlandsche Bank) that he warranted for 60 
million guilders to save the RB.41 
The importance of joint stock commercial banks certainly grew 
during the first twenty years of the twentieth century. Undoubtedly, this 
development was related to the Dutch economic process in which growth 
of the Dutch manufacturing business had taken place. At that time, the 
four largest banks were the Rotterdamsche Bank, the Amsterdamsche 
Bank, the Twentsche Bank, the Incasso-Bank, and the Nederlandsche 
Handel-Maatschappij. If a closer look is taken at their balance sheets, we 
see their growth in the period 1895-1949 (table 4.1): 
 
Table 4.1: Total balance sheet in million guilders of the four 
largest banks in the period 1895-1949.42 
     
Year Twentsche 
Bank 
Amsterdam-
sche Bank 
Rotterdam-
sche Bank 
Nederlandsche 
Handel-
Maatschappij 
1895 39,12 29,44 15,74 63,81 
1900 61,17 28,60 23,27 58,26 
1905 78,99 44,60 22,11 109,45 
1910 104,01 51,57 30,46 136,67 
1913 127,47 86,57 123,41 151,57 
1914 135,25 92,08 124,85 157,30 
1919 263,47 456,74 608,37 452,85 
1924 240,90 423,67 288,86 391,07 
1929 286,06 440,86 386,21 475,08 
1934 233,38 364,36 256,12 293,87 
1939 209,58 294,64 275,54 353,65 
1944 507,76 462,98 663,75 976,66 
1949 759,20 1110,00 1077,65 1687,99 
 
During the inter war period, the Second World War, and the first years 
after this War, commercial banks kept on doing what they had always 
done. However, as from the 1950s, commercial banks entered the market 
                                                 
41 De Jager, ‘De harde leerschool’,  pp. 265-266. 
42 Jaap Barendregt (1999) ‘Op weg naar nationale bekendheid. Het Handelsbankwezen tussen 1870 en 
1914’,  in: Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom, Ton de Graaf (eds.) Wereldwijd bankieren. ABN AMRO 1824-1999 
(ABN AMRO Bank N.V.; Amsterdam) pp. 133, 136, 147, 159.; De Jager, ‘De harde leerschool’, p. 256, p. 
263, p. 274, p. 284.  
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for savings which were traditionally dominated by savings banks, 
agricultural banks, and the ‘Rijkspostspaarbank’ (the postal savings bank) 
(see table 4.2). The pursuit for saving deposits was related to increased 
demand for medium term credits from Dutch industrial firms and the 
decreased supply of deposits of Dutch business firms in general. 
Commercial banks were brought into contact with these types of loans just 
after World War II. In that period, the Minister of Finance, mr. P. Lieftinck, 
established a national bank, the ‘Herstelbank’ which aimed at restoring 
Dutch business. Banks participated for 49 percent in the share capital of the 
Herstelbank and were closely involved in the operations of this bank. As a 
result, commercial banks got acquainted with medium term credits.43    
 
Table 4.2 : Shares of different groups of banks in 
the market of savings, 1950-1988 (in percentages)44 
      
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988 
‘Rijkspostspaarbank’ 32 24 18 14 16 
Savings banks 29 28 25 17 16 
Agricultural banks 37 39 42 41 40 
Commercial banks 1 8 16 28 28 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The activities in the savings market, heralded the start of retail banking of 
commercial banks. Retail banking implied the offering of banking services 
to private housekeepings. The Twentsche and Amsterdamsche Bank took 
the lead in this retail banking process. For instance, the Twentsche Bank 
introduced deposit-bankbooks, the personal loan (1958), the salary account 
(1959), investment funds and budget credits. The Amsterdamsche Bank 
stimulated, for example, consumptive credits. These types of services 
eventually led to a diversification of the Dutch banking sector. Banks with 
different origins, thus with a commercial, agricultural, or savings 
background offered more and more the same package of services. 45 
  
                                                 
43 Jan Luiten van Zanden and Roland Uittenbogaard (1999) ‘Expansie, internationalisering en 
concentratie, 1950-1990’ in:  Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom, Ton de Graaf (eds.)  Wereldwijd bankieren. ABN 
AMRO 1824-1999 (ABN AMRO Bank N.V.; Amsterdam) p. 342; Jaap Barendregt and Hans Visser, 
‘Towards a new maturity, 1940-1990’ in: Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden 
(eds.)(1997) A financial history of The Netherlands (Cambridge University Press; Cambridge) p. 170. 
44 Barendregt and Visser, ‘Towards a new maturity’, p. 171. 
45 Van Zanden and Uittenbogaard, ‘Expansie’, pp. 343-344, pp. 348-349.   
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Let us recall the balance sheets of the four largest joint stock commercial 
banks. What is interesting, is the enormous boost the Rotterdamsche Bank 
made in the period 1910-1913. This is due to several take-overs and 
mergers and is generally seen as the start of a concentration process in the 
Dutch financial sector. The process implied less but larger banks. The 
decrease of the number of banks is visualised below (figure 4.1): 
 
 
 
Source: Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw: balansreeksen en naamlijst van 
handelsbanken, DNB Statistische Cahiers Nr. 3 (NIBE/SVV; Amsterdam) p. 102. 
 
The causes for their disappearance are shown below (figure 4.2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Number of joint stock commercial banks in the 
Netherlands, 1900-1990
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Source: Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw: balansreeksen en naamlijst van 
handelsbanken, DNB Statistische Cahiers Nr. 3 (NIBE/SVV; Amsterdam) p. 102. 
 
As we can see in figure 4.2, a boost of take-overs is seen in the period 
around 1920, and somewhat less in the period 1966-1970. The decreased 
number of joint stock commercial banks, affected for a large part the 
disappearance of provincial banks: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Causes decrease joint-stock commercial banks, 
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Source: D.C.J. van der Werf (1988) De Bond, de Banken en de Beurzen (NIBE; Amsterdam) pp. 304-307. 
 
The graphs show that, especially provincial financial intermediaries 
disappeared almost completely during the twentieth century. The 
Rotterdamsche Bank was one of the banks that remained and that only 
grew larger. In the next section, this Bank is discussed in more detail.  
 
4.3.1 Origination Rotterdamsche Bank(vereeniging) 1863-1911 
In 1863, a group of Rotterdam businessmen and bankers initiated the 
foundation of the Rotterdamsche Bank (RB). Among this group we find R. 
Mees & Zoonen, Gebroeders Chabot & Zn., Schaay & Madry, Jan Havelaar 
& Zn, Hendrik Muller Szn en J.W. Bunge.46 The founders aimed at a bank 
                                                 
46 Joost Jonker (1999) ’De bakermat van het moderne bankwezen. De Nederlandse geldhandel tussen 
de Franse Tijd en de eerste handelsbanken, 1813-1870’ in: Joh. de Vries, Wim Vroom en Ton de Graaf 
(eds.)  Wereldwijd bankieren. ABN AMRO 1824-1999 (ABN AMRO; Amsterdam)  p. 92 and Historisch 
Figure 4.3 Number provincial banks, 1814-1984
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that would mainly serve the financing of trade between the Netherlands 
and the Dutch East Indies (the present Indonesia) and of the 
manufacturing industry in this Dutch colony.47 A year after its foundation, 
the RB opened a principal branch office in Batavia (nowadays this is 
Jakarta). In 1865, the RB started branch offices in Singapore and Surabaya, 
and in 1867, also in Amsterdam. However, the branch offices in Singapore 
and in Amsterdam barely existed for one year. The RB had to cut costs due 
to the unfavourable economic situation in the East Indies. Due to a severe 
recession in the East Indies, the RB decided to phase out its activities in 
that area. The offices in Batavia and Surabaya were liquidated. The RB 
made arrangements with international banks, active in the East Indies, so 
that the RB and its clients could still perform economic activities in this 
part of the world.48  
In 1879, the RB had to deal with another setback. A Rotterdam 
banker, Lodewijk Pincoffs, who was involved in several Rotterdam trade 
and securities firms, managed to bring down almost all Rotterdam banks, 
bankers and cashiers since he had cheated with the bookkeeping of one his 
own banks.49 The setbacks made the RB follow a somewhat reserved 
strategy. The RB first needed to obtain a foothold at the domestic market.  
The RB started to focus more on other types of financial services 
such as the securities trade although it was not a completely new area. The 
RB had already been involved in the securities trade in several ways. First, 
the RB had issued shares itself to gather capital. Second, the Bank owned 
securities itself to profit from the fluctuations in prices to lard its own 
capital.50 Probably, these securities were also be used to settle orders from 
clients of the RB without actually bringing these orders to the Exchange 
itself. Third, the RB participated in syndicates. In the annual reports of the 
RB, a specification of participation in syndicates was given for several 
years. Unfortunately, it was not done consistently.51 Fourth, the RB 
provided short term credits that were used to trade in securities, the so 
called ‘prolongatiekrediet’.52 Fifth, the RB mediated in the execution of 
security orders for their clients. The RB certainly did not belong to the 
                                                                                                                           
Archief ABN AMRO (HAAA), archive Rotterdamsche Bank (RB), inv. nr. 73, Gedenkschrift ter 
herinnering aan het 50-jarig bestaan der Rotterdamsche Bank, thans Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging 
(Rotterdam 1914) p. 5. 
47Jonker, ‘De bakermat van het moderne bankwezen’, p. 92. 
48 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 73, Gedenkschrift, pp. 9-11.  
49 Barendregt, ‘Op weg naar nationale bekendheid’, p. 131. 
50 Kymmell, Geschiedenis II-B, p. 262.  
51 HAAA, archive RB, Annual reports Rotterdamsche Bank/Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging 1891-1964.  
52 Kymmell, Geschiedenis  II-B, pp. 222 and 225. 
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largest players in this area of financial markets. The third activity, namely 
participation in syndicates, implied long term financing while the RB still 
emphasised on the providing of short term trade credits. Rotterdam ship 
owners and shipping companies turned to Amsterdam financial 
intermediaries for long term financing.53 The same accounted for wealthy 
investors who deployed directly Amsterdam financial intermediaries to 
execute their security orders.54 Hence, the RB was related to securities 
trade only marginally since it had no office in Amsterdam and therefore, 
the RB could not become a member of the VvdE. 55   
 
4.3.2 Expansion Rotterdamsche Bank(vereeniging) 1911-1964 
Since the activities of the Rotterdamsche Bank in the Dutch Indies did not 
work out, the Bank first tried to obtain a foothold in the Netherlands itself. 
Under the direction of Willem Westerman, who entered the board of 
directors in 1904, the RB started to grow.  Westerman became president-
director in 1910. He immediately appointed J.P. van Tienhoven and K.P. 
van der Mandele as members of the board of directors. Now, the board 
existed of young (they were all three in their thirties) and ambitious 
directors. Particularly in the year 1911, these ambitions became reality. In 
this year, the RB merged with the Deposito- and Administratiebank (1900) 
from Rotterdam. After this merger, the name of the Rotterdamsche Bank 
was changed to the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging (Robaver). 
Furthermore, the Robaver took a controlling share in an old Amsterdam 
banker’s firm Determeijer Weslingh & Zn (1765) in the same year  
Unfortunately, little is known concerning the motives for these two 
rather remarkable actions while a large part of the archive of the RB was 
destroyed in World War II. Still, we can imagine what the board of 
directors aimed at. Apparently, the directors wanted to strengthen and 
expand the securities trade part of the Robaver. Both the Deposito- and 
Administratiebank and Determeijer Weslingh & Zn dealt extensively in 
securities. The Deposito- and Administratiebank focussed more on the 
administrative side of securities trade. Determeijer Weslingh & Zn was an 
active player at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. According to a historical 
overview written in the year report of 1963 of the Rotterdamsche Bank (in 
1947, the Robaver changed its name back to Rotterdamsche Bank again), 
                                                 
53 P. van de Laar (1996) ‘Waar werkte Rotterdam? Een analyse aan de hand van beroepstellingen 1859, 
1889, 1899 en 1909’, in: Rotterdams Jaarboekje 1996 (Stichting Historische Publicaties Roterodamum: 
Rotterdam), pp. 339-373,  pp.  365-366. 
54 De Vries, Een eeuw vol effecten., p.  95. 
55 Brugmans, Begin van twee banken, p. 150 
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the Deposito – and Administratiebank and the Robaver completed each 
other while they were specialised in different aspects of the securities 
trade.56 Since Determeijer Weslingh & Zn was a member of the VvdE, 
Robaver had gained a seat at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange without 
having to meet the rather strict rules for membership of the VvdE. The 
acquisition with Determeijer Weslingh & Zn was a cunning move. Banks 
were not very welcome as members of the VvdE; they were big players 
and they had a name of clearing orders without bringing them to the 
market. Hence, commission traders feared that banks would deprive them 
of their powerful status and of orders, and thus of commission fees. Not 
coincidentally, membership of the VvdE was refused to the Nederlands-
Indische Handelsbank and the Javasche Bank at the end of 1911.57  
The question arises if employees or members of the board travelled 
now and then to the ASE before the grip of the VvdE on the securities 
trade tightened. After all, the RB was founded in 1863, while the VvdE was 
established in 1876. Maybe the Rotterdamsche Bank first focused on 
obtaining its goals that were set by its establishment that was to provide 
credits to facilitate trade between the Netherlands and the Dutch East 
Indies. After that had failed, after the RB was recovered from the Pincoffs 
affair and after Willem Westerman had entered the executive board in 
1904, the RB started to make work of performing other types of financial 
services. This resulted in a complete integration of services related to the 
securities trade in 1911. Before 1911, the RB probably made use of one or 
several Amsterdam stockbrokers to execute its and its client’s securities 
orders. After 1911, the RB could execute the orders itself.  
The Robaver continued its merging and acquisition activities. In 
1913, another Amsterdam bankers firm was taken under the wings of the 
Robaver, namely Labouchère Oyens & Co, a continuation of Ketwich & 
Voombergh (1720). The Robaver aimed at strengthening its position in 
Amsterdam with this acquisition.58 Particularly, the acquisitions with the 
Amsterdam banks, stirred up the Amsterdam financial industry. For the 
first time, a Rotterdam financial intermediary had penetrated the 
Amsterdam financial market and most Amsterdam financial middlemen 
were not too pleased with it. In 1912, the board of Robaver decided that 
two Rotterdam business partners of Determeijer Weslingh & Zn were, for 
                                                 
56 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 313, Jaarverslag Rotterdamsche Bank 1963 (Annual Report Rotterdamsche 
Bank 1963), p. 28.  
57 Kymmell, Geschiedenis  II-A, p. 100.  
58 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 108, Elfde vergadering van commissarissen, 20 september 1913 (Eleventh 
meeting of commissioners, 20 September 1913).  
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the time being, not allowed to do business in Amsterdam due to the 
negative public opinion. 59  
 Nonetheless, the Robaver continued its concentration process. After 
having obtained a seat in Amsterdam, the attention of the Robaver 
focussed on acquiring a foothold in the province. In 1915, a majority of the 
shares of the ‘Nationale Bank’ at The Hague were bought whose seat was 
brought to Leiden. In the same year, the Robaver opened a branch office in 
The Hague. The Nationale Bank practiced predominantly its banking and 
cashier activities in the province. One year later, the Robaver founded a 
subsidiary company in Utrecht, under the name Nationale 
Bankvereeniging. The Nationale Bank and several other take-overs of 
smaller provincial bankers firms such as the Bank van Huydecoper & Van 
Dielen at Utrecht, the Dordtsche Bank at Dordrecht, the Statenbank at The 
Hague, and A. Bloembergen & Zonen’s Bank at Leeuwarden were 
subsumed into this Nationale Bankvereeniging. Furthermore, the Robaver 
took a controlling share in the Zuid-Nederlandsche Handelsbank at 
Tilburg in the same period, which had branch offices in the largest cities of 
the southern parts of the Netherlands like Breda, Eindhoven, Sittard and 
Maastricht. Already in 1920, the Zuid-Nederlandsche Bank was brought 
under the Nationale Bankvereeniging. Now, the Nationale 
Bankvereeniging possessed 86 branch offices in the country. In 1929, the 
Robaver completely took over the Nationale Bankvereeniging and from 
then, this department of the Robaver carried the name ‘Provinciale 
Centrale’.60 The Robaver even founded a bank especially for their female 
clientele (simply the Vrouwenbank or Women’s bank) in 1928 which was 
dissolved in 1971 because it had become unnecessary.61 After these 
‘roaring’ twenty years of mergers and take-overs, the number of 
acquisitions of the Robaver diminished.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 114, Vergadering van het comité uit Commissarissen der Robaver, 27 maart 1912 
(Meesting, committee commssioners Robaver, 27 March 1912). 
60 Brugmans, Begin van twee banken, pp. 152 and 154 
61 ABN AMRO (1993) ‘ABN-AMRO. De Historie’ (Historisch Archief ABN-AMRO;Amsterdam) pp. 15-
16. 
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Table 4.3: Take-overs Robaver/RB of commercial banks 
after 1930.62 
   
Year Name Place 
1948 Halfwegsche Bank  Halfweg 
1950 Bank voor Schouwen en 
Duiveland 
Zierikzee 
1951 Middenstands 
Credietbank ‘Neede’ 
Neede 
1960 Nijkerksche Bank Nijkerk 
1961 Nederlandsch-Indische 
Handelsbank    
Amsterdam 
1964 Maris & Schipper Willemstad 
 
In the years 1950 the RB grew less fast than the other three large banks 
(Twentsche Bank, Amsterdamsche Bank and Nederlandsche-Handel 
Maatschappij). According to Van der Werf, this was due to the lagging 
growth of investment credits and the granting of credits to financing 
companies.63 Investment credits were used to purchase investment goods. 
Financing companies were engaged in object financing (for instance, an 
agricultural machine) or financing of a specific market sector such as 
dealers, buyers or end consumers.64 The RB also did not plunge into new 
developments in Dutch banking such as the personal loan for private 
persons, as introduced by the Twentsche Bank in 1958. Already in the 
same year, one of the members of the Board of Directors of the RB, C.F. 
Karsten, brought up the issue of introducing personal loans. However, his 
fellow directors did not see the need to provide these types of loans. Years 
after the Twentsche Bank and Amsterdamsche Bank began to provide 
personal loans, the Board changed its mind. In 1963, the RB provided 
personal loans as well although not very wholeheartedly. Strangely 
enough, the interest of the Board for the savings department of the RB, 
appeared rather late although the RB owned its own savings bank since 
1931. The Board observed in 1956 that the interest rate was much lower in 
comparison to other banks; in other words, the RB had not monitored the 
activities of other banks in the area of savings, otherwise, the RB would 
have kept up by raising the interest rate. The branch offices of the RB were 
                                                 
62 Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw, pp. 103-120. 
63 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 169. 
64 Banklexicon (NIBE/Kluwer; Amsterdam/Deventer), p. 117. 
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ordered to raise the interest rate but they were not allowed to make that 
publicly known; the Board wanted to keep savers at a distance since they 
thought that saving did not yield profits. In 1959, the somewhat reserved 
attitude of the board of the RB towards savings, started to change. As from 
this year, other banks such as the Twentsche Bank and the Nederlandsch-
Handel Maatschappij explicitly focussed on ‘small’ clients by introducing 
account books for their current account, their savings account, and their 
investment account. When the Amsterdamsche Bank also introduced 
savings accounts, the RB could not stay behind. The already existing 
savings bank was taken under the wings of the RB itself as a separate 
savings department. After a few years of experience with savings, the 
Board recognised its potential and continuity. The Board even considered 
financing a larger part of its investments out of savings.65 After World War 
II, the RB slowly reacted on ongoing developments in banking. The RB 
merely responded to other Dutch banks for introducing new types of 
financial services.  
In this period, the first years of the 1960s, the RB was obviously not 
going that well. The granting of credits lagged behind other banks. Karsten 
insisted on being more accommodating in providing credits. Yet, the rest 
of the board did not advocate this opinion. Probably, as Van der Werf also 
suggested, several members of the Board were very anxious to end up in 
the same situation as forty years ago when the Bank nearly went bankrupt 
as a result of granting a very large credit. Van der Werf also points out the 
decreased earning capacity (rentabiliteit) of the RB in the years 1960 (11,4 
%) – 1963 (7,2 %). The RB had enough reserves to carry on for a few years 
but it is clear that the Bank had ended up in a less favourable situation.66 
For that reason, the RB consented in starting negotiations with the 
Amsterdamsche Bank in order to agree on a future merger. In 1964 the 
Rotterdamsche Bank merged with the Amsterdamsche Bank into the 
AMRO-Bank.67  
 
4.3.3 Origination Twentsche Bank(vereeniging) 1861-1917 
In the nineteenth century, Benjamin Willem Blijdenstein junior laid the 
foundations for the Twentsche Bankvereeniging. He started out as a notary 
in Enschede, a town in the Eastern part of the Netherlands near the 
German border. In this region, which is called ‘Twente’, the textile 
                                                 
65 Van der Werf, Banken, pp. 192-193.  
66 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 227, pp. 238-240.  
67 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 384.  
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industry formed the main economic activity. Blijdenstein also started to 
preoccupy himself with several banking activities which gradually began 
to push aside his activities as a notary. Since the market for textile grew in 
the Far East, Blijdenstein sent his son, also called Benjamin Willem 
Blijdenstein only without the ‘junior’ part, to London to open an office 
over there, since England had large interests in that part of the world. The 
firm ‘B.W. Blijdenstein & Co’ started in London in 1858. Also the Dutch 
East Indies appeared to be a profitable outlet for textiles. This development 
instigated the idea for the establishment of an Amsterdam branch of the 
Blijdenstein firm. The idea developed to the foundation of a bank. In 1861, 
Blijdenstein junior founded, together with several textile manufacturers 
from Twente, the ‘Twentsche Bankvereening’ (TBV). The organisational 
form of the TBV was a sleeping partnership or private limited company 
(commanditaire vennootschap).68  
Around the turn of the century, the organisational form of the TBV 
caused a lingering conflict between the ‘traditionals’ and the 
‘progressives’. The traditionals, mainly consisting of the family 
Blijdenstein which were the founders of the TBV, wanted to keep the 
limited partnership. The ‘progressives’ wished to turn the TBV into a 
limited liability company. Finally, the Blijdenstein family gave in. Per 1 
January 1917 the Twentsche Bankvereeniging transformed from a silent 
partnership to a limited liability company. The official name now became 
the Twentsche Bank N.V. (TB).69 
Not surprisingly, the services the TBV provided focused on the 
granting of short term credits to finance industrial, especially textile, 
manufacturing and it took care of all the administrative financial handling 
surrounding the shipment of goods. For instance, the shipments needed 
certified bills of cargo and they also needed to be insured. Next to that, the 
range of services differed not much from other joint stock commercial 
banks such as the Rotterdamsche Bank. The TBV tried to attract deposits 
and accepted bills of exchange.70 The TBV was also engaged in securities 
trade in the same way as the RB.71 The TBV owned securities itself, it 
participated in syndicates, it mediated between buyers and sellers of 
                                                 
68 ABN AMRO (1996) Van katoentjes tot persoonlijke lening. Geschiedenis van De Twentsche Bank 1861-1964 
(Historisch Archief ABN AMRO; Amsterdam) pp. 10-13. 
69 C.A.M. Wijtvliet (1993) Expansie en Dynamiek. De ontwikkeling van het Nederlandse handelsbankwezen 
1860-1914 (NIBE; Amsterdam) pp. 174-177. 
70 M.C. Wintersteijn (1961) Twentsche Bankvereeniging 1861-1961 De Twentsche Bank N.V. (unpublished 
manuscript) p. 7. 
71 Van katoentjes, p. 15.  
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securities and the ASE, it offered credits to trade in securities such as the 
‘prolongatiekrediet’ and, after the TBV had become a limited liability 
company in 1917, it also issued shares. 
 
4.3.4 Expansion Twentsche Bank(vereeniging) 1906-1964 
The TBV expanded its services in scope and volume by taking over other 
financial intermediaries. The RB had taken a very offensive strategy, the 
Twentsche Bankvereeniging turned into a calmer road. Maybe, the 
background of the TBV as a provincial banker with a less ambitious 
expansionist policy, played a role. 
The TBV however did not sit still as it came to contacts and 
cooperation with other financial intermediaries, especially in the province 
where it traditionally had many contacts. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the TBV was very active in taking participations in several 
provincial firms.  
 
Table 4.4: Participations Twentsche Bank/Twentsche 
Bankvereeniging, 1906-1917.72 
   
Year of 
participation 
Firm in which TB(V) has taken a participation Location 
1906 Bergsma & Dikkers Hengelo 
1907 Lissesche Bankvereeniging Lisse 
1909 C. & H. Baurichter Oldenzaal 
1909 Jordaan & Cie Paris 
1910 Schmasen & Nacker Roermond 
1911 D.A. Wisselink Alkmaar 
1911 Heldersche Bank Den Helder 
1917 Groninger Bank Groningen 
1917 Venlosche Bank Venlo 
1917 Haarlemsche Bankvereeniging Haarlem 
 
According to Wintersteijn, the initiative for co-operation did not only come 
from the larger joint stock commercial banks that wanted to expand their 
sphere of influence but also from the provincial financial firms themselves 
while they could not cope with the large capital demands that the rising 
industrial activities needed. Wintersteijn also stated although he did not 
indicated  how many and who, that many provincial bankers, started their 
                                                 
72 Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p. 73. 
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financial career as an employee at the TB(V). Therefore, they appealed for 
help with the TB(V).73 This ‘help’ expressed itself in the fact that the TB(V) 
took a controlling share in such a provincial financial intermediary so as 
that its subsistence was guaranteed. Another kind of help was that the 
TB(V) sent orders for collections to a provincial cashier, in exchange for 
securities orders.74 Apparently, the landing of securities orders was of 
large importance. Even within the TB(V), employees battled over it. For 
instance, a former bank employee remembered a sharp competition 
between a branch office of the TBV and the main office. In 1915, he was 
assigned to collect a list at the main office. The list represented the 
executed security orders for the clients of the branch office. However, the 
stock exchange employees at the main office were not very willing to hand 
the list over to him. They wanted to keep the profits that came with 
executed orders for themselves although they belonged to the same 
company. These men yelled at him and tried to scare him off. At his wits 
end, he grabbed the papers from their writing desks and ran away.75  
 Gradually, the strategy of participating in provincial financial firms 
changed to taking controlling shares and complete mergers at the end of 
the 1910s, since the TB had become a limited liability company. In 1918 
and 1919, controlling shares were taken in the Provinciale Bank voor 
Limburg, the Geldersch-Overijsselsche Bankvereeniging, and the Bank van 
Wisselink. The Stichtse Bank at Utrecht and Stoop & Zn at Dordrecht were 
completely taken over in respectively 1918 and 1920. These became branch 
offices of the Twentsche Bank.76 The following schematic overview of the 
TB and its acquisitions can be made around 1921: 
                                                 
73 Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p.  51. 
74 Rijksarchief Overijssel (RAO; Public Records of Province Overijssel), archive Twentsche Bank, inv. 
nr. 781, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 11 maart 1882-25 mei 1883 (Minutes 
meetings board of directors TBV Amsterdam office 11 March 1882-25 May 1883), 9 September 1882 and 
18 September 1882; idem, inv. nr. 782, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen van het kantoor Amsterdam 26 mei 
1883-16 december 1884 (Minutes meetings board of directors TBV Amsterdam office 26 May 1883-16 
December 1884), 9 July 1883; idem, inv. nr. 793, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen van het kantoor 
Amsterdam 2 februari 1895-17 januari 1896 (Minutes meetings board of directors TBV Amsterdam office 
2 February 1895-17 January 1896,) 15 July 1895. 
75 RAO, archive Twentsche Bank, inv. nr. 623, Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 
1947  (Staff magazine of the Twentsche Bank), vol. 1, no. 8, p. 2. 
76 Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p. 73 
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We see that in 1925, earlier participations in companies as Bergsma &
Dikkers and Baurichter are converted to mergers. By the time the Second
World War broke out, all these firms in which participations had been
taken (also the above mentioned banks in the schema as the Bank van
Wisselink, Haarlemsche Bankvereeniging, Lissesche Bankvereeniging,
Provinciale Bank voor Limburg, Geldersch-Overijsselsche
Twentsche Bank
N.V.
(Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, The
Hague, Dordrecht,
Utrecht)
Haarlemsche
Bankvereeniging
(Haarlem and its
environs)
Maatschappij
“Volharding”
(Amsterdam)
Bank of Wisselink
(Alkmaar and its
environs)
B.W. Blijdenstein
& Co (Londen)
Branch Offices of
Twentsche Bank in
Eastern part of the
Netherlands
(=Twente)
(Enschede,
Almelo, Hengelo,
Oldenzaal)
Provinciale Bank
for Limburg
(Maastricht and its
environs)
Geldersch-
Overijsselsche
Bankvereeniging
(Deventer and its
environs)
Twentsche
Trustmaatschappij
(Amsterdam)
Groninger
Bankvereeniging
(Groningen and its
environs)
Lissesche
Bankvereeniging
(Lisse)
Figure 4.4: Schematic overview of the TB and its acquisitions in 1921
Source: Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p. 76.
Value Systems of the Dutch Securities Trade 
 95
Bankvereeniging, and Groninger Bankvereeniging) were carrying the 
name of Twentsche Bank N.V.77 The subsidiary companies Maatschappij 
“Volharding” and Geldersch-Overijsselsche Bankvereeniging remained as 
they were.  
 The acquisitions of the Twentsche Bank were of a different nature 
compared to the first mergers of the Robaver (Deposito- and 
Administratiebank, Determeijer Weslingh & Zn and Labouchère Oyens & 
Co) which were clearly meant to obtain a seat in Amsterdam, and the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange since the Robaver could not become a direct 
member of the VvdE because it had no offices in Amsterdam. The 
Twentsche Bank(vereeniging) had its main seat in Amsterdam from the 
beginning, and was already directly active on the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange since the Bank was a member of the VvdE. Still, the trade in 
securities had grown to an important activity of the Twentsche Bank, and 
the Bank always looked for ways to obtain more security orders.  No 
doubt, merging or taking a controlling share in a firm, was a means to 
obtain more stock exchange orders.  
 In the interwar period, the Twentsche Bank took over Buisman, 
Gratama & Co from Zwolle in 1925, Koopman & Co from Middelburg in 
1930, the Provinciale Bank voor Limburg from Venlo in 1930, the 
Handelsbank from Arnhem in 1931, the Nijmeegsche Bankvereeniging 
Van Engelenburg & Schippers CV from Nijmegen in 1931. After World 
War II, the Twentsche Bank remained alert for possibilities to merge but, 
like the Robaver, the frequency of merging activities diminished. In 1945, 
the N.V. Het Onderling Crediet from Rotterdam, in 1949 the 
Middenstands-Credietbank voor Gorinchem en Omstreken from 
Gorinchem as well as Ogier & Co from Gouda. After that, two important 
provincial banks joined the ranks of the Twentsche Bank; the Van 
Ranzow’s Bank from Arnhem in 1950 and Van Mierlo & Zn N.V. from 
Breda in 1952.78 The bringing in of Van Ranzow’s was important because 
this Bank was directed by capable directors, the brothers Wurfbain. The 
board of the Twentsche Bank especially saw a future for J.C. Wurfbain as a 
director for their own Bank. Van Mierlo & Zn. was well represented in the 
province of ‘Noord-Brabant’, particularly in its western part; a province 
which the Twentsche Bank had not covered yet. Van Mierlo & Zn. Filled 
this gap.79 The Twentsche Bank proceded with Gebr. Mispelblom Beyer 
                                                 
77 Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw, pp. 106-120. 
78 Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw, pp. 104-120.  
79 Van der Werf, Banken, pp. 128-130, p. 140. 
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from Leeuwarden in 1952, G. Mesdag from Groningen in 1956, and Bank 
Jordaan NV Haaksbergen in 1958.80 1963 marked the year of the take-over 
of Bank Vermeer from Deventer and one year later, the Twentsche Bank 
took over one of the last independent provincial banks, the Hoornsche 
Bank from Hoorn.81  
During the same period the Twentsche Bank certainly showed itself 
to be an exponent of a new trend in banking, retail banking. The 
Twentsche Bank aimed at gaining the confidence of ‘small’ clients such as 
introducing the earlier mentioned ‘personal loan’ in 1958. However, 
already in an earlier stadium, the TB had entered this specific part of the 
financial sector by means of offering ‘consumptive credits’. The TB 
provided these types of small credits through the Industrieele Disconto 
Maatschappij which it had taken over in 1953. The credits were used to 
buy consumer goods such as cars or housekeeping devices.82 Besides this 
extension of financial services, the TB also kept on doing what it had 
always been doing; providing credits for domestic industrial activities. For 
several reasons, the Board of the TB deliberately focused on the domestic 
market and not on the international market. First, it was hard to judge the 
financial situation of foreign enterprises, second, these companies would 
never be full clients, and third, the TB did not want to compete with their 
fellow foreign banks. Traditionally, the TB offered credits for the textile 
industry; it was even one of the reason to establish the TB in the first place. 
Precisely these credits caused difficulties for the TB due to deteriorating 
economic circumstances for the textile sector. This development led, 
amongst others, to a decreased solvability of the bank.83 The TB looked for 
possibilities to solve these problems. Already in 1959 representatives of the 
Twentsche Bank and the Nederlandsche-Handel Maatschappij held 
conversations concerning a possible merger. They did not come to an 
agreement immediately. After several interruptions and as much 
resumptions of the negotiations, the NHM even flirts with the 
Amsterdamsche Bank, the TB and NHM finally joined forces in 1964. The 
newly formed bank carried the name Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN).84 
In 1990 the ABN merges with the AMRO-bank into ABN AMRO Bank.  
 Both the RB and the Twentsche Bank built up a large network of 
branch offices throughout the Netherlands during the twentieth century. 
                                                 
80 Nederlandse financiële instellingen in de twintigste eeuw, pp. 104-120. 
81 Van Zanden en Uittenbogaard, ‘Expansie’, p. 335-336.  
82 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 125.  
83 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 121, pp. 148-150.  
84 Van der Werf, Banken, p. 374.   
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This network was for a large part established by take-overs of local 
financial intermediaries. This integration process mostly strengthened the 
existing services (horizontal integration but it also offered the opportunity 
to offer new services or the same services without intermediation of a local 
party (vertical integration).  
 
4.4 Value systems 
On the basis of the description from above, we can discern several value 
systems of the Dutch securities trade over time. Next to a different value 
system that exists in different times, different value systems also exist 
besides each other at the same time. The most basic value system for 
buying and selling securities, is composed of two parties; the vendor and 
the buyer (figure 1). This basic type of trade probably occurred that 
securities trade started at first in the Netherlands which must be around 
1600 (if we take the shares of the VOC as the first traded Dutch securities). 
Naturally, this figure is not specific to trade in securities but it applies to 
trade in general. 
 
Figure 4.5 (1602) 
 
 
 
 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, a distinct group of traders started to trade 
in securities soon after the introduction of VOC shares. In the beginning, 
securities trade was not their sole business. A professionalisation of the 
Dutch securities trade took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
The result was that several intermediaries started to specialise in securities 
trade, and that thus the value system extended. Potentially, a vendor and 
buyer could still find each other without the mediation of a financial 
intermediary. One of them could also deploy a professional trader or both 
could hire such a person (figure 4.6a and figure 4.6b).  
 
Figure 4.6a (1600-1876) 
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Financial 
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Or: 
 
Figure 4.6b (1600-1876) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 1876, it did not matter whether this financial intermediary came 
from outside Amsterdam or not. After 1876, when the VvdE was 
established, members of the VvdE needed to have an office in Amsterdam 
and were not allowed to trade with non-members. These strict demands 
for membership really had an effect as from 1903 when the VvdE could 
effectively close of ‘their’ securities trade floor in the new Berlage 
Exchange. From the year 1903, the value system of the Dutch securities 
trade thus lengthens even more, if a provincial vendor and/or a provincial 
buyer hired a local financial intermediary. Furthermore, the very basic 
form of trading with one other (vendor-buyer), was ruled out since the 
same year. 
 
Figure 4.7 ((1876) 1903 - ) 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, a new intermediary arose; the 
specialist who became an intermediary for the intermediaries. This 
resulted in the following value system: 
 
 
Vendor 
Financial 
interme-
diary 
Financial 
interme-
diary
 
   Buyer 
Provincial 
vendor 
Provincial 
financial 
intermediary
Amsterdam 
financial 
intermediary
Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
Provincial 
financial 
intermediary
Provincial
   buyer 
Amsterdam 
financial 
intermediary 
Value Systems of the Dutch Securities Trade 
 99
Figure 4.8a (1890-2001) 
 
If we add ‘provincial’ and ‘Amsterdam’ into this schema, the several 
variations can be discerned. First, if both vendor and buyer were both 
citizens of the city of Amsterdam, the following value system applied.  
 
Figure 4.8b 
 
Second, both vendor and buyer lived outside Amsterdam:  
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Figure 4.8c 
 
 
Third, the vendor could be from the province with a provincial 
intermediary and the buyer from Amsterdam: 
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Figure 4.8d 
 
 
Or vice versa: 
 
Figure 4.8e 
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Lastly, a provincial client could also directly contact an Amsterdam 
intermediary: 
 
Figure 4.8f 
 
 
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, joint stock commercial banks 
arose as financial intermediaries in, amongst others, securities trade. At 
first their appearance changed nothing in the value system of securities 
trade since they functioned as the existing intermediaries in securities. 
However, these banks started to expand as from the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This expansion manifested itself in take-overs of 
provincial financial intermediaries and the establishment of branch offices. 
This development persevered throughout the twentieth century. So, if you 
were a provincial investor and were a client with a branch office of a bank 
that also had an office in Amsterdam, the value system was shaped in the 
following way:  
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Figure 4.9 20th century 
 
 
 
 
As from the second half of the twentieth century, we saw that the same 
development applied for several merchant bankers such as Hope & Co en 
Heldring, Pierson & Heldring that started to merge with other financial 
intermediaries. Hence, we want to stress that figure 4.9 not only applied 
for the large stock commercial banks but also, as from around the second 
half of the twentieth century for merchant bankers. 
Again, several variations on the above scheme are possible. For 
instance the vendor and buyer may originate from Amsterdam: 
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Figure 4.9a 
 
 
Or the vendor is from Amsterdam and the buyer from the province:  
 
Figure 4.9b 
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Or vice versa: 
 
Figure 4.9c 
 
 
 
 
Note that figures four and five and their variations persist side by side 
although banks dominated as intermediaries in securities more and more 
throughout the twentieth century.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The main aim of this chapter was to discern the actors who form the value 
system of the Dutch securities trade (subquestion a) and to detect any 
changes throughout the period 1850-1970. The actors are buyers and sellers 
of securities, stockbrokers that can be subdivided into commission traders, 
sworn brokers, day traders, joint stock commercial banks and specialists. 
These actors together form a network, which facilitates trade in securities. 
What we see is that different value systems exist next to each other at the 
same time, depending on the fact whether the perspective of an 
Amsterdam or provincial investor is taken, and on who are their 
intermediaries.  
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In the period 1850-1970 several changes can be seen in the value 
systems. Until around 1900, the general development is that the value 
system expands due to a professionalisation of trade which firmly sets the 
position of intermediaries such as the commission traders, sworn brokers, 
bankers, banks and specialists. So the first change is the upturn of these 
intermediaries. With the help of an intermediary a buyer or seller did not 
need to find a seller or buyer himself and an intermediary took care of the 
administrative actions after a closed deal. A second change can be 
attributed to the foundation of the VvdE in 1876. From this year onwards, 
a larger role for Amsterdam stockbrokers is retained by the strict rules of 
the VvdE. The third change is the rise of specialists. This rise can be 
explained from the fact that the growth in number of listed securities 
required people who were specialised in the trade of one or several 
particular securities. The fourth alteration is the most remarkable which is 
an overall movement towards integration. For a large part, the joint stock 
commercial banks were responsible for this movement. From the 
beginning of the twentieth century, joint stock commercial banks started to 
appropriate a larger role as intermediaries in the Dutch securities trade. If 
a provincial investor chose a bank with a branch office in the place of 
residence of this provincial investor and an office in Amsterdam, the value 
system shrinks again. Yet, this was not always the case. Provincial and 
Amsterdam stockbrokers persisted throughout the twentieth century 
although the dominating picture in this period is commercial banks as an 
intermediary in the Dutch securities trade. The number of independent 
stockbrokers, whether they were from Amsterdam or the province, 
declined in the twentieth century as a result of take-overs of both large 
banks and merchant bankers, bankruptcies and closures. So the big change 
in the organisation of the Dutch securities trade was the dominance of 
banks as intermediaries as from the second half of the twentieth century 
onward. The question is why this happened. Stockbrokers were specialised 
in trade in securities. To banks, it was only one of their activities and their 
main focus. One would expect that the specialists (not to be confused with 
the earlier mentioned specialists as match makers between buyers and 
sellers) would survive because they knew best what was of importance 
and what happened in the world of valuable papers. Trying to explain the 
movement towards integration in the Dutch securities trade, will be the 
focus for the remainder of this thesis. For that, we need to make clear what 
actually happened in the daily practice of financial intermediaries who 
facilitated the Dutch securities trade. When discussing this daily practice 
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we cannot leave out information and communication technology since ICT 
became omni-present in securities throughout the twentieth century. So, 
before we go on to the study of securities trade services, first the available 
means of information and communication technologies in the period 1850-
1970 will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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5.  Telecommunications in The Netherlands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Information and communication technologies have always been of great 
importance to financial intermediaries, especially to traders in goods and 
securities. Intermediaries in trade exist by the grace of availability of 
information, in particular, how fast they possess relevant information. 
Every medium of communication shall be deployed to obtain information 
that will lead to an advantage over the other. The main focus of this thesis 
is to identify whether telecommunication technologies have influenced the 
way Dutch securities trade was organised. Therefore, we have to know 
which telecom technology became when available against what costs. In 
other words, this information relates to sub questions (d) what are the 
available means of ICT in the Netherlands in general?, and (k) what are the costs 
of making use of information sources such as sending a telegram, or making a 
telephone call? The focus of this cost analysis is clearly on the telegraph and 
the telephone and much less on related technologies such as 
radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony. The telegraph and the telephone 
were widely used in securities trade as will become clear in chapters six 
and seven.  
Not so much the technical aspects of these telecommunication 
technologies will be discussed but we will focus on the introduction and 
development as well as the usage of telegraphy, especially electromagnetic 
telegraphy, telephony, and the telex. This will make clear at what time, 
what information and communication technologies were available to 
establish contact with the world outside the Exchange building. This 
information is necessary to answer the question on how these telecom 
technologies were deployed and used in services related to securities 
trade.  
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The chapter starts with a general overview of institutional aspects 
of telegraphy and telephony. Section 5.3 discusses the start and 
development of telegraphy. Section 5.4 discusses telephony.  
 
5.2 Institutional environment Dutch post, telegraphy and telephony services  
Before telegraphy, telephony and other types of information and 
communication technologies will be discussed in more detail, first the 
institutional setting in which these technologies were provided will be 
dealt with. The reason to deal with this first is to prevent 
misunderstandings in the remainder of this chapter concerning the name 
of the state’s postal and telegraph service. 
When telegraphy came under state control in 1852, the national 
telegraph service (‘Rijkstelegraaf’, note; private telegraph services were 
also active) fell under the Ministry of Domestic Affairs (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken). The postal services fell under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Finance (Ministerie van Financiën). In the year 1877, a new 
Ministry of Public Works, Trade and Industry (Ministerie van Waterstaat, 
Handel en Nijverheid) was established. The national post and telegraph 
service were both transferred to this ministry. Complete integration of 
both services became reality in 1886. The division became known as the 
‘Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en Telegrafie’ (General Board of the Post and 
Telegraph Service), or in short P & T. Since the P & T fell under the 
responsibility of a minister, the powers of the ‘Hoofdbestuur’ were limited. 
The fact that the ‘Hoofdbestuur’ had limited control over the height of its 
budget, frustrated the general managers of the P & T. Not surprisingly, the 
general managers strove for more autonomy. In 1893, the P & T turned 
into an autonomous organisation within the Ministry of Public Works, 
Trade and Industry. Its name changed to ‘Administratie der Posterijen en 
Telegrafie’ (Administration Post and Telegraph Service). Twenty two years 
later, the P & T became a state company. Therefore, we officially speak of 
the ‘Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen en Telegrafie’ from 1915 onward.1   
When telephony was introduced in the Netherlands in 1881, it 
legally fell under the state’s telegraph service since the telephone was seen 
as a sort of telegraph. As a result, telephony was also classified under the 
national telegraph law of 1852. In its starting phase, the actual construction 
and exploitation of a telephone infrastructure was left to private persons 
although the national telegraph service did already use telephones in 1881 
                                                 
1 Mila Davids (1999) De weg naar zelfstandigheid. De voorgeschiedenis van de verzelfstandiging van de PTT in 
1989 (Uitgeverij Verloren; Hilversum) pp. 110-112. 
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for the transfer of telegrams. In February of that year a first 
‘Rijkstelefoonkantoor’ (state’s telephone office) opened its doors at Texel, 
an island in the North of the Netherlands. In the same year, four similar 
offices were opened in other parts (mainly rural areas) of the country.2 
Still, private companies instigated public telephony for which they 
received a concession. Employees of the Rijkstelegraaf needed to supervise 
the granted concession. In doing this, it became clear that the juridical 
aspects of laying telephone lines, were significantly different from 
constructing telegraph lines. The difference was that telephone lines 
needed to be extended to private property. Otherwise, residents were 
unable to use their telephones. At that time, telegraphic traffic mainly 
passed on between Rijkstelegraaf offices hence, telegraph lines were 
constructed on public territory (telegraph traffic between private persons 
or a private person and a Rijkstelegraaf office only became possible as 
from 1907). Therefore, the telegraph and telephone needed to be separated 
legally. In 1904 the government passed the Telegraph- and Telephone bill. 
Only in 1928, the word ‘telephony’ was taken up in the name of the 
responsible division, resulting in the Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie, or 
in short PTT.3  
 The Ministry of Public Works, Trade and Industry also changed its 
name. From 1906, it became the Ministry of Public Works, while Trade and 
Industry formed a new Ministry together with Agriculture. In 1947, 
Transport was added to the Ministry of Public Works. To this Ministry the 
PTT had to justify its actions.4  
The degree of independence of the PTT remained an issue 
throughout the twentieth century. In 1989, an important step was taken to 
transform the PTT into a private company. In this year, the PTT had 
become a limited liability company in which the Dutch Government acted 
as the only shareholder. The full name of this ‘new’ company became 
‘Koninklijke PTT Nederland N.V.’, or in short KPN (Royal PTT the 
Netherlands). No binding agreements concerning the division of shares 
were made since the Minister of Transport and Public Works clearly 
regarded the 100 percent ownership in shares by the government as a 
temporary arrangement.5 Indeed, the Dutch government has gradually 
                                                 
2 Onno de Wit (1998) Telefonie in Nederland 1877-1940. Opkomst en ontwikkeling van een grootschalig 
technisch systeem (Otto Cramwinckel; Amsterdam) p. 70.  
3 Davids, De weg naar zelfstandigheid, pp. 110-111.  
4 See for an overview of Dutch Administrations during the twentieth century: http://www.pdc.nl, 
visited  27 February 2003. 
5 Davids, De weg naar zelfstandigheid, p. 133 and p. 136.  
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reduced its ownership over time (1998: 43,5 %; September 2003: 19,3%). In 
1998, KPN implemented an important reorganisation measure; its postal 
and telecom activities were separated. The postal division merged with the 
Australian company Thomas Nationwide Transport (TNT; named after its 
founder Ken Thomas) to TNT Post Group (TPG). Its telecom part became 
known as KPN Telecom.6 
 
5.3 Rise and fall of telegraphy in the Netherlands 
5.3.1 Start telegraphy 
With the coming of electrified means to send information, messages 
travelled faster than its messengers. In Communication in History (1995), the 
changed way of how information was communicated is called a 
transformation from the ‘transportation’ model of communication to the 
‘transmission’ model.7 In the transportation model, the sending of 
messages depended on the available means of transportation (people, 
horses, stagecoaches, trains etc.). The introduction of the telegraph meant a 
separation between transportation and communication. Information could 
now be transmitted autonomously and quicker than means of 
transportation. This is the transmission model. 8  
Yet, communication and transportation remained related to each 
other although their mutual dependency turned around. Telegraphy and 
transport, especially the railroad, even became the ‘siamese twins of 
commerce’.9 In the United States (US), the railway system was mostly 
single tracked. Hence, the danger existed that trains would collide. With 
the help of the telegraph, the railroad system was managed in an efficient 
and safe way. The stations communicated with each other about which 
trains departed at what time. The telegraph was also useful to commercial 
activities. A manufacturer could be informed on the local needs and thus 
the number of products sent to local outlets could be adjusted. This type of 
information and its rapid availability, was especially convenient to 
producers and sellers of perishable goods such as fruit and vegetables.  
                                                 
6 Annual report KPN 1998, p. 18, see also: http://www.kpn-
corporate.com/nl/kpn/index.php?id=1.08&taal=nl, and http://www.tpg.com under ‘history’, visited 
27 February 2003. 
7 ‘Electricity creates the wired world’ in: David Crowley and Paul Heyer (1995) Communication in 
History. Technology, Culture and Society (Longman Publishers; White Plains, N.Y.) pp. 145-148, p. 145. 
8 James Carey (1995) ‘Time, Space, and the Telegraph’ in: David Crowley and Paul Heyer, 
Communication in History. Technology, Culture and Society (Longman Publishers; White Plains, N.Y.) pp. 
154-159, p. 155. 
9 Quote of H.D. Estabrook in 1913, in: Alexander J. Field (1994) ‘French Optical Telegraphy, 1793-1855: 
Hardware, Software, Administration’, Technology and Culture, vol. 35, no. 2, p. 315.   
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Table 5.1: Speed of sent messages in days, 1866-1875.10 
    
To London from 
Surface Mail 
1866-1869 
(number of 
days) 
Transmission via 
Telegraph 1870- 
(number of days) 
Year connected via 
Intercontinental 
telegraph 
Australia: Sydney 60 4 1876 
New Zealand 65 4 1876 
Asia:  
Bombay 29 3 1870 
Calcutta 35 3 1872 
Hong Kong 51 3 1871 
Madras 40 3 1870 
Shanghai 56 4 1870 
Yokohama 70 5 1871 
Africa:  
Alexandria 11 2 1868 
Capetown 30 4 1868 
Lagos 12 3 1886 
Madeira 8 2 1874 
North America: 
Galvestone 17 3 1866 
Montreal 14 2 1866 
New Orleans 17 3 1866 
New York 14 2 1866 
Central America: 
Barbados 26 4 1868 
Havanna 24 4 1868 
Jamaica 25 4 1868 
South America: 
Baia 15 3 1873 
Buenos Aires 32 3 1875 
Colombo 33 3 1875 
Natal 36 4 1875 
Rio de  
Janeiro 30 3 1875 
Valparaiso 46 4 1875 
 
                                                 
10 Source: Jorma Ahvenainen (1986) ‘The Role of the International Telegraphs in the years 1870-1914’, 
in: W. Fischer R.Marvin McInnis and J. Schneider ed., The emergence of a world economy, 1500-1912 
(Steiner; Wiesbaden) p. 507. 
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Hence, the telegraph was an important device for logistical control.11 Table 
5.1 illuminates the enormous acceleration of sent trade data all over the 
world due to the electro-magnetic telegraph.  
Different persons in several countries experimented with electric 
telegraphy in the 1830s, which eventuated in the electromagnetic telegraph 
that appeared to be the most practical application of electric telegraphy.12 
The electromagnetic telegraph had its predecessors such as talking drums, 
smoke signals, carrier pigeons, and optical telegraphy.13 The optical 
telegraph appeared at the end of the eighteenth century in several forms 
(for instance; three wooden arms attached to a wooden scaffold, designed 
by a Frenchman called Claude Chappe). The key to these different optical 
telegraphs was that a scaffold could be turned and twisted and that each 
position represented a letter, a number, a word or a series of words. These 
telegraph scaffolds were placed on high points in the landscape, such as 
hills or church towers. The observer who stood on the next station picked 
up the messages with the help of a pair of binoculars and then forwarded 
the message.14 Of course, the optical telegraph could only be used during 
daytime and when the weather was clear. It mostly relayed military news 
although a Dutch economic journal immediately recognised its commercial 
potential.15 However, in the Netherlands the optical telegraph remained 
exclusively reserved for sending messages with a military or political 
character in contrast to its neighbouring country, Belgium. In Belgium, 
private exploitation of optical telegraphy existed. In 1842, a large part of 
the Belgium financial sector complained to their government. They felt 
damaged because of the speculation practices of private telegraph owners 
who also traded in securities. Obviously, the latter group profited from 
prior knowledge on prices of securities.16  
                                                 
11 Field,‘The Magnetic Telegraph’, p. 406 and p.  410.  
12 O. de Wit (1993) ‘Telegrafie en Telefonie’ in: H.W. Lintsen et al. (red.) Geschiedenis van de techniek in 
Nederland. De wording van een moderne samenleving 1800-1890 (Walberg Pers; Zutphen) pp. 271-298, pp. 
275-276. 
13 ‘Electricity creates the wired world’ in: David Crowley and Paul Heyer (1995) Communication in 
History. Technology, Culture and Society (Longman Publishers; White Plains, N.Y.) p. 145.  
14 G.Wilson  (1976) The Old Telegraphs (Phillimore; London); PTT (1977) Ontwikkeling van de telegrafische 
berichtgeving    (Staatsbedrijf der PTT: Den Haag) pp. 3-4; Rob Korving and Bart van der Herten (red.)  
(1997) Een tijding met de snelheid des bliksems. De optische telegraaf in de Nederlanden 1800-1850 (Leuven 
Universitaire Pers; Leuven) . 
15 E.A.B.J. ten Brink and C.W.L. Schell (1954) Geschiedenis van de Rijkstelegraaf 1852-1952 (Staatsbedrijf 
der PTT; Den Haag) p. 4.  
16 Pascal Verhoest (2000) Openbare telecommunicatie (1798-1998). Twee eeuwen politieke economie van het 
netwerkbeheer in België. (VUBPress; Brussel) p. 26.  
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Private companies and persons were responsible for the first 
applications of the electromagnetic telegraph in the Netherlands. The 
railway company ‘Hollandsche IJzeren Spoorweg Maatschappij’ (HIJSM: 
Dutch Iron Railway Company)) set the first Dutch electromagnetic 
telegraph connection into operation in 1845. The HIJSM employed this line 
along the railroad connection between Amsterdam and Haarlem. 
Messages could be forwarded with a speed of 15 to 28 characters per 
minute.17  
In 1845, the Dutch government received a request for exploiting a 
telegraph line between Amsterdam, as a centre of trade, and Den Helder, 
an important seaport at that time. If a ship came in, this telegraph line 
notified commercial Amsterdam.18 Unfortunately, it took years before the 
Dutch government dealt with this request. The Dutch government lingered 
that long because of fear of competition with the state’s postal service and 
of abuse by stock exchange speculators and political troublemakers.19 
When the government finally did take a decision, a much broader issue 
was at stake: how to create and exploit a public telegraph network? Leave 
it to private persons or turn it in to a state service? A choice was made for 
the latter. As from 1 December 1852, the Dutch national telegraph service 
(‘Rijkstelegraaf’) became operative. The government aimed at turning the 
telegraph, its infrastructure and its services, into a state owned public 
service. In 1884, the ‘Rijkstelegraaf’ had obtained control of all telegraph 
lines that were formerly exploited by private companies.20  
 
5.3.2 Subscription telegraphy  
Sending a telegram involved going to the nearest office of the 
‘Rijkstelegraaf’ from which the message was relayed to the nearest 
‘Rijkstelegraaf’ office of the addressee. An employee of the ‘Rijkstelegraaf’ 
delivered the telegram to the addressee. This somewhat laborious 
procedure gave two Amsterdam merchants the idea of setting up a private 
telegraph network that linked up subscribers directly with each other. In 
1861 the two Amsterdam merchants obtained permission to exploit such a 
service but never realised their plans. There appeared to be not enough 
interest in such a service among private persons at that time.21  
                                                 
17 De Wit, ‘Telegrafie en telefonie’, p. 277. 
18 E.A.B.J. ten Brink (1957) De Rotterdamsche Telegraaf Maatschappij 1854-1884 (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s 
Gravenhage) pp. 3 -4. 
19 Ten Brink, De Rotterdamsche Telegraaf Maatschappij, p. 4.  
20 De Wit, ‘Telegrafie en telefonie’, p. 287.  
21 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 116-117. 
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The laborious procedure for sending telegrams also resulted in 
being unprofitable for the Rijkstelegraaf to offer telegraph services in small 
and remote places. The number of telegrams was simply too few to operate 
a profitable telegraph service. With the introduction of the telephone, these 
problems were solved since a telegram message could now be passed on 
verbally, via the telephone. Since more telephone calls were made than 
telegrams sent, small provincial villages obtained a telephone (annex 
telegraph) station. The content of a telegram message was passed on via 
the telephone to the nearest telegraph transmitting station and from there, 
sent to the nearest telegraph station of the addressee.22        
The idea of subscription telegraphy became more serious in 1907. 
In this year, a ‘Koninklijk Besluit’ (Royal Decision) was accepted that 
approved of the instalment of telegraph connections between subscribers 
and a Rijkstelegraaf office (note; this did not involve telegraph connections 
between clients). The costs of this service were fl. 10 per month. Initially, 
the service did not attract many interested parties. The first subscriber was 
the ‘Nederlandsch-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij’ (Dutch-
American Steam Navigation Company) from Rotterdam that obtained a 
connection in 1910. From then on, more clients were connected to this 
specific service. The subscribers received a device to send and transmit 
telegrams, the so called ‘Ferndrucker’. The ‘Ferndrucker’ did not reach a 
high speed in sending and transmitting telegrams. Furthermore, the 
electricity for the Ferndrucker came from storage batteries that needed to 
be recharged regularly. If such a battery had run out of electricity, the P & 
T came to pick it up and gave the client a new battery. This service cost a 
client around fl. 60 per month in addition to the subscription rate and the 
right to have a personal telegram address. Besides the additional costs, the 
whole picking up and switching procedure was time consuming and 
inconvenient for both client and the P & T.23 
The devices used to transmit telegraph messages gradually 
evolved. The Morse-apparatus was the most well-known telegraph device 
to transmit messages with.24 In 1919, Charles L. Krum introduced the 
teleprinter or ‘verreschrijver’. This transmitting device looked almost 
similar to a typewriter. The typed message appeared on paper but it was 
also punched in code on a small paper strip. This coded message passed 
through a telephone line by means of electrical pulses. On the other end, 
                                                 
22 De Wit, ‘Telegrafie en Telefonie’, pp. 293-296.  
23 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 118-119. 
24 De Wit, ‘Telegrafie en Telefonie’, p. 290. 
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the coded message was decoded automatically and appeared in letters on 
paper. The teleprinter was very user friendly and thus, perfectly adapted 
to send messages between private persons since the need to know 
complicated codes disappeared.25 Sending messages with the help of a 
teleprinter is called a ‘telex service’. The word ‘telex’ is a contraction of 
teleprinter and exchange. A telex apparatus and a telex network were in 
fact the result of attempts to make telegraphic traffic between private 
persons possible.26 
In 1921, the Rijkstelegraaf tested these teleprinters extensively. The 
Rijkstelegraaf refrained from applying them right away since after long 
use of the first versions of the teleprinters, disturbances occurred. After the 
teleprinter was considerably improved, the Rijkstelegraaf decided to put 
them into use.27 In 1933, the PTT opened a public telex network. Telex 
traffic took place by telephone lines since more people were linked to a 
telephone network than to a telegraph network. Besides a public telex 
network, the PTT also offered the possibility to create a private telex 
network to which interested persons or firms could subscribe to. 28 In 1935, 
the ‘Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau’ (General Dutch News Agency) 
created a private telex distribution network to which seventy daily 
newspaper were linked up. From a central point, all seventy newspapers 
received news at the same time by telephone lines on their telex 
machines.29  
 
5.3.3 Radiotelegraphy  
Another development in telegraphy had already presented itself in the 
Netherlands around twenty years earlier than the teleprinter; 
radiotelegraphy. Radiotelegraphy involves sending messages by electro-
magnetic waves. Since these waves travelled through air, telegraph or 
telephone lines were not necessary to transmit a message. Not 
coincidentally, the first applications of radiotelegraphy appeared in the 
shipping sector. With help of radiotelegraphy, seamen could contact the 
shore or vice versa. The Netherlands got involved in radiotelegraphy in 
1899. In that year, the Lloyds Committee from London, requested 
                                                 
25 PTT (1968) Telegrafie, telefonie en draadomroep in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en 
Telefonie; ‘s Gravenhage) p. 30.  
26 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 170.  
27 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp.  62.  
28 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 120-126.  
29 J.A. Baggerman and J.M.H.J. Hemels (1985) Verzorgd door het ANP. Vijftig jaar nieuwsvoorziening 
(Uitgeverij L.J. Veen B.V.; Utrecht/Antwerpen) p. 38. 
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permission to locate and exploit a radio station (a ‘Marconi’- device) on the 
lightship ‘Maas’. This anchored and illuminated ship laid before the 
‘Rotterdamse Waterweg’, to point out the entrance to the canal that led to 
the Rotterdam port. The Dutch government refused to grant the 
permission since it feared a loss of authority in its own country in the area 
of radiotelegraphy if a foreign company was given permission to exploit 
such a service, right in front of the Dutch coast. Instead, the Dutch 
Government installed a committee that explored the possibilities of 
radiotelegraphy. At the same time, the ‘Rijkstelegraaf’ also experimented 
with radiotelegraphy. At the end of 1904, a well-equipped radiotelegraphy 
station at Scheveningen-Haven, at the North Sea, was opened. However, 
not many ships were equipped with the radio installation equipment. The 
possibilities for sending and receiving telegrams increased after shipping 
companies that exploited ferry services installed a complete send and 
receive station on their ferries. Vessels could sail up to such a ferry and 
offer or receive messages. These messages were sent to Scheveningen-
Haven and from there, transmitted by the normal telegraph lines.30 
Around 1913, six coastal radio stations and around hundred wireless 
telegraph stations, installed on vessels, were in operation. These 
radiotelegraphic devices mainly served to facilitate maritime 
communication in coded messages.31  
The tariff system for radiotelegraphic traffic was rather 
complicated. On top of the prices for normal (wired) telegrams, a ‘coastal 
tax’ of 0,10 cents per word was added with a minimum of fl. 1 per radio-
telegram. Let us take the example of an interurban telegram of 10 words 
that cost 0,25 cents in 1910. A radio telegram thus cost minimal fl. 1,25. For 
the use of radiotelegraph stations on board of vessels, the Minister of 
Communications charged a ‘shipping tax’ of 0,10 cents per word (in 1907; 
0,20 cents per word) with a minimum of fl. 2 per telegram. For received 
messages on board of a ship, again a ‘coastal tax’ of fl. 1 per message 
needed to be paid. In 1923, the prices for radiotelegraphy became more 
conveniently arranged; fl. 2,50 on top of each normal telegram tariff.32 
Thus, a ten-worded radio telegram added up to fl. 3,00). 
Further technical developments in the field of wireless 
communication led to wider applications such as transmitting ‘the spoken 
                                                 
30 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp.  130-140.  
31 W.O. de Wit (2002) ‘Radio tussen verzuiling en individualisering’ in: J.W. Schot e.a. (red.) Techniek in 
Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. Deel V Transport en Communicatie (Walburg Pers; Zutphen) pp. 203-229, 
p. 206.  
32 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 320-321. 
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word’ (radiotelephony), and to broadcasting by radio. Radio technology 
attracted many amateurs who experimented with this form of wireless 
telegraphy and telephony in the 1910s. H. à Steringa Idzerda who 
fabricated wireless transmitting equipment started with weekly wireless 
telephony broadcasts as from 1919. Idzerda’s public remained limited to a 
few thousands listeners whom he mainly dished up advertisements of his 
own company, the Nederlandsche Radio Industrie (Dutch Radio Industry). 
In 1923, another producer of wireless transmitting equipment, the 
Nederlandsche Seintoestellen Fabriek (NSF; Dutch Transmitting 
Instruments Factory) also started to advertise through radio broadcasts.  In 
1924, this transmitting station developed into a public radio station with a 
variety of programmes such as broadcasts of live music. This station 
became known as the Hilversumsche Draadlooze Omroep (HDO: 
Hilversum Wireless Broadcasting Corporation) that attracted many paying 
listeners. The HDO thus laid the basis of the Dutch radio broadcasting 
system.33 
 
5.3.4 Telegraphy and telexes  
At the end of the 1930s, telegraphy, both wired and wireless, worked 
reasonably well in the Netherlands. World War II did not significantly 
changed that. The German invasion inflicted some damage to the Dutch 
telegraph network but, miraculously, most damage could be repaired quite 
easily. Soon after the Germans took control most telegraph lines were 
opened to the public again. During the occupation, the extent to which 
Dutch people made use of the telegraph fluctuated strongly. The German 
occupiers determined that if a telegram was sent a, a stamp from the 
Sicherheitspolizei was needed. This measure obviously discouraged the 
sending of telegrams since it implied control over the contents of the 
message. Not surprisingly, the number of domestic telegrams declined by 
sixteen percent in 1940 compared to 1939. Yet, the measure was reversed 
again in 1941. In the years hereafter, the number of sent domestic 
telegrams grew explosively, resulting in five million telegrams, 
transmitted in 1943  (in comparison 1939: 1.990.000, 1950: 3.509.000, 1955: 
2.506.000)34. The explosive growth could be ascribed to the fear of being 
tapped when having a telephone conversation. However, the shortages of 
material and devices started to have serious consequences for the 
telegraph service. Only with great efforts, were the employees of the 
                                                 
33 De Wit, ‘Radio tussen verzuiling en individualisering’, pp. 208-211.  
34 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 227.  
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Rijkstelegraaf able to make ends meet. When the war hardened in the fall 
of 1944, the Germans imposed stricter measures for sending telegrams. At 
the end of 1944, telegraphic traffic had nearly come to a standstill.35   
 After World War II, telegraph traffic recovered quite easily. Still, 
the telegraph service had to be enhanced in order to compete with the 
telephone, and thus find a right for existence. Already at the beginning of 
World War II, PTT engineers had developed plans to reorganise the Dutch 
telegraph system. They especially focussed on possibilities to automate the 
connections that have to be made to get a telegram at its destination. The 
PTT engineers developed a switchgear system that went through several 
experiments. Pre-emptive to the automation of telegraph traffic was the 
usage of teleprinters. Teleprinters could be easily adapted for automated 
traffic. In 1952, powerful equipment that automatically made connections 
for telegraph traffic was installed in the main office of the PTT in 
Amsterdam. Although this exchange was originally meant for the public 
telegraph network, the PTT realised that it was actually most needed to 
facilitate the telex network due to the growth of telex traffic after 1945 
which is showed in table 5.2.36 The increase in telex traffic persevered since 
the scarcity of the necessary devices gradually disappeared and the 
number of countries that could be reached by telex expanded in the 1950s. 
As a result of these developments, the PTT built a separate telex 
infrastructure with its own exchanges in 1954. Because of this, telex traffic 
no longer needed to make use of telephone exchanges to send messages.37    
 
Table 5.2: Number of telex subscriptions, 1939-1970.38 
  
Year Number telex connections 
1939 295 
1950 431 
1955 1401 
1960 3238 
1965 6780 
1970 12972 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the automation of the telegraph network went on. 
By 1967, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and eighty larger post offices 
                                                 
35 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, pp. 172-173. 
36 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 113-115.  
37 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 186. 
38 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 228 
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spread over the country had connected one or more teleprinters to an 
automatic telegraph exchange to which were connected. The remaining 
offices only sent and received telegrams by means of a telephone. With the 
realisation of the Gentex-net (General Telegraph Service via Exchanges) in 
the 1960s, European countries could exchange telegrams automatically.39 
Despite these measures to make the sending of a telegram more attractive, 
the number of sent telegrams decreased because more and more people 
had a telephone connection (table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3: Number telegrams (per thousand, per 
five year), 1853-1985.40 
    
Year Domestic 
telegrams 
Telegrams 
abroad 
Total 
1853 15 24 39 
1855 56 47 104 
1860 198 125 323 
1865 419 289 709 
1870 1106 516 1622 
1875 1442 684 2125 
1880 1915 976 2892 
1885 2002 1160 3162 
1890 2185 1597 3781 
1895 2380 1847 4227 
1900 2800 2268 5068 
1905 3111 2808 5919 
1910 2906 3267 6173 
1915 4044 4151 8195 
1920 4725 5584 10309 
1925 2457 5892 8349 
1930 2149 4981 7130 
1935 1271 3203 4474 
1939 1990 3917 5907 
1950 3509 4322 7882 
1955 2560 4405 6965 
1960 2296 1911 4207 
1965 2003 1697 3700 
1970 1346 1426 2772 
                                                 
39 PTT, Telegrafie, telefonie en draadomroep in Nederland,  pp. 22-24.  
40 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 227. 
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During the last decades of the twentieth century, not only the telephone 
formed a competing communication means, the fax and electronic mail 
threatened the existence of the traditional telegram even more. Per 1 
September 2001, the telegraph service ended as provided by the PTT. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to send telegrams although only to foreign 
destinations. This service was taken over by a company named Unitel.41 
 
5.3.5 Tariffs telegraphy  
In order to provide an answer to subquestion (k), an overview of the costs 
of making use of telecommunication technologies needs to be studied. To 
be able to draw a comparison between the costs for sending a telegram 
over time, two actions are taken. First, one unit that can be measured 
throughout the whole period has to be distinguished since the tariff system 
for sending a telegram changed several times in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. We have chosen to take the costs of sending a ten-
worded telegram. Although we do not have numbers on the amount of 
telegrams categorised in size (number of words) we suspect that the 
cheapest (telegrams with a maximum of ten words) was mostly sent. In 
table 5.4, the ten worded telegram is thus used as the unit to compare its 
tariffs over time. The second action relates to the indices, used to calculate 
the real prices. We have used the consumer price indices (cpi), drawn up 
by the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) that range from 1824 to 
1998.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Esther Rosenberg, ‘Ziekenhuis houdt telegram in leven’, NRC Handelsblad, 15 August 2001. 
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Table 5.4: Tariffs of telegrams (10 words) with the Rijkstelegraaf in 
absolute and real prices, 1852-1970. 
     
Year Costs per 
(local) telegram 
(10 words)42 
Interurban Real prices 
local 
(1970=100)43 
Real prices 
interurban 
(1970=100) 
1852 Fl. 1,20  Fl. 1,20  Fl. 7,58 Fl. 7,58 
1858 Fl. 0,50 Fl. 0,50 Fl. 4,39 Fl. 4,39 
1868 Fl. 0,30 Fl. 0,30 Fl. 1,66 Fl. 1,66 
1879 Fl. 0,25 Fl. 0,25 Fl. 1,31 Fl. 1,31 
1886 Fl. 0,15 Fl. 0,25 Fl. 0,95 Fl. 1,58 
1916  Fl. 0,30  Fl. 1,26 
1919  Fl. 0,40  Fl. 1,27 
1920 Fl. 0,40 Fl. 0,50 Fl. 1,17 Fl. 1,46 
1934 Fl. 0,40 Fl. 0,50 Fl. 1,91 Fl. 2,38 
1950  Fl. 0,60  Fl. 1,20 
1954 Fl. 0,60 Fl. 0,60 Fl. 1,04 Fl. 1,04 
1961 Fl. 0,80 Fl. 0,80 Fl. 1,17 Fl. 1,17 
1965 Fl. 2,00 Fl. 2,00 Fl. 2,45 Fl. 2,45 
1970 Fl. 3,50 Fl. 3,50 Fl. 3,50 Fl. 3,50 
 
In 1852, at the start of the Rijkstelegraaf, sending a telegram was an 
expensive business. The Rijkstelegraaf aimed at returning its investments 
in building a national telegraph infrastructure. The costs dropped quite 
heavily throughout the nineteenth century. In the first half of the twentieth 
century, the costs continued to decrease until 1934. After a sharp rise in 
that year, tariffs declined again and increased again as from 1965. In 1950 a 
telegram was around seven times as cheap as in 1852. It seems that the 
number of sent telegrams and the height of telegram tariffs are 
interrelated: high tariffs and low number of sent telegrams, low tariffs and 
large number of sent telegrams as we can see in figure 5.1.  
                                                 
42 Costs of telegrams before 1950 are derived from Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 316-319, p. 
321, p. 324, pp. 326-327 and after 1950; Bibliotheek Museum voor Communicatie (BMvC) te Den Haag 
(Library Museum for Communication at The Hague), Tarieftabel voor telegrammen met binnenlandse 
en Europese bestemming (tariffstable telegrams with domestic and European destinations), T39A.  
43 See for consumer price indexes CBS (1999) 200 jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen (CBS: Voorburg/Heerlen) 
pp. 109-111, also to be consulted at (http://www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/algemeen/200-
jaar-stat-tijdreeksen.pdf).  
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5.4 Telephony  
5.4.1 Start telephony 1881-1900 
At the same time attempts were made to introduce a telegraph service 
between private persons in the Netherlands, experiments were conducted 
in Germany and the United States that eventually led to the introduction of 
the telephone in 1876.44 The telephone has the distinct character of a direct 
two-way communication that takes place irrespective of the location of the 
two persons that call each other. However, in the beginning the two-way 
interactive communication was not that obvious. A telephonic 
conversation required two devices, a transmitter and a receiver. With only 
a receiver, it was not possible to answer the person on the other side of the 
telephone line. With the introduction of telephone exchanges in 1878 and 
the further evolution of the telephone (in the US), two-way traffic became 
conceivable.45 It took a while before the telephone was viewed as a 
separate useful communication means. The telephone was merely seen as 
                                                 
44 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 34.  
45 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 43-45. 
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an extension of the telegraph. In its very beginnings the telephone was 
called ‘the speaking telegraph’. The contents of a telegram now could be 
communicated with the help of the telephone; it saved you a walk to the 
telegraph office. And, just as with telegrams, the content of a telephonic 
message was strictly related to business.46 The inventors of the telephone 
did clearly not foresee its huge social significance. Also, even in 1894, the 
usefulness of the telephone was still contested. In 1894, a reader of the 
‘Amsterdamsche Courant’, stated that the telephone should absolutely not 
be treated as an equivalent to the telegraph. He could easily do without a 
telephone. Furthermore, he regarded the telephone definitely not useful to 
serve as a large national means for communication.47  
 In the Netherlands, first experiments with the telephone started in 
1877. Employees of the Rijkstelegraaf as well as private persons performed 
tests with this new way for communication.48 Four years later, the first 
public telephone network was realised in Amsterdam. In 1881, the 
‘Nederlandsche Bell Telephoon Maatschappij’ (Dutch Bell Telephone 
Company; further abbreviated as NBTM) started a telephone service in 
Amsterdam with 49 subscribers. A year later, the NBTM opened a local 
telephone network in Rotterdam, while in The Hague and Utrecht local 
telephone networks were installed respectively in 1883 and 1884.49 For a 
matter of fact, the NBTM was certainly not the only local network operator 
but it exploited the largest networks.  
As in other countries, the telephone was primarily promoted as a 
device to support business, and not to support social contacts.50 Early 
adopters of telephones related to the dominant economic activity of a city 
or region as De Wit already observed.51 In Amsterdam, a relatively large 
group of financial intermediaries were among the first subscribers. For 
Rotterdam, the first subscribers were mostly active in the port of 
Rotterdam. 52  
                                                 
46 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 43-45. 
47 National Archive (NA), Archive Hoofdbestuur Posterijen en Telegrafie 1893-1928, no. 2.16.21, inv. nr. 
164, Verbaal hoofdbestuur  1 januari – 31 maart 1894 (incoming and outgoing mail 1 January 1894 – 31 
March 1894), Brochure Amsterdamsche Courant, gevoegd bij brief van Minister van Waterstaat aan 
hoofdbestuur P & T, 17 januari 1894, no. 639 (leaflet attached to Letter of Ministry of Public Works to P 
& T , 17 January 1894, no. 639).  
48 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 54-55. 
49 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 66. 
50 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 62-63.  
51 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 83. 
52 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 83 and unpublished research memorandum by Adri Albert de la Bruhèze (April 
2001). 
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 Local networks functioned for the time being as isolated entities. As 
from the year 1888, the Minister of Public Works, Trade and Industry 
granted permission to the NBTM for the linking up of local networks. In 
this year, the first trunk (interurban) lines were laid between Amsterdam 
on the one side, and Haarlem and Zaandam on the other side. 53  
International telephony also became an option. In the Netherlands, 
the international telephone service opened at 1 November 1895. 
Subscribers to long distance telephony from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Dordrecht could then be linked to Antwerp and Brussels in 
Belgium and vice versa. The Dutch government operated these 
international telephone connections.  
 
5.4.2 Telephony 1900-1940  
The use of the telephone gradually increased in the Netherlands. In 1882, 
after one year of service, the NBTM had welcomed 500 subscribers in 
Amsterdam, and, in 1884, around 400 in Rotterdam. The number of 
subscribers in both cities did rise but not explosively. In 1895, Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam counted respectively around 1750 and 750 subscribers. On 
a national level, the number of subscribers had risen to 2500 in 1885, and 
up to around 4600 ten years later. 54  
The local networks of Amsterdam and Rotterdam did not work 
properly despite the rather high subscription rates. According to De Wit, 
this was mainly due to the laborious concession system. If a company 
wished to operate a local telephone network, it needed a concession from 
both the national government, because telephony fell under its 
responsibility, and the local authorities while local public spaces needed to 
be rearranged for the construction of a telephone network. Apart from this 
bureaucratic rigmarole, nothing was arranged after the concession had 
ended. As a consequence, the NBTM was not very willing to invest in their 
own networks. This situation led to a faltering telephone network. Since a 
large part of telephone traffic took place in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the 
pressure on the telephone networks was larger than other Dutch cities.55 
As a result, the city councils of Amsterdam and Rotterdam decided to 
exploit a municipal telephone service to put an end to the defective 
telephone networks of the NBTM as from 1896. Not only the city councils 
of the two largest cities of the Netherlands looked for alternatives to 
                                                 
53 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 106-107.  
54 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 83-84.  
55 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 83-84.  
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develop and exploit an adequate telephone network. Other municipalities 
also started to establish municipal telephone companies due to 
dissatisfaction with the prevailing telephone operator. Because private 
telephone companies failed to provide proper telephone networks and 
services, concessions for local telephone networks were solely given to 
municipalities as from 1898.56  
In 1897, the government took over the long distance telephone 
network of the NBTM at the instigation of the Parliament since an 
adequate functioning of long distance telephony was considered important 
to Dutch society and the economy. Before, the government had shown 
some hesitancy to be actively involved in telephony. The government 
feared that telephony would lead to  a decrease in use, and thus incomes, 
of the government’s telegraph service. Yet, after several years of co-
existence, this was not the case. In general, domestic telegraph traffic even 
increased although at several specific lines, telegraph traffic decreased. 
Furthermore, if a telegraph line showed a decrease in use, not only long 
distance telephony was to blame. The enhanced post service and railway 
traffic were also seen as causes for diminished telegraph traffic at 
particular telegraph lines.57 The idea grew that well functioning telephone 
networks were of national importance, and so, the national authorities had 
an obligation to take care of that. In 1904, this obligation was arranged 
legally. Since then, the Dutch government started to take over local 
networks as well. Formerly it only took care of long distance and 
international telephony. Initially, the state focused on local networks 
which were operated by private companies with ending concessions. 
Later, that is from 1917, telephone networks exploited by municipalities 
were also taken over. Except for those of the three largest cities 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague), the state owned all 
telephone networks as from 1927. This situation ended in 1940; the 
Germans put every telephone line under the state’s supervision.58  
 
5.4.3 Developments in telephone infrastructure 
With a local telephone call, a switchboard operator linked the two callers. 
After the local networks were linked up, another switchboard operator 
came in to contact the called person in that place. This procedure could 
result in long waiting times or erroneous connections. Since 1907, the P & T 
                                                 
56 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 124.  
57 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 93.  
58 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 124-129 and p. 192.  
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offered the possibility to rent a private telephone line with 24 hour per day 
availability. Such a line was used to, for instance, connect two offices of the 
same firm.59 We have to bear in mind that switchboard operators were still 
involved to make the connection; a switchboard operator of office A made 
contact with a switchboard operator at office B. The annual rent for such a 
connection was fl. 4500 (in real cost fl. 27767) 60 if the distance between the 
connected premises was less than 15 kilometres. In 1919 this sum was 
raised to fl. 13.000 (in real cost fl. 41280,70) per year. If the distance was 
more than 15 kilometres the subscriber owed an annual rent of fl. 7000 (in 
real cost fl. 43193,18) to the P & T and as from 1919, the sum totalled fl. 
20.000 (in real costs fl. 63508,77).61 Hence, the costs were considerable. 
Another disadvantage of the manual switchboard system was that 
it did not pay to install a switchboard and an operator in remote areas. As 
a consequence, rural areas were deprived of telephone services; a type of 
fast communication that could be very convenient in case of emergency or 
to order food articles. In order to resolve these problems, automatic 
telephone exchanges were introduced. In 1911, the municipal telephone 
company of Amsterdam installed a semi-automatic telephone exchange. 
Semi-automatic implies that one still had to contact a switchboard operator 
who dialled the number instead of plugging the lines into the 
switchboard.62 Eleven years later, Amsterdam switched over to a fully 
automatic telephone system.63  
The municipal telephone companies appeared to be more decisive 
concerning the automation of their telephone networks than the national 
PTT. The PTT operated smaller telephone networks than those of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam or The Hague. The automation of the Dutch 
telephone network started off more seriously after PTT engineers had seen 
successful experiments with automatic telephony in Switzerland for small 
telephone networks in the 1920s. The PTT initiated an ambitious project at 
the beginning of the 1930s with the aim to automate the entire Dutch 
telephone network within fourteen years. Already in 1940, 82 percent of 
                                                 
59 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 151. 
60 1970=100 
61 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Uittreksel  Staatsblad no. 606 (1919) (Abstract government gazette).  
62 Gedenkboek Gemeente telefoon Amsterdam 1896-1936 (Amsterdam 1936), pp. 63-64. 
63 G. Hogesteeger en R.A. Korving (1990) Bellen voor de vrijheid. Illegale telefoonverbindingen in de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog (Stichting het Nederlandse PTT- museum; ’s Gravenhage) p. 27.  
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the local networks were automated while 50 percent of interurban traffic 
passed was transferred through automatic exchanges.64  
World War II severely disturbed the automation process. Unlike 
the national telegraph network, the telephone infrastructure was seriously 
damaged during the invasion of the Germans. Furthermore, German 
occupiers restricted telephone traffic to a large extent. They reserved a part 
of the capacity to themselves. German women were even brought in to 
work as switchboard operators. In 1941 the Germans determined that new 
subscriptions were only honoured if the subscriber could prove the 
telephone was vital (‘lebenswichtig’) to him or her. This implied that 
mainly doctors and hospitals could apply for a telephone subscription.  In 
1943, the German occupier decided that subscribers to whom the 
telephone was indispensable in war (‘kriegswichtig’) could keep their 
connection; all others were disconnected. In 1944, only a small group had 
the disposal over a functioning telephone connection.65 
After World War II, the Dutch telephone network was devastated. 
Telephone exchanges were destroyed (both by the Germans and the Dutch 
resistance). Besides, the Germans had robbed thousands of telephones as 
well as telephone cables.66 The Dutch government aimed at reconstructing 
telecommunication infrastructure as soon as possible, since it was 
considered of great importance to trade and industry. However, the 
necessary materials needed to be imported since no Dutch telecom 
industry existed. Several countries had to deal with the same urgency so 
large demands for the necessary materials existed. Hence, the supply of 
the necessary materials was lacking.67 Another factor that slowed down the 
reconstruction of the telecom infrastructure were the uncertainties 
concerning the PTT budget since the Minister of Public Works, under 
which the PTT fell, had a large influence on its finances. For instance, 
during the Korean War in 1951-1952 and the mild recession at the end of 
the 1950s, the government cut back the PTT’s budget. Meanwhile the 
demand for telephone connections and subscriptions grew intensively. The 
PTT could not comply with the requests at all which led to long waiting 
lists. In 1960, around 36.000 people waited for a telephone connection, in 
                                                 
64 W.O. de Wit, ‘Het communicatielandschap in de twintigste eeuw; de materiële basis’ in: J.W. Schot 
e.a. (red.) (2002) Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. Deel V Transport en Communicatie (Walburg 
Pers; Zutphen) pp.161-177, p. 167 
65 Hogesteeger en Korving, Bellen voor de vrijheid, pp. 35-36.  
66 Hogesteeger en Korving, Bellen voor de vrijheid, p. 37.  
67 Pieter D. Dorsman (1990) Overvloed en tekort. Het beleid van PTT rond de telefoonvoorziening in het 
Europoortgebied, 1957-1970  doctoraalscriptie EUR, pp. 33-34. 
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1966 156.000 people and 176.700 people in 1977. The waiting lists merely 
disappeared at the  beginning of the 1980s which implied that almost all 
Dutch households had the disposal over a telephone connection.68   
 
Table 5.5: Number telephone connections in the Netherlands, 1890-
1985.69 
  
Year Number telephone connections (in 
thousands) 
1890 6 
1900 19 
1910 59 
1920 116 
1930 214 
1935 257 
1939 323 
1950 507 
1955 729 
1960 1029 
1965 1504 
1970 2202 
 
5.4.4 Radiotelephony and radiotelegraphy  
After World War II radiotelephony and radiotelegraphy developed 
onwards and even became quite popular for sending coded messages. One 
reason for this increased popularity was the enhanced reliability due to the 
introduction of the so-called TOR–system (Teletype Over Radio) in 1947. 
Wireless radio regularly induced problems in transmitting the correct 
message since the content was sometimes ‘mutilated’. Because 
radiotelegraphic messages were sent in code language, misspelled letters 
could cause confusion. With the help of the TOR-system the receiving 
station was able to notice, by means of a special code, whether the contents 
of a message had changed during the transmitting phase. If so, then the 
transmitting station automatically transferred the message once again.70  
                                                 
68 Onno de Wit (1995) ‘Langs de lijnen van geleidelijkheid: de telefonie in Nederland als object van 
staatszorg, 1877-1989’ in: Rathenau Instituut, Toeval of noodzaak? Geschiedenis van de overheidsbemoeienis 
met de informatievoorziening (Rathenau Instituut; Den Haag) pp. 71-127, p. 123; De Wit, ‘Het 
communicatielandschap in de twintigste eeuw’, p. 168. 
69 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica., p. 230. 
70 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 184.  
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A new wireless telegraphy service was introduced in 1963, namely 
‘semafonie’. A great advantage was that the subscriber could quite easily 
carry with a ‘semafoon’, although in its starting period it appeared to be 
quite large. A semafoon was a device that received radio signals and 
indicated who had called the carrier of the semafoon since a semafoon did 
not receive speech. So, after a subscriber had been called, he or she needed 
to find a telephone to contact the sender of the message.71    
 The PTT gave serious attention to radiotelephony after 1945. A PTT 
committee advised to establish: (1) a public national network (‘Openbaar 
Landelijk Net’: OLN) to facilitate radiotelephony; (2) local networks (one 
fixed station which covered a limited area); and (3) private networks (users 
with their own network and their own frequency, without access to the 
OLN).72 The PTT placed ground stations (basis stations) that covered an 
area covering a radius of 25 kilometres. The OLN welcomed its first 
subscriber in 1949. The number of subscribers to the OLN gradually 
increased from 300 in 1956 to 2600 in the peak year 1978. In March 1980 a 
renewed network went on air, named ATF-1 (autotelefoonnet).  In 1994, 
the fourth version of ATF, ATF-4 or better known as GSM (Global System 
for Mobile Communications) was put into service. GSM facilitated mobile 
telephony all over Europe and in many countries over the world for 
twenty-four hours per day.73 
 The PTT installed several local networks to meet the second advice 
of the PTT committee. The ports of both Amsterdam and Rotterdam used 
such a network as did the eastern part of the ‘Flevoland’ province; the so 
called ‘Poldernet’.74 Private networks were also introduced according to 
the third advice. In 1957, the PTT put into use a private network for 
shipping traffic which became known as ‘marifonie’.75 Nowadays, 
applications of transmitting messages, both written and spoken, by radio 
waves are still widely used in maritime and mobile communication. 
 
                                                 
71 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 202. 
72 Jacques Caspers (1996) ‘Mobiele communicatie in historisch perspectief: de wereld van voor de 
handhelds’, Informatie & Informatiebeleid vol. 14, no. 1, http://www.cram.nl/cram/ieni/960102.htm, p. 
4 and 7. 
73 Caspers, ‘Mobiele communicatie in historisch perspectief’,pp. 6 - 7; see also W.O. de Wit (2002) ‘De 
ICT-revolutie’ in: J.W. Schot e.a. (red.) Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. Deel V Transport en 
Communicatie (Walburg Pers; Zutphen) pp. 261-275. 
74 Caspers, ‘Mobiele communicatie in historisch perspectief’, p. 6. 
75 Hogesteeger, Van lopende bode tot telematica, p. 202. 
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5.4.5 Tariffs and telephone costs in the Netherlands76 
In the starting period, subscribers paid a fixed annual subscription rate 
without having to paying additional costs for each telephone conversation. 
Next to that, subscribers paid single connection charges to be connected to 
the telephone network. Figure 5.2 shows the development of the height of 
subscription rates in the three largest cities of the Netherlands in real 
prices in the period 1881-1941. The reason to stop in 1941 is related to the 
fact that the municipal telephone services of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and 
The Hague were placed under control of the PTT on instigation of the 
Germans during World War II. Since this thesis focuses on business actors, 
the subscription rates for business activities are taken. Rotterdam and later 
on also Amsterdam distinguished between private and business 
subscribers. The Hague had its own way to establish the annual 
subscription rates. The height of the subscription rates depended on the 
number of telephone calls. We take the subscription rates that had to be 
paid for the maximum number of phone calls. Figure 5.3 shows the 
connection charges. Appendix A displays tables of the exact rates per 
period. We want to stress here that the figures are used to show trends in 
costs, not to explain the trends. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 In this section, the tariffs and costs of telephony in the Netherlands will be discussed. Two sources 
formed the basis of these reconstruction of costs, namely Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en 
Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven 
van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, 
Telegrafie en Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling van enkele telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der 
PTT; ’s Gravenhage). Linda van Goor has also provided an overview of telephone costs in her 
dissertation (Linda van Goor (2000) Banken en industriefinanciering in de 19e eeuw.  (Tinbergen Institute; 
Amsterdam) p. 82) for the period 1881-1900. However, it is not clear which costs she shows. Since the 
y-axis ranges from zero to 1,2 we might conclude that call charges are displayed in nominal prices. This 
would be strange because call charges were only introduced in 1897.  
Telecommunications in The Netherlands 
 133
 
Source: Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het 
abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf 
der PTT; ’s Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling 
van enkele telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage). 
 
 
Source: Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het 
abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf 
der PTT; ’s Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling 
van enkele telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage).
Figure 5.2 Annual subscription rates Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
The Hague in real prices (1970=100) 1881-1941
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Figure 5.3 Connection charges, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague in real prices (1970=100) 1896-1941
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Both the annual subscription rates and the connection charges decreased 
considerably after its starting period. Yet, in Amsterdam and The Hague 
several fluctuations accompanied the process of decreasing costs. 
Especially striking is the increase in subscription rates and the decrease in 
connection charges in The Hague in the 1920s. Maybe, the The Hague 
telephone service aimed at stimulating the number of telephone 
connections by lowering the connection charges. These costs were 
recovered via increased subscription rates. In the 1930s the decrease of 
prices persisted. The diminishing annual subscription rates did not imply 
that subscribers paid less than before because the municipal telephone 
services introduced call charges in this period.77  
Since 1920 the subscription rates for telephone networks, operated 
by the government, became more structured. The height of the 
subscription rates depended on the number of subscribers that were 
connected to the same telephone network. For a trunk connection, a 
subscriber did not pay any additional subscription rates, only a call charge. 
Figure 5.4 shows the development of the annual subscription rates of the 
‘Rijkstelefoondienst’ of the largest networks (see appendix A for the exact 
sizes and accompanying subscription rates). We focus the largest networks 
since the actors that are studied in more detail in chapters four, six and 
seven of this thesis held office in the larger cities of the Netherlands. Figure 
5.4 also displays the connection charges subscribers had to pay only once, 
for a connection to its local network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het abonnementstarief, 
de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s 
Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling van enkele 
telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage). 
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Source: Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het 
abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf 
der PTT; ’s Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling 
van enkele telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage). 
 
The subscription rates of the Rijkstelefoondienst also lowered over time. 
The sharp rise and fall of the rates in the 1920s is rather striking. We are 
not certain of the origin of this heavy fluctuation in price. In 1922, the 
Rijkstelefoondienst had changed the cost structure for the largest networks 
(more than 4000 subscribers). Before, subscribers to these networks paid a 
fixed subscription rate per year irrespective of the number of phone calls. 
In 1922, the Rijkstelefoondienst determined that the subscription rate in the 
largest networks depended on the number of phone calls. In figure 5.4 we 
have taken the maximum being 750 calls per year.  However, this new 
tariff system does not explain the extreme increase in subscription rates.  
Like the rest of Europe, the Netherlands had to deal with the consequences 
Figure 5.4 Annual subscription rates and once only connection 
charges Rijkstelefoon of the largest networks in real prices 
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of the economic boom after World War II. One of these consequences 
existed in a 50 % increase of the real wages.78 We know that salaries took 
up most of their budgets as of 1920.79 Imaginably, the same sort of 
development took place at the Rijkstelefoondienst. Furthermore, more and 
more switch board operators were necessary to handle telephone traffic. 
Automation of telephone exchanges became inevitable. The connection 
charges also diminished but increased again as from the 1950s. The 
increase was a result of the problems the PTT faced with meeting all the 
requests for a telephone connection, as was touched upon in section 5.4.3. 
The PTT raised the connection charges substantively in order to deter 
people from requesting a telephone connection. 
In addition to the subscription rates and connection charges, 
subscribers of the Rijkstelefoondienst who made use of interurban 
telephony paid a charge rate per telephone call.80 Figure 5.5 demonstrates 
the development of these costs. The distance between the two networks 
and the length of the conversation determined the height of the charge 
rate. The PTT changed the ‘distribution code’ for establishing the charge 
rate several times (see appendix A). In order to make a cost comparison 
over a longer period, we have taken the example of ‘near by’ (less than 15 
km) and of more than 35 km trunk calls with a maximum of three minutes. 
Since we expect that securities traders often made urgent telephone calls, 
these are included as well. Since 1930, the Rijkstelefoon also charged costs 
for local telephone calls although these remained very low. These costs are 
also showed in figure 5.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Van Zanden, Een klein land, p. 140. 
79 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 183. 
80 De Wit, Telefonie, p. 208, p. 213.  
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Source: Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De ontwikkeling van het 
abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf 
der PTT; ’s Gravenhage). 
 
The tariffs for telephone calls dropped but not smoothly. This 
development was similar to the other telephone costs such as the annual 
subscription rates. These costs also decreased but were accompanied with, 
sometimes heavy, fluctuations. 
Commission traders thus ‘lost’ less costs for communicating over 
time. One would expect that these costs were somehow represented in the 
commissions that commission traders received for executing an order. For 
this thesis, it would be interesting to calculate the costs of communication 
as a percentage of the total commission fees. However, the height of 
commission fees was not based on a calculation of costs. 81 Therefore, we 
need to speculate on what part of a commission fee consisted of 
                                                 
81 NA, Archief Bond voor den Geld - en Effectenhandel te ’s Gravenhage, entrance no. 2.19.042.14, inv. 
nr. 155, Nota inzake de provisietarieven van de Nederlandse Organisatie van het Effectenbedrijf, dd. 14 
november 1962 (Memorandum concerning commission fees, written by the Dutch Organisation for 
Securities trade, 14 November 1962). 
Figure 5.5 Tariffs trunk and local calls Rijkstelefoon in real 
prices (1970=100) 1897-1970
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communication costs. For that, several assumptions need to be made. We 
have taken two situations: that of a provincial commission trader with a 
client that lived more than 35 kilometres away and that of an Amsterdam 
commission trader with provincial clients that also lived more than 35 
kilometres outside Amsterdam. The criterion of ‘more than 35 kilometres’ 
offers the possibility to take a high price per telephone call. Suppose that a 
provincial stockbroker needed three telephone calls for executing an order; 
one to provide information, one to pass on the actual order to Amsterdam 
(assuming clients called themselves to pass on the order to their 
stockbroker), and one to inform the client on the results. Suppose that an 
Amsterdam commission trader needed two calls because he was present at 
the floor of the ASE. Finally, an order worth fl. 1000 is taken as an example. 
In chapters four and five, an overview of the commission rates and prices 
per telephone call were given.  Based on that data, we composed figure 5.6 
in which telephone costs are presented as a percentage of a commission 
fee, assuming a fl. 1000 securities order. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Telephone tariffs as a percentage of commission 
rates
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Year
Te
le
ph
on
e 
ta
rif
fs
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80 commission fees
telephone costs provincial
stockbroker
telephone costs
Amsterdam stockbroker
Percentage telephone
costs of commission fee
for a provincial
stockbroker
Percentage telephone
costs of commission fee
for an Amsterdam
stockbroker
Telecommunications in The Netherlands 
 139
 
Figure 5.6 shows two developments. First, it demonstrates that the costs 
for communication became a smaller part of the commission over time. 
Second, it makes clear that provincial stockbrokers had to count in a larger 
part for communication costs than their Amsterdam counterparts and thus 
made less profit.    
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an overview of the availability of telecommunication 
technologies in the Netherlands. Several of these technologies were 
introduced in the Netherlands by private persons and were later on taken 
over by the Dutch administration.  Dutch private persons experimented 
with electro-magnetic telegraphy in the 1840s but it became a public 
service in 1852. As concerned telephony, a private company opened the 
first public Dutch telephone network in Amsterdam in 1881. The role of 
the Dutch government consisted out of assigning the necessary concession 
to the NBTM. After the telephone services started to deteriorate, the Dutch 
government intervened and decided to establish a national telephone 
network. During the twentieth century, the possibilities to communicate 
developed further through the radio and existing communication 
technologies enhanced. With the information provided in this chapter, we 
are able to answer subquestion (d) what are the available means of ICT in the 
Netherlands in general? Table 5.7 summarises what information and 
communication technology became a public service at what date in the 
Netherlands.  
 
Table 5.6: Public availability ICT in the 
Netherlands. 
  
What type of ICT? Year public service 
Telegraphy 1852 
Telephony 1881 
Radiotelegraphy 1904 
Radio broadcasting 1924 
Subscription telegraphy 
(Telex) 
1933 
 
Apart from the public availability of information and communication 
technologies, the costs for making use of them were studied (subquestion 
k). In line with chapter two, we expected to see a decrease in 
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communication costs over time while at the start of a new technology, 
costs are high but drop after more people start to use it and the technology 
evolves. Indeed, the figures show that in the initial stage of a 
communication technology the costs for making use of it are rather high. 
Telegram costs dropped quite fast after the introduction of telegraphy, 
remained low at the first half of the twentieth century and increased again 
in the 1960s. The increase in price seems to be related to the number of 
transmitted telegrams. The decrease in sent telegrams through the public 
service probably has to do with faster and more convenient information 
and communication technologies such as the telephone but especially the 
telex. The telex was in fact a telegraph device, primarily used in business 
and the press.  The spread of telexes and the accompanying infrastructure, 
decreased the need to transmit telegrams by the public network because 
firms could directly transfer telegraphic messages to each other.  
The costs of using the telephone were also quite high in its starting 
phase. In the end, the costs are considerably lower (except for the 
connection charges of the Rijkstelefoondienst) compared to the first years 
of telephony in the Netherlands although heavy fluctuations accompanied 
the cost reduction process. The annual subscription rates of the The Hague 
municipal telephone service were even higher in the period 1923-1935 in 
comparison to its starting period around 1900. The variations in 
subscription rates might be the result of the developments in the Dutch 
telephone networks. Initially, the installation of a manually operated 
telephone network brought along high costs. An increase in these 
networks led to decreasing costs due to advantageous scale effects. Further 
developments however resulted in disadvantages of scale; the number of 
switch board operators necessary to operate the ever extending telephone 
networks grew extensively as did their salaries. Automatic telephone 
exchanges reduced the need for switchboard operators. Surely, automatic 
telephone exchanges induced high costs in their introductory phase but led 
to a decrease in costs after having operated for a period of time. The 
conclusion on the development in ‘communication’ costs thus must be that 
they are rather high in the initial phase of a new information and 
communication technology but drop, although not gradually, after it is 
more widely used and adopted. Costs can increase again after a 
communication technology ages.  
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6. The Stock Exchange as a Telecommunication 
Junction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on the available telecommunication technologies  
in the Exchange buildings of Amsterdam. The information provided in this 
chapter, helps to find an answer to subquestion (e) what means of ICT were 
used in the Dutch securities trade? The chapter is structured according to the 
different Exchange buildings that accommodated the securities trade. We 
will begin with the Zocher Exchange since this was the first building that 
housed telecommunication technologies, starting with the electro-magnetic 
telegraph. Section 6.3 discusses the telecommunication technologies in the 
Berlage Exchange that hosted securities trade from 1903 to 1913. Since 
1913, the Amsterdam securities traders practised their profession from the 
Cuypers Exchange. The available telecommunication technologies that 
were present in that exchange building will be dealt with in section 6.4. 
This chapter thus lists what kind of telecommunication technologies 
became available in what period at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. In the 
previous chapter, we have done the same for Dutch society at large. 
Section 6.5 will compare the results of both chapters. We expect that the 
newest telecommunication technologies were quickly available at the ASE, 
irrespective of its costs. 
  
6.2 The ‘Zocher Exchange’ (1845-1903) 
After the establishment of the Rijkstelegraaf in 1852, a telegraph office was 
located at the Zocher Exchange. Just as the post office, the telegraph office 
was located at the entrance of this building. Messages, either per mail or 
per telegram, could be sent to and fro the Exchange building. The 
telegraph became an important aid for trade in general. Already after its 
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first year of existence, the executives of the Rijkstelegraaf were surprised of 
the large extent traders, made use of the telegraph service. As a result, the 
Amsterdam office of the Rijkstelegraaf already needed to expand its 
facilities in 1853.1 In 1854, D. Crommelin, an Amsterdam financial 
intermediary, stated that if one wanted to trade in securities in large 
quantities, one could not do without the telegraph. However, Crommelin 
complained that this ‘beautiful’ invention in communication, did cost a lot 
of money.2 
As from 1855, the Rijkstelegraaf expanded the telegraph 
connections between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, in particular to comply 
with the demand of sending telegrams as quick as possible, during the 
official stock exchange hours of the Exchange.3 Messengers of the 
Rijkstelegraaf brought telegrams with other destinations than Rotterdam, 
from the Exchange building to the main office of the Rijkstelegraaf. From 
this main office, these telegrams were relayed to the rest of the 
Netherlands and, to the rest of the world.  
At the end of the 1860s, a new central telegraph office needed to be 
built in Amsterdam. Securities traders stressed the fact that this office had 
to be located in the direct vicinity of the Exchange building while this 
would benefit the securities trade. Since all important telegraph lines 
started or ended at the central telegraph office, it was sensible to keep the 
lines to this office as short as possible to prevent disturbances and delays. 
The stockbrokers pointed out that the securities trade was completely 
dependent on the telegraph and without it, the securities trade would not 
mean a thing. The telegraph became so important because it gave quotes of 
foreign stock exchanges, also during the opening hours of the Amsterdam 
Exchange. In Amsterdam, trade in shares and bonds mainly took place on 
the basis of these prices.4 A society of stockbrokers, the ‘Effectensociëteit’, 
developed plans to distribute Amsterdam quotes by telegraph in 1861. 
However, the costs to establish such a service were simply too high: 
                                                 
1 BMvC, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Verslag aan den Koning over de openbare werken in het jaar 
1853, “Telegrafie” (Ministry Domestic Affairs, Annual Report to the King concerning the Public Works 
over the year 1853, “Telegraphy”) , p.111.   
2 N.W. Posthumus (1921) ‘Nota over den toestand van de Amsterdamsche handelshuizen in het jaar 
1854’, in: Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek vol. 7 (NEHA: Amsterdam) pp. 196-209, p. 207. 
3 BMvC, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Verslag aan den Koning over de openbare werken in het jaar 
1855, ‘De toestand der telegrafen in Nederland,  (Ministry Domestic Affairs, Annual Report to the King 
concerning the Public Works over the year 1855, “the situation concerning the telegraphs in the 
Netherlands”) p. 3.  
4 GAA, AKvKA, no. 5287, inv. nr. 246, Ingekomen stukken 1869, ‘Een hoofdambtenaar bij den 
Rijkstelegraaf’ , 2 februari 1869 (Incoming mail, ‘A civil servant at the States Telegraph Service’, 2 
February 1869). 
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around 2.880 Dutch guilders per year whereas the annual rent of the 
society’s building added up to 2.200 guilders.5 
At the end of the nineteenth century the Amsterdam Exchange was 
connected by telegraph lines to the Exchanges of Rotterdam, Berlin, 
Brussels, Frankfurt am Main, London and Paris. Telegrams with other 
destinations, or telegrams that contained more than fifty words, were sent 
to the main office of the Rijkstelegraaf in Amsterdam by pneumatic tube 
that was installed in 1896.6 When the Exchange of Berlage opened in 1903, 
every three minutes messages for telegrams were forwarded to the main 
office of the Rijkstelegraaf by a pneumatic tube.7 Table 6.1 displays the 
amount of telegrams offered at the Rijkstelegraaf office in the  Zocher 
Exchange. It also shows the relation between the number of sent telegrams 
from the Netherlands and from the Zocher Exchange. Especially from the 
moment international destinations became available, the number of 
‘exchange’ telegrams comprised a considerable amount of the national 
total of sent telegrams.  
Communication facilities expanded with the coming of the 
telephone. Since 1884, the NBTM exploited a telephone bureau as from 
1884 in the Zocher Exchange. This telephone bureau was located near the 
corner of the stockbrokers.8 The NBTM offered the possibility to call the 
Exchange during opening hours. An employee of the telephone bureau 
noted who had called and gave this note to the person concerned who 
could then decide to phone back or not.9 During the discussions on the 
alteration plans of the Zocher building at the end of the nineteenth 
century, it became evident that the stockbrokers highly appreciated the 
vicinity of this telephone bureau since it meant ‘one of the few comforts of 
the Exchange’.10 Stockbrokers also took their own initiatives to enhance 
ways to obtain information, relevant to securities trade. For instance, in 
1900,  Rotterdam stockbrokers, united in the Vereeniging van  
                                                 
5 Jonker, Merchants, pp. 151 and  310.  
6 NA, Archive Hoofdbestuur Posterijen en Telegrafie 1893-1928, no. 2.16.21, inv. nr. 179, Verbaal 
“hoofdbestuur”  1 juli- 30 september 1899, ‘Algemeene instructie voor den dienst op de kantoren der 
Rijkstelegraaf’, 10 juli 1899, no. 8553 (incoming and outgoing mail 1 July 1899 – 30 September 1899, 
(General instructions for the Rijkstelegraaf) 10 July 1899, no. 8533).  
7 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 341-342.  
8 Archive Euronext, Jaarverslag‘Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel’ 1893,  (Annual report ‘Vereeniging voor 
den Effectenhandel’ 1893), p. 29.  
9 Officieele Gids der Nederlandsche Bell-Telephoon Maatschappij (juli 1891). 
10 Archive Euronext, Jaarverslag Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel’ 1893 (Annual report ‘Vereeniging voor 
den Effectenhandel’ 1893), p. 27. 
Chapter 6 
 
 
144 
Table 6.1: Number of telegrams offered at the office of the Rijkstelegraaf at 
the Zocher Exchange compared to the national total of sent telegrams, 
1878-1889.  
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Source: Library Museum for Communication, Jaarverslagen Rijkstelegraaf 1881, 1883, 1885, 1887, 1889 
(Annual Reports Rijkstelegraaf,); and Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 480-481.  
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Effectenhandelaren, requested a direct telegraph connection between their 
meeting rooms in the Rotterdam Exchange to the Amsterdam Exchange. 
As from January 1901, the Rotterdam stockbrokers could make use of this 
special service against fl. 2500 for the annual rent, plus additional costs for 
each sent telegram. They used this connection solely for the receiving of 
Amsterdam quotations during the official trade hours. Before and after 
these hours, the Rotterdam stockbrokers returned the authority over the 
telegraph connection to the P & T.11 
 
6.3 The ‘Berlage Exchange’ (1903-1913) 
The architect H.P. Berlage devoted a central place to communication 
means in his design for a new Exchange building. He situated the post, 
telegraph and telephone office in the entrance hall of the building that 
gave access to the trading floors.12 The stockbrokers were privileged: they 
had a direct passageway at their disposal that connected the securities 
trade floor to the telephone bureau. They did not have to cross the public 
entrance hall to reach the telephone bureau as the grain traders had to do. 
Especially during the official stock exchange hours (13.30 -14.45 hrs), the 
entrance hall was often filled with people who wanted to take a look at the 
traders. Within the rooms that were rented by the VvdE such as the library 
and the billiards room, telephone facilities were installed so that members 
could use them for business. Business went on after the official trading 
hours, and even took place before the official trading time.13    
The telephone facilities in the central hall did not always meet the 
requirements of the securities traders. In 1905, Labouchere Oyens & Co, an 
Amsterdam stockbroker, presented a petition to the Amsterdam Chamber 
of Commerce and Factories on behalf of a large group of commission 
traders and sworn brokers in the securities trade in which they stressed the 
importance for improvements to the interurban telephone service at the 
Exchange building. The undersigned stated that requests for interurban 
telephone connections increased daily. Commission traders and sworn 
brokers who maintained relationships in the province and even in foreign 
                                                 
11 NA, Archive Hoofdbestuur Posterijen en Telegrafie 1893-1928, no. 2.16.21, inv. nr. 533, Index op het 
verbaal “hoofdbestuur” 1900 no. 2901-4200 (Index incoming and outgoing mail 1900 no. 2901-4200), p. 
3003 and, inv. nr. 538, Index op het verbaal “hoofdbestuur” 1901 no. 3021-3620 (Index incoming and 
outgoing mail 1901 no. 3021-3620), p. 3088. 
12 Nederlands Architectuur Instituut (NAI: Dutch Architecture Institute), Rotterdam, file H.P. Berlage 
Nzn, microfiche 77, 65.113-65.118. 
13 NAI, file H.P. Berlage Nzn, microfiche 77, 65.113-65.118; Archive Euronext, inv. nr. 3946A, Jaarverslag 
Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel’ 1905 ( Annual report Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel 1905), p. 9.  
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countries, needed to contact their clients during trading hours to pass on 
prices, to receive orders, and to inform their clients about the results of 
concluded orders. If every broker intended to use interurban telephone 
lines, they had to wait a long time so that the purpose of the presence of 
telephones was lost. The petitioners furthermore stressed that this was 
especially the case since interurban telephone lines were also made 
available to the commodities traders. They ended with a plea for more 
interurban telephone booths and additional telephone personnel.14 
According to the board of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, the Post 
and Telegraph service was aware of the poor interurban telephone 
facilities at the Berlage Exchange. The director-general of the P & T 
responded that the necessary adjustments were going to be executed to 
meet the requirements of the traders.15        
 
6.4 The ‘Cuypers Stock Exchange’ (1913-1998) 
6.4.1 The ‘Cuypers Stock Exchange’ (1913-1927) 
Within the Cuypers building, telecommunication technologies occupied an 
even more prominent place than before. Now, the stock exchange booths 
that surrounded the trading floor were equipped with telephones. The 
stockbroker did not have to leave the trading floor any longer to contact 
his office or clients and vice versa. Stockbrokers that could not afford the 
annual rent of such a stock exchange booth, or in case all were already let, 
made use of the telephone bureau that was located in the vicinity of the 
stock exchange floor or of the telephones in clubrooms of the VvdE. 
Besides a telephone office, a post and telegraph office was situated in the 
Cuypers building. Domestic telegrams were sent immediately from this 
office; international telegrams were transmitted by a subterranean 
pneumatic connection, just as in the Berlage Exchange, to the main office of 
the ‘Rijkstelegraaf’ and then relayed to the rest of the world. As from the 
1920s, the Western Union Telegraph Company offered an alternative. This 
company owned an office in the Cuypers building from which a direct  
                                                 
14 GAA, AKvKA, inv. nr.  317, Ingekomen stukken 1905, Adres van Labouchere, Oyens & Co, A’dam 
aan KvKA,  3 maart 1905, nr. 47, (Incoming documents 1905, Letter from Labouchere, Oyens & Co, 
A’dam to KvKA, nr. 47, 3 March 1905).  
15 GAA, AKvKA, inv. nr. 33, Notulen van de Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken Amsterdam 1905, 17 
maart 1905 (Minutes Board 1905, 17 March 1905), and idem, inv. nr. inv. nr.  317, Ingekomen stukken 
1905,  Brief  Directeur –Generaal  P.& T. te Den Haag aan KvKA,  24 mei 1905, nr. 123 (Incoming 
documents 1905, Letter from director-general of the State’ s Post and Telegraph Service to KvKA, nr. 
123, 24 May 1905). 
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telegraph connection ran to the New York Stock Exchange via the London 
Stock Exchange. Western Union made use of ‘verreschrijvers’.16  
In addition to making use of the existing information and 
communication possibilities, financial intermediaries started to create their 
own telecommunication infrastructures in the 1920s. In 1920, the P & T 
reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that a group of Amsterdam 
bankers had taken the initiative to establish a Dutch cable company in 
cooperation with Western Union with the aim to construct telegraph lines 
between the Netherlands, Germany and from there to the Azores 
archipelago. The idea was that, from this group of islands, the United 
States was reached with a telegraph cable of the Western Union. 
Apparently, these Amsterdam bankers were not satisfied with the existing 
telegraph connection between the Netherlands and the United States in 
that period. However, the German Telegraph Administration refused to 
co-operate and the whole enterprise was cancelled.17  
A more successful initiative was taken in the same year. The NSF 
requested the Minister of Public Works in 1920, to license the 
establishment and exploitation of a radio service that passed through the 
prices of active securities during the official trading hours. A person spoke 
the prices in code into a microphone. The NSF figured that this type of 
information would especially interest banks and commission traders from 
outside Amsterdam. This information could immediately be passed on to 
clients so that a heightened number of transactions was expected. 
Certainly, banks and commission traders made use of interurban 
telephone connections. Yet, these connections always involved the 
deployment of several, sometimes even four, switchboard operators before 
the caller could speak to the called person. In combination with structural 
                                                 
16 A.W. de Iongh (1926) Gedenkboek 1876-1926. Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel te  Amsterdam 
(Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel; Amsterdam) pp. 97-99.  
17 NA, Archive Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen,Telegrafie en Telefonie. Kabinet 1893-1934, no. 2.16.04.02, 
inv. nr. 19, Verbalen 1920, brief van de afdeling Posterijen en Telegrafie, gericht aan Min. van Bui. Za.,  
26 juli 1920, no. 5111   (incoming and outgoing mail 1920, Letter from P & T to Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 26 July 1920, no. 5111).  
Figure 6.1: After the introduction of the telephone at the Zocher Exchange in 1884, 
telecommunication technologies obtained a prominent place in the Exchange buildings. 
In the Cuypers Exchange, the trade floor was surrounded with stock exchange booths 
that were filled with telephones.  
Copyright figure: Foundation History of Technology. 
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capacity problems (too few lines), an urgent telephone call could 
sometimes take up to three hours in 1920.18 Hence, a radio service offered a 
solution for the problematic telephone connections for the securities 
traders in the province, and secondly, such a radio service decreased the 
necessity to contact Amsterdam financial middlemen for acquiring current 
price information.  
The VvdE supported the NSF’s request. The board of the VvdE sent 
a circular to its members, which led to an enthusiastic response. 
Particularly, members that possessed branch offices in the province reacted 
positively while they still depended on interurban telephone connections. 
In his reaction to the request, the Minister indicated that he preferred a 
public service but presumed that it would take a while before that would 
go into operation. Therefore, at the end of 1920, the Minister granted 
temporarily permission to the VvdE to establish, in co-operation with the 
NSF, a radio broadcasting service that would relay current stock market 
price from the stock exchange building to its subscribers.19 The first 
experimental broadcasts started already at Christmas 1920, and during the 
summer of 1921, the first subscribers were provided with a receiving set. 
Impressive antenna’s appeared on fifty bank buildings and on towers of 
churches. Every ten or fifteen minutes, prices of active stocks were 
transmitted in code. 20 The subscribers listened to this by means of a 
headphone and received the key to the code that was changed regularly. In 
1926, 105 companies and institutions from outside Amsterdam had 
subscribed to this service that the VvdE offered as from 1921.21   
A few years later, it became clear that the temporarily granted 
permission was not going to be renewed. The government decided to end 
all private initiatives in the field of radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony. In 
1927, the PTT took over the stock exchange transmitting station. The PTT 
started a business news station, broadcasting from Scheveningen-Haven.22  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 De Wit, Telefonie, pp. 107 and 132.  
19 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, p. 171. For a matter of fact, the NSF hired the transmitting station 
from the British Marconi Company that followed the experiments with great interest.  
20 at  1:30, 1:45, 2:00, 2:15, 2:30 and 2:45 hours (www.stichtingvvde.nl, 16 January 2004) 
21 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, p. 171;  W. Vogt ([1958]) Spanne en Spanningen. De veertigjarige 
geschiedenis van de n.v. Philips’ Telecommunicatie Industrie voorheen n.v. Nederlandse Seintoestellen Fabriek 
(Meulenhoff; Amsterdam) pp. 71-74; De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 168.  
22 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 174-175; De Vries, Een eeuw, Vogt, Spanne en Spanningen, p. 76.  
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6.4.2 Stocktickers in the Netherlands 
The VvdE started to look around for a new system for the quick 
broadcasting of quotations. The search for a new system led to countries 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom where respectively in 
1867 and 1872, the stock ticker was introduced in substitution for the 
couriers that ran up and down from the stock exchange floor to the 
stockbroker offices with the latest stock market prices. A stock ticker was a 
telegraphic device that printed stock market quotations and important 
news announcements on a small paper strip, the tape.23  
In 1927, a member of the VvdE, Mr A.H.H. Boissevain, stayed a 
short period in New York to visit his contacts. The VvdE asked him to 
study the stock ticker systems at Wall Street while he was there. As much 
as four companies operated a stock ticker service: Dow Jones News Ticker, 
Stock Quotation Company, New York Quotations Company, and the 
Western Union Telegraph Company. The first two companies made use of 
telephone lines for transmitting the information, and the latter two 
employed telegraph lines. The VvdE preferred the stock ticker systems 
that worked with telephone lines because they already had made some 
arrangements with the municipal telephone service of Amsterdam.24  
Still, the VvdE contacted Western Union to fulfil its information 
needs although this company worked with telegraph lines, and not with 
the desired telephone lines, to operate their ticker service. Western Union 
already exploited a telegraph line from Amsterdam to New York so this 
company was already located in Amsterdam. An employee of Western 
Union, Mr J. Beenhouwer, functioned as the contact between Western 
Union and the VvdE. Western Union approved of the idea of setting up a 
Dutch ‘Tikkerdienst’ (ticker service) and was prepared to participate in it 
financially and by way of delivering the necessary devices.25 Later, for 
unknown reasons, the Western Union withdrew its promises concerning 
financial participation but was still prepared to provide the necessary 
                                                 
23 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex , inv. nr. 818 II 131, Beschrijving tikkerapparatuur [1931] 
(Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Description ticker equipment, [1931]). 
24 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, brief van het bestuur van de VvdE 
aan de Gebroeders Boissevain, 14 februari 1927 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, , letter board VvdE 
to Bros. Boissevain, 14 February 1927); and nota werking tikkersysteem van de New York Quotation 
Company [1927] (memorandum concerning the working of the ticker system of the New York 
Quotation Company [1927]).  
25 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, brief van J. Beenhouwer aan het 
bestuur van de  VvdE, 14 mei 1930 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’ , letter J. Beenhouwer to board 
VvdE, 14 May 1930). 
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technical apparatus.26 Apparently, Beenhouwer was caught by the idea 
and kept involved in the Tikkerdienst. He even became the main initiator 
of the whole enterprise. Beenhouwer started to send letters to financial 
intermediaries in Amsterdam to promote the ticker service. Within a short 
period of time, he organised eighteen companies that were willing to 
participate in the limited liability company, the Tikkerdienst. They all took 
a block of five shares of fl. 1000 per share. That brought its paid up capital 
to fl. 90000.27 The shareholders were mostly Amsterdam financial 
middlemen as table 6.2 indicates:  
 
Table 6.2: Shareholders N.V. Tikkerdienst 1930.28 
  
Firm Place 
Amsterdamsche Bank Amsterdam 
Amsterdamse Liquidatiekas Amsterdam 
J. Beenhouwer Amsterdam 
Bank-Associatie Amsterdam 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas Amsterdam 
Broekman’s effectenkantoor Amsterdam 
De Twentsche Bank Amsterdam 
Heldring & Pierson  ‘s Gravenhage 
Incasso-Bank Amsterdam 
R. Mees & Zoonen Rotterdam 
Nederlandse Handel-Maatschappij Amsterdam 
Nederlands-Indische Escompto Maatschappij Amsterdam 
Nederlands-Indische Handelsbank Amsterdam 
H. Oyens & Zonen Amsterdam 
Patijn, Van Notten & Co Amsterdam 
Pierson & Co Amsterdam 
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging Amsterdam 
B. Sanders Ezn. Amsterdam 
Vermeer & Co Amsterdam 
 
                                                 
26 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, brief van J. Beenhouwer aan het 
bestuur van de VvdE, 12 augustus 1930 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, letter J. Beenhouwer to 
board VvdE, 12 August 1930).  
27 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, statuten N.V. Tikkerdienst 1930 (founding papers N.V. Tikkerdienst 
1930). 
28 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, statuten N.V. Tikkerdienst 1930 (founding papers N.V. Tikkerdienst 
1930). 
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After a successful trial period, the N.V.29 Tikkerdienst started its services 
on 2 November 1931. The Tikkerdienst ‘hired’ a room in the Cuypers 
building in which the transmitting station was installed, paying a rent of 
1000 Dutch guilders per year. Actually, the rent was a formality because 
the VvdE subsidised the Tikkerdienst fl. 1000 per year. The VvdE 
contributed to the Tikkerdienst also in another way: a chief ‘guide’ (an 
employee of the Guidebank) for the ticker service would be recruited. This 
chief guide had to collect the quotations that the VvdE put at its disposal 
free of charge, which he passed on to the employees of the Tikkerdienst at 
the transmitting room, whom in their turn, relayed the information to the 
subscribers of the Tikkerdienst. The chief guide received his salary for one 
half from the VvdE and the other half from the Tikkerdienst.30  
In 1937, the Tikkerdienst introduced the possibility to project the 
small paper strip on a elongated screen. Such screens were placed on top 
of the Guidebank. Now, everyone on the trading floor could clearly see the 
information on the tape, without having to crowd around the boards or 
tickers.31 Not only did the ways to view the information of the ticker 
expand, but also the types of information that were transmitted through 
the ticker were extended. The Tikkerdienst began with the opening 
quotations, the actual concluded affairs (‘gedane affaires’), and the final 
quotations. The Tikkerdienst started to extend its services in the course of 
the 1930s. In 1932, quotations from dealings that were closed before official 
trading hours were transmitted via the ticker.32 The Tikkerdienst also 
wanted to place tikkers in the public entrance hall of the Berlage Exchange 
as from 1934. The VvdE was not exactly charmed by this request. The 
board of the VvdE feared that several firms would ‘abuse’ the information 
of the tikkers by buying and selling securities from each other, against the 
prices printed on the tikker tape, without the mediation of the ASE. As a 
result, members of the VvdE would miss orders, and thus commission or 
courtage. According to the Tikkerdienst, this fear was unjust. On the  
 
 
                                                 
29 NV= naamloze vennootschap = limited liability company.  
30 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, ‘Huurovereenkomst tusschen de 
VvdE en de N.V. Tikkerdienst, augustus 1931  (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Rental agreement 
between the VvdE and the N.V. Tikkerdienst, August 1931); brief van  het bestuur van de VvdE aan de 
N.V. Tikkerdienst, 13 augustus 1931 (letter VvdE to N.V. Tikkerdienst, 13 August 1931).  
31 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, Jaarverslag N.V. Tikkerdienst 1937 (Annual report N.V. Tikkerdienst 
1937). 
32 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Statistiekboeken N.V. Tikkerdienst 
[1943] (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’,  Statistics N.V. Tikkerdienst [1943]). 
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Leaflet N.V. Tikkerdienst, ca. 1940. (Museum voor Communicatie, Den Haag). 
 
 
 
contrary, it would just result in more affairs.33 Initially, no tikkers were 
placed  in the Berlage Exchange. However, as we shall see later on, tikkers 
appeared in the Berlage building a few years later. Another extension of 
provided information by the Tikkerdienst were the prices of the affairs 
concluded after official trading hours as from 1938.34 
The Tikkerdienst started its services in Amsterdam. The 
Tikkerdienst certainly aimed at expanding its network but to achieve that 
goal, arrangements needed to be made with telephone companies for the 
usage of interurban and local  telephone lines.35 In 1935, the Tikkerdienst 
extended its services to The Hague. The ticker messages were sent to a 
                                                 
33 Archief Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex , inv. nr. 818 II 131, Brief van N.V. Tikkerdienst aan de 
VvdE, 23 oktober 1934 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, letter N.V. Tikkerdienst to VvdE, 23 October 
1934). 
34 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Statistiekboeken N.V. Tikkerdienst 
[1943] (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Statistics NV Tikkerdienst [1943]). 
35 HAAA, archive Rotterdamsche Bank, inv. nr. 525, Jaarverslag N.V. Tikkerdienst 1934 (Annual report 
N.V. Tikkerdienst 1934). 
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telephone exchange in The Hague. The The Hague department of the 
Tikkerdienst had hired two rooms in a nearby restaurant. From this 
restaurant, the messages were transmitted to the The Hague subscribers.36 
Plans existed to extend the service to Rotterdam. The board of the 
Rotterdam Association for Stockbrokers (Vereeniging voor 
Effectenhandelaren) pointed out the advantages of a stock ticker system; it 
should be no longer necessary to call to the Amsterdam Stock Exchange for 
information, only for passing through the orders. Hence, this meant a 
saving in costs for phone calls.37 Apparently, the Rotterdam stockbrokers 
could not be persuaded since the Tikkerdienst has never operated in 
Rotterdam.  
The national ambitions of the Tikkerdienst were realised in 1938. In 
co-operation with the VvdE and the PTT, the Tikkerdienst started to 
provide current price information through a private telex network.38 
Theoretically, everyone in the Netherlands could subscribe to this telex 
service provided that the necessary devices were purchased or hired. In 
contrast to the already existing telex network of the news agency 
‘Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau’ (General Dutch Press bureau: A.N.P.), 
but similar to the public telex network of the PTT, this telex network used 
telephone cables for sending messages. A subscriber obtained an 
additional telephone line which ran between his office and an office of the 
‘Rijkstelefoon’ service. So, although this subscriber might already have a 
‘normal’ telephone connection and although he might have been linked up 
to the public telex network, the extra telephone line was still installed. In 
the case that the subscriber had already made use of the public telex 
network, he had a ‘verreschrijver’. This subscriber could install a switch in 
order to change between the public telex network and the price telex 
network. The total subscription costs added up to fl. 800 à fl. 850 annually. 
This included the subscription rate to the price telex network, the costs for 
hiring a telex installation, costs for the additional telephone line and the 
costs for paper and typewriter ribbons.39   
                                                 
36 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Beschrijving tikkerapparatuur 
[1931] (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Description Ticker Apparatus, [1931]). 
37 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Circulaire VvdE aan haar leden, 29 
oktober 1935 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’,  Circular board Vereeniging van Effectenhandelaren to 
their members, 29 October 1935).  
38 Ten Brink and Schell, Geschiedenis, pp. 125-126; HAAA, archive Rotterdamsche Bank, inv. nr. 525, 
Jaarverslag N.V. Tikkerdienst 1937 (Annual report N.V. Tikkerdienst 1937). 
39 Archive De Nederlandsche Bank (Dutch Central Bank, further abbreviated as DNB), inv. nr. 
1.42/49/1, telex en telegram verkeer 1937 (telex and telegram traffic 1937). 
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The Tikkerdienst started in Amsterdam with 33 subscribers against 
17 in The Hague. Table 6.3 indicates that the number of subscribers 
initially rose steadily but stagnated during World War II : 
 
Table 6.3: Tikkerdienst number subscriptions at Amsterdam, 1931-
1943. 40 
      
Date Number 
subscripti-
ons A’dam 
Date Number 
subscrip- 
tions 
A’dam 
Date Number 
subscrip- 
tions 
A’dam 
1 Nov. 1931 33 1 May 1936 37 1 May 1940 68 
1 May 1932 32 1 Nov. 1936 36 1 Nov. 1940 65 
1 Nov. 1932 31 1 May 1937 50 1 May 1941 67 
1 May 1933 30 1 Nov. 1937 58 1 Nov. 1941 62 
1 Nov. 1933 33 1 May 1938 57 1 May 1942 66 
1 May 1934 35 1 Nov. 1938 66 1 Nov. 1942 72 
1 Nov. 1934 36 1 May 1939 65 1 May 1943 67 
1 May 1935 34 1 Nov. 1939 70 1 Nov. 1943 63 
1 Nov. 1935 36     
 
 
Table 6.4: Tikkerdienst number subscriptions at The 
Hague, 1935-1943. 41 
    
Date Number 
subscriptions 
The Hague 
Date Number 
subscriptions 
The Hague 
1 Nov. 1935 17 1 May 1940 26 
1 May 1936 18 1 Nov. 1940 27 
1 Nov. 1936 18 1 May 1941 31 
1 May 1937 23 1 Nov. 1941 33 
1 Nov. 1937 24 1 May 1942 35 
1 May 1938 24 1 Nov. 1942 36 
1 Nov. 1938 23 1 May 1943 34 
1 May 1939 23 1 Nov. 1943 32 
1 Nov. 1939 26   
                                                 
40 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Statistiekboeken N.V. Tikkerdienst 
[1943] (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Statistics N.V. Tikkerdienst [1943]). 
41 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Statistiekboeken N.V. Tikkerdienst, 
[1943] (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Statistics N.V. Tikkerdienst [1943]). 
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A spokesman of the ‘Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging’  (Robaver) 
elaborated on the advantages of the tikker in a newspaper in 1930. The 
tikkersystem guaranteed promptness, correctness, and completeness while 
the information was printed directly on paper. This prevented mistakes 
and misunderstandings which, due to bad telephone connections, could 
occur when using the telephone. Especially provincial offices would profit 
from the tikker because they depended on interurban telephone calls of 
their main office or their Amsterdam commission trader. Another financial 
intermediary, H. Oyens and Sons, also favoured the tikkersystem above 
the telephone system because, first, prices of all executed orders of the 
main/active securities were printed on the tikker tape and not only the 
quotations of the time slots in which the official trade time was divided. 
Second, the information was received quicker and more constantly in 
comparison to the telephone. Third, a client could, if he had a tikker in his 
vicinity, independently keep up with the course of the quotations.42  
The subscribers to the Tikkerdienst consisted mostly of financial 
firms such as banks, bankers, commission traders as is showed in 
appendix B. These companies often placed the tikkers in public places so 
that their customers could also have a look at it and inform themselves. 
The stockbrokers firm Louis Korijn & Co held office opposite the Stock 
Exchange building. Korijn & Co had a public reading and news room 
(Lees- en Tijdingzaal) within their office in which people interested in 
securities trade could read professional literature, and where Korijn & Co 
had hung up boards on which current quotations were written down. 
When the tikker was introduced, Korijn & Co hired a room in the Berlage 
building in which a tikker was placed for public use.43 Korijn & Co 
immediately deployed the possibility of projecting the ticker tape on a 
elongated screen in 1937. The projection of the ticker tape prevented the 
pushing aside of people so that everyone had a clear view on what the 
tikker displayed.44 Primarily to please their guests, also hotels like the 
Carlton subscribed to the Tikkerdienst. So, during a lunch, guests of the 
Carlton ‘could combine pleasure with business’, as their advertisements 
stated.45   
                                                 
42 HAAA, archief RB, inv. nr. 525, ‘Het “tickersysteem” te Amsterdam’ in: De Maasbode [1930]. 
43 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex,  inv. nr. 818 II 131, advertentie Louis Korijn & Co, 27 
januari 1934 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex, ’Advertisement Louis Korijn & Co, 27 January 1934).  
44 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdienst en Telex , inv. nr. 818 II 131,  bericht van Louis Korijn & Co aan 
zijn klanten, 7 december 1937 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex, Message of Louis Korijn & Co to its 
customers, 7 December 1937).  
45 ‘Tikker op de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs (I)’, in: H.W. Guenst (1991) Trommelpapper. 115 jaar 
Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel (VvdE; Amsterdam) pp. 61-62. 
The  Stock Exchange as a Telecommunication Junction 
 157
 Tikkerdienst traffic increased steadily: the number of subscribers 
expanded as did the profits of the Tikkerdienst (appendix B). Yet, World 
War II put a spoke in its wheel. The profits of the Tikkerdienst diminished 
during this war. The Tikkerdienst had a hard time starting up again after 
1945 (see appendix B). Due to diminishing returns, the Board of the 
Tikkerdienst started to consider the possibility to transfer all shares to the 
VvdE.  As from 1956, the VvdE owned the Tikkerdienst.46  
The Tikkerdienst continued to expand its services. At the end of the 
1960s, the Tikkerdienst provided the following information: 
• Quotations of trade before official stock exchange hours; 
• Opening quotations London, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Tokyo; 
• Course of the quotations; 
• All official quotations; 
• Exchange rates (of foreign currencies); 
• Final quotations Frankfurt and London; 
• Opening quotations New York; 
• News provided by the A.N.P. and averages of prices, volume (number 
of orders) and so on, provided by the ‘Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek’ (Central Bureau for the Statistics: C.B.S.); 
• All financial messages of the A.N.P. (for which one needed an extra 
subscription).47 
Despite the extensive coverage of information, the Tikkerdienst plodded 
along. It served 109 subscribers, spread over Amsterdam and The Hague. 
These subscribers paid a subscription rate of respectively fl. 600 and fl. 675 
per half year. Some of these subscribers had installed a tikker in their stock 
exchange booth. Also the Guidebank whose task it was to gather the 
concluded orders and pass them on to the employees of the Tikkerdienst, 
had placed several tikkers at its desks. The devices were primarily used as 
a convenient means to check earlier concluded orders. In the 1960s, two 
mechanics walked around on the stock exchange floor to repair and 
replace the tikker machines.48 The fact that two mechanics were necessary 
implies that the tikkers broke down regularly. Indeed, in the 1960s the 
Tikkerdienst still worked with the same tikkers as in 1930. The machines 
had became obsolete so its parts were sparse and repairs costly. Besides 
                                                 
46 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, Brief van N.V. Tikkerdienst aan aandeelhouders, 29 maart 1956 
(Letter N.V. Tikkerdienst to shareholders, 29 March 1956). 
47 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Nota betreffende situatie N.V. 
Tikkerdienst, 28 oktober 1969  (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, memorandum concerning position 
N.V. Tikkerdienst, 28 October 1969). 
48 Interview G. van den Brink, who worked at the ASE from 1958 to 1996. 
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the outdated material, the P.T.T. demanded a different voltage with which 
the pulses were passed through. This demand would have to result in 
radical and thus costly alterations of the tikkersystem. Maybe, it was more 
useful to  switch to a complete new system. 49  
The VvdE reconsidered the position of the Tikkerdienst in 1969.50 
The Board decided to end the transmission of prices and other types of 
relevant information by means of the tikker in 1971. The subscribers of the 
Tikkerdienst were offered to subscribe to the price telex network; 66 
subscribers took the offer. The Tikkerdienst was converted into a private 
company (besloten vennootschap), carrying the name ‘Beursnieuws B.V.’ 
(exchange news), which was effectuated per 18 January 1972.51 The 
elongated screens were replaced by Philip’s illuminated news trailers.52 
Better alternatives (telex) and outdated technology thus led to the closure 
of the Tikkerdienst. Nowadays, the ticker tape still exists. Above the 
entrance of the Cuypers exchange, a news trailer displays current prices of 
securities. Also websites of stock exchanges offer the possibility to insert a 
news trailer on computer screens.  
 
6.4.3 Telecommunications at the Cuypers Exchange after World War II 
In the after war period, not so many new but increasingly more and 
enhanced telecommunication technologies entered the ASE. Underneath 
the trading floor, several rooms were in use as ‘clubrooms’ (sociëteitszalen) 
by the VvdE. However, in the 1960s the frequency of its use diminished 
and it was decided that these rooms could be hired by the members. The 
banks and commission traders that hired these rooms ‘stuffed’ them with 
telephones, telexes, and stock tickers.53 In 1954, the AVRO, a Dutch radio 
and television broadcasting association, started to broadcast a radio 
                                                 
49 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Nota betreffende situatie N.V. 
Tikkerdienst,  28 October 1969 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, memorandum concerning position 
N.V. Tikkerdienst, 28 October 1969). 
50 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Nota betreffende situatie N.V. 
Tikkerdienst, 28 October 1969 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, memorandum concerning position 
N.V. Tikkerdienst, 28 October 1969). 
51 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Jaarverslag Beursnieuws B.V. 1971 
(Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, Annual report Beursnieuws B.V. 1971). 
52 Archive Euronext, map Tikkerdient en Telex, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Mededeling van VvdE , 24 
september 1973 (Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, announcement VvdE, 24 September 1973).  
53 Interview mr. W. Wiegel who worked at the ASE from 1963 to  1982. 
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program called ‘Beursplein 5’ (the address of the ASE) live from the stock 
exchange floor.54  
In 1971, a few specialists (hoekmannen) undertook a remarkable 
action. They had installed a private telephone system between their own 
stock exchange booth and stock exchange booths of other members of the 
VvdE. For instance, the company Mandersloot & De Bruin, a specialist in 
Shell Royal Oil securities, installed such a telephone system, connecting 
twenty nine members to their stock exchange booth. So did H. de Roos Jr. 
& Co, a specialist in AKZO shares, connecting eighteen other members. So, 
stock exchange employees not only used the telephones in the stock 
exchange booths to have contact with their offices or their clients, but also 
with each other. The aim of such a private telephone system was that 
members could call the stock exchange booths of the specialists to ask for a 
quotation without having to cross the stock exchange floor. Or, if a 
telephonic order came in, the stock exchange employee could call the 
specialist right away to conclude the order. A fast and direct quotation 
advice by the specialists was especially appreciated by the members.55 In 
fact, within the stock exchange building an additional, dedicated 
information network was created.  
The Quotations Committee did not approve the telephone systems 
that both Mandersloot & De Bruin and De Roos had placed without their 
permission.56 The Quotations Committee feared that the public nature of 
the securities trade might be in danger as a result of these private 
telephone systems. The danger existed that trade would divert from the 
open corner (since Shell and AKZO were active securities) to the stock 
exchange booths of the specialists. Still, the Committee identified it as an 
efficient means to communicate and thus, the Committee, and also the 
board of the VvdE, were reluctant in prohibiting the private telephone 
systems right away.57 The chairman of the Quotations Committee held a 
                                                 
54 RAO, archive Twentsche Bank, inv. nr. 2349, Folder aankondigingen radio-uitzendingen, uitgegeven 
door de VvdE [1961] (Leaflet published by VvdE that announces radio broadcasts from the stock 
exchange floor). 
55 Archive Euronext, inv. nr. 1990, Uitknipsel Notulen van de bestuursvergadering van de VvdE, 11 
november 1971  (Clip out minutes meeting Board of the VvdE, 11 November 1971).  
56 Archive Euronext, Besluiten van de Commissie voor de Notering etc. Klachten inzake notering 1970 
t/m  (Decisions of the Quotations Committee etc. Complaints concerning quotations), inv. nr. 1604 B, 
Verslag van de vergadering d.d. 14 oktober 1971 van de Commissie voor de Notering (Report of a 
meeting of the Quotations Committee, 14 October 1971).  
57 Archive Euronext, Besluiten van de Commissie voor de Notering etc. Klachten inzake notering 1970 
t/m  (Decisions of the Quotations Committee etc. Complaints concerning quotations), inv. nr. 1604 B, 
Verslag van de vergadering d.d. 14 oktober 1971 van de Commissie voor de Notering (Report of a 
meeting of the Quotations Committee, 14 October 1971); and, inv. nr. 1990, Uitknipsel Notulen van de 
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questionnaire among the members who were connected to these telephone 
systems in order to gain more insight in the issue. Twenty firms were 
asked whether they had any objections to the removal of the private 
telephone system, if they made much use of the connections, and whether 
they could continue their affairs without these lines. All of the 
interviewees were prepared to give up the telephone lines in question, 
although some  protested. For instance, Pierson, Heldring & Pierson used 
the internal telephone connections extensively, and would deplore their 
removal. In contrast, F. van Lanschot would not regret the disappearance 
of the lines.58 In 1974, the private telephone systems were abolished.59 
After the tikker had disappeared, computers entered the securities 
trade. In 1988, the ‘trade supporting system’ (Handelsondersteunend 
Systeem; HOS) was introduced in the Dutch securities trade; a system that 
particularly supported the specialists. It appeared to be the start of a 
drastic change of the appearance of the securities trade floor.60 It also 
marked the end of the open outcry system. The trade floor was 
reconstructed again after the introduction of the Trading System 
Amsterdam (TSA) in 1994. No more screaming nervous stockbrokers that 
flocked around the specialist to execute their orders or stockbrokers who 
walked up and down to their stock exchange booths to receive and make 
calls. The financial intermediaries started to execute the securities trade 
from the dealing rooms, located at the main offices of their employer. After 
the merger with the option traders, the specialists moved from the trading 
floor to a room on the first floor of the Cuypers Exchange. Nowadays, the 
securities trade is completely done from behind computer screens.61  
 
6.5 Comparison between general availability of ICT and ICT at ASE 
We have seen what telecommunication technologies became available as a 
general public service and at the Exchange buildings. Below, these data are 
listed in table 6.5. By drawing up this table, subquestion (d) what are the 
                                                                                                                           
bestuursvergadering van de VvdE, 11 november 1971  (Clip out minutes meeting Board of the VvdE, 
11 November 1971).  
58 Archive Euronext, inv. nr. 1990, Vertrouwelijke enquete, gehouden door de voorzitter van de 
Commissie voor de Noteringen [1974](Confidential questionnaire, executed by the chairman of the 
Quotations Committee) [1974].  
59 Archive Euronext Besluiten van de Commissie voor de Notering etc. Klachten inzake notering 1970 
t/m  (Decisions of the Quotations Committee etc. Complaints concerning quotations), inv. nr. 1604 B, 
Kort verslag van de Commissie voor de Notering, 28 februari 1974 (Short report of a meeting of the 
Quotations Committee, 28 February 1974).  
60 J.E. Berendsen, J. de Haan en G.H. Huisman, “Amsterdam (Ex)changes. Theorie en praktijk van de 
Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs”, Financiële Monetaire Studies, jg. 16, 1998, nr. 4, p. 17. 
61 120 jaar beurshandel, p. 32. 
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available means of ICT in the Netherlands in general? is answered. Subquestion 
(e) what means of ICT were used in the Dutch securities trade? is only partly 
answered since this chapter did not make clear which ICT were used by 
the actors at their offices. This issue will be further explored in chapter 
seven. 
  
Table 6.5: Comparison between public availability of ICT and ICT 
at the ASE, 1850-1940. 
   
What type of ICT? ‘Public’ availability ICT at ASE 
Telegraphy 1852 1852 
Telephony 1881 1884 
Radiotelegraphy 1904  
Radio 1924 1921 
Tikker  1931 
Telex 1933 1938 
 
Soon after its national introduction, telegraphy was introduced to the 
Zocher Exchange. The quick adoption relates to the fact that traders 
already experimented with electromagnetic telegraphy in the 1840s. 
Telephony was introduced at the Exchange building three years after the 
local telephone network in Amsterdam was established. We do not have 
an explanation for this rather late adoption of telephony. Presumably, 
telegraphy sufficiently satisfied the needs of traders till then. Actors at the 
ASE did not use radiotelegraphy but the VvdE did make use of 
radiotelephony through radio broadcasts. The VvdE had to give up their 
radio concession since it was decided that radiotelephony (including 
broadcasting) should fall under the supervision of the PTT in 1926. The 
tikker did not become a public service because it was an information 
technology, specifically designed for trade on financial markets and 
operated on a subscribers base only. Although the services of the 
‘Tikkerdienst’ were limited to Amsterdam and The Hague, national 
coverage was reached by means of a price telex network in 1938.  
   
6.6 Conclusion 
Communication possibilities widened enormously in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Telecommunication technologies became 
indispensable for the securities trade, as this chapter indicated. Telegraphy 
became available in the Netherlands in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. In 1855, the Rijkstelegraaf extended telegraph capacity between 
Chapter 6 
 
 
162 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam to send and receive telegrams during the 
opening hours of the Exchange. Since 1878, a direct telegraph line between 
the Exchanges of Amsterdam and Rotterdam was available. In 1881, a 
public telephone network in Amsterdam came into operation, while since 
1884 the NBTM exploited a telephone bureau at the Zocher Exchange. So, 
it was possible to have telephonic contact with the outside world to pass 
on relevant information. The 1905 address of several securities traders, 
initiated by Labouchere Oyens & Co, revealed with whom direct contact 
during trade hours was needed: their own offices, their provincial relations 
and the clients, to communicate prices, to receive orders, and to give notice 
of executed orders.  
Stockbrokers not only used telecommunications that were provided 
by third parties, they also actively searched for ways to employ ICT 
specifically for the securities trade. The stock exchange radio broadcasting 
station in 1921, the attempts of a group of Amsterdam bankers to form a 
Dutch cable company around the same time, the establishment of the 
‘Tikkerdienst’ in 1930, and the establishment of a price telex service in 1938 
all demonstrated the inventiveness of stockbrokers and the VvdE to 
employ ICT in their own way. The fact that several telecommunication 
technologies were utilised to inform the outside world on what went on 
inside the Exchange building, shows that the traders realised that 
information generates trade. In a way, ICT made securities trade more 
open. We have seen the development of an open to a closed securities 
trade in the third and fourth chapter. The telegraph, the telephone, the 
tikker and the telex offered the possibility to open up securities trade 
although on a different level. ICT has opened up securities trade resulting 
in a wider availability of information. It has not influenced the rules for 
membership of the VvdE. Also, the openness as a result of ICT needs to be 
put in perspective. The tikker and telex service were subscriber based. The 
subscribers were mainly professionals.  
Now that we have discussed the available means of communication 
to the security traders, we want to know how they were actually used and 
what was done with the information that was passed on. For that reason, 
several case studies were executed which will be elaborated on in the next 
chapters. We will have a closer look to the backgrounds of the cases, what 
their available means of communication were, how they organised their 
services concerning the securities and last but certainly not least, if 
telecommunication technologies altered the way they arranged these 
services.
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7. Services and ICT in Dutch Securities Trade  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Now that we have discussed the different intermediaries, the available 
means of telecommunication technologies in general and in the Dutch 
securities trade in particular, the subsequent step is to discern the activities 
of the Dutch stockbrokers and how they made use of ICT to perform these 
activities. The aim of this chapter will be to come to a general overview of 
daily services provided by intermediaries in the securities trade. It would 
be logical to first study the activities of the commission traders since they 
traditionally functioned as the most important party in the Dutch 
securities trade. Yet, not much information on their daily practice has been 
preserved in their archives. Therefore, the RB and the TBV are used as a 
basis to come to a general overview of activities.  
The aim connects directly to one of the subquestions, posed in 
chapter two, namely subquestion (b) what are the separate activities of the 
intermediaries in the securities trade? Since clients pay for these activities, the 
activities can be regarded as value-creating activities which link to 
subquestion (c) what value do intermediaries in the Dutch securities trade 
create? Apart from distinguishing the separate activities, we would like to 
know what telecom technologies the actors used to perform these activities 
which can be connected to subquestions (f) how did the involved actors 
deployed ICT in the securities trade? and (h) what are the different means of 
telecommunication (telegraphs, telephones, telexes) per actor. The involved 
actors used ICT to gather and provide information. Therefore we will 
distinguish (g) what types of information are of importance? It will be 
interesting to see whether the process of gathering and providing 
information changed due to the use of ICT. To detect any changes, we 
need to find an answer to subquestions (i) at what time (during trade hours, 
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the same day, the day after?) did actors receive information and (j) did the timing 
of transfer of information change over time? To be able to apply transaction 
costs economics, we need to answer subquestions (l) the investments in the 
capacity of ICT, such as infrastructure (just the lines and cables), devices 
(telephonic apparatus) and personnel, especially if this capacity is purchased to 
maintain a particular relationship in securities trade, (m) to what extent is 
uncertainty present?, and (n) how many transactions have taken place? After 
the services and the employed ICT with the actors are studied, we might 
be able to analyse whether the investments in ICT were purchased 
specifically to execute the services in the securities trade.  
The chapter starts with an analysis of the telecom facilities of the 
Robaver. After that, the activities of the Robaver in relation to the 
securities trade are discussed. The reason to discuss the telecom facilities 
before elaborating upon the activities is that when dealing with the 
activities, we cannot do without ICT. The same will be done for the 
Twentsche Bank. Section 7.7 continues with an analysis of the (however 
limited) information we have traced concerning the activities of the 
‘smaller’ stockbrokers such as commission traders. In section 7.8 all the 
activities of the studied intermediaries are combined in a general overview 
of activities in the Dutch securities trade. The section ends with a figure 
that visualises these activities. In the discussion part, we will return to the 
subquestions. The period of this chapter ranges from 1850 to 1964. The 
year 1852 is taken as a starting point since from that year the 
electromagnetic telegraph became available. We end with 1964 because the 
TB and the RB both merged with another joint stock commercial bank in 
that year.   
 
7.2 Available means of communication RB/Robaver 
The Rotterdamsche Bank was primarily located in Rotterdam until 1911. 
By means of telephone guides, we are able to sketch an overview of the 
telephonic accessibility of the RB. The NBTM started a local telephone 
network in Rotterdam in 1882, one year later than in Amsterdam. The first 
list of NBTM subscribers appeared in 1883, which also mentioned the RB 
in Rotterdam as one of the subscribers.1 As from the beginning of the 
twentieth century onwards, the RB decided to take more telephone 
connections. As a matter of fact, the telephone connections mentioned 
here, were the number of lines that ran from the Rotterdam office to the 
local telephone exchange. In 1905, the RB had two telephone connections 
                                                 
1 Officieele gids der Nederlandsche Bell-Telephoon Maatschappij, nr. 1 (September 1884). 
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at its disposal. In 1915 the number of telephone connections of the Robaver 
amounted to five, and in 1920 the local telephone guide showed twelve 
telephone numbers via which the Robaver could be reached. As from the 
1930s, the Robaver in Rotterdam only had one telephone number, but 
containing thirteen lines. For several years, a number of departments of the 
RB were mentioned separately in the telephone guides such as the Board 
of Directors, General Affairs, Arbitrage, Securities and the Exchange 
department. Apparently, these departments needed to be reached easy for 
clients.2 As a matter of fact, the mentioning of these departments stopped 
around the same time the Robaver could be reached by one number, with 
several lines. This number of lines was expanded to nineteen after World 
War II. As from 1960, the number of lines was not mentioned any longer in 
the telephone guide. The RB could also be reached directly to the 
Rotterdam Exchange as from 1950 onwards. Most likely, this possibility 
already existed but it was explicitly printed in the Rotterdam telephone 
guide as from 1950. 3 
As we saw in chapter four, the RB expanded enormously as from 
1911 onwards. In order to enhance communication between the different 
offices over the country, the RB made use of the possibility to hire 
telephone lines. This possibility had become available as from 1907. As 
from May 1911 onwards, employees of the Robaver could make use of a 
direct trunk line between the main offices in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. 
One has to bear in mind that two switchboard operators still came in 
between; one at the switchboard of the Rotterdam office and one at the 
Amsterdam office. 4 In 1916, the The Hague office of the Robaver was 
linked to Amsterdam and Rotterdam by means of such a direct trunk line.5 
Apparently, the employees of the Amsterdam and Rotterdam office 
communicated intensively with each other since the Robaver decided to 
hire a second trunk line between these offices as from 1920. 6 
                                                 
2 Gemeentearchief Rotterdam (GAR: municipal archive Rotterdam), Gids gemeentelijke telefoondienst 
Rotterdam, 1905, 1915, 1920 and 1925. 
3 GAR, Gids gemeentelijke telefoondienst Rotterdam, 1935, 1950, 1956, 1960 and 1964. 
4 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Brief van Robaver (R’dam) aan het Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en Telegrafie 
te ’s Gravenhage, dd.  4 mei 1925 (Letter from Robaver (Rotterdam office) to Board of P & T at The 
Hague, 4 May 1925). 
5 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Brief van Robaver (R’dam) aan het Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en Telegrafie 
te ’s Gravenhage, dd. 12 juni 1925 (Letter from Robaver to Board of P & T at The Hague , 12 June1925). 
6 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Brief van Robaver (R’dam) aan het Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en Telegrafie 
te ’s Gravenhage, 16 september 1919 (Letter from Robaver to Board of P & T at The Hague, 16 
September 1919). 
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The costs for renting such a specific telephone line totalled up to 
quite an extensive amount. Before 1919 the renter owed the P & T fl. 7000 
per year; after the economic boost in 1919 the P & T raised the annual rent 
to fl. 20.000. 7 If an organisation decided to rent such a direct trunk line, it 
had to take into account that the P & T demanded that it was rented for at 
least five years. In the 1920s, the Robaver reconsidered the need for its 
trunk lines. This reconsideration was probably the result of the setbacks 
the Robaver experienced in this period. The Robaver wanted to dispose of 
the trunk line between Rotterdam and The Hague in 1925. However, since 
the obligatory (second term of) five years had not yet elapsed, the P & T 
only agreed to stop the agreement if the Robaver guaranteed it would hire 
one of the two trunk lines that connected Rotterdam and Amsterdam, at 
least until 1929. The Robaver agreed on this proposal, probably since the 
rent for second trunk line between Rotterdam and Amsterdam, could be 
stopped according to the agreement in November 1925, which the Robaver 
did.8 Hence, in 1925 the Robaver rented two direct trunk lines; Amsterdam 
– The Hague and Amsterdam – Rotterdam. Clearly, the Amsterdam office 
had grown to the most important one of the Robaver.  
The Robaver not only rented direct trunk lines, the Amsterdam 
office also requested a direct telegraph connection to the main office of the 
Rijkstelegraaf in Amsterdam. As from 1916, the Amsterdam office of the 
Robaver could make use of this connection. The telegraph messages were 
typed on a fairly easy to handle ‘telescripteur’.  The annual rent added up 
to fl. 475 in the first year, fl. 450 in the subsequent four years and fl. 270 as 
from the fifth year.9 One year later, the Dutch Central Bank (de 
Nederlandsche Bank: DNB) also decided to hire such a telegraph 
connection. Before doing that, the DNB obtained advice from the Robaver. 
The Robaver recommended purchasing or hiring at least two 
‘telescripteurs’ in case one subsided, and also to place a telephone in the 
telegraph department so that, in case of any disturbances to the telegraph 
                                                 
7 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Uittreksel  Staatsblad no. 606 (1919) (Abstract government gazette) 
8 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Briefwisseling tussen van Robaver (R’dam) en het Hoofdbestuur der 
Posterijen en Telegrafie te ’s Gravenhage, dd. 12 juni 1925, 25 juni 1925, 26 juni 1925, 5 augustus 1925, 
15 augustus 1925 (Correspondence between Robaver to Board of P & T at The Hague, 12 June 1925, 25 
June 1925, 26 June 1925, 5 August 1925, 15 August 1925). 
9 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 358, Briefwisseling tussen de Robaver (A’dam) en het Hoofdbestuur der P & T te 
’s Gravenhage,  23 maart 1914,  31 december 1914, 2 januari 1915, 23 maart 1915, (Correspondence 
between Robaver to Board of P & T at The Hague, 23 March 1914, 31 December 1914, 2 January 1915, 23 
March 1915). 
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network, the telegraph messages could be transmitted orally.10 In 1921, the 
Amsterdam office of the Robaver moved into a new building. This 
building was equipped with the most modern telecom equipment. The RB 
placed a private branch exchange with fifty lines for internal 
communication. A few years later it already replaced this equipment by a 
private automatic branch exchange (pabx): the first in the Netherlands.11 
The question arises how important telecom was to the Robaver. For 
instance, in the annual reports no word was wasted on the decision of 
whether or not to rent trunk lines or purchase telecom devices, although 
the costs appeared to be quite high. Only sporadically were the company’s 
expenses divided more specifically, which makes it impossible to place the 
telecom costs of the in a broader perspective (see appendix C).12  
The frequency of use of the telephone depended on the type of the 
department. In 1917, the employees of the department of Securities-
Arbitrage made most use of the telephone. This is not surprising since the 
core of the arbitrage trade is to profit from price differences of securities 
listed at stock exchanges all over the world.13 Hence, the employees of this 
department needed to communicate with foreign countries to inquire after 
the current prices.  
Another tool that helped the employees of the departments 
concerned with securities trade became the tikker as from 1931. The 
Amsterdam office of the Robaver was actively involved in the 
establishment of the Tikkerdienst because it participated in this 
undertaking as a shareholder. Not surprisingly, this office was subscribed 
to this service. 14 It seems likely that the The Hague office also had a tikker 
at the moment this service came available in The Hague in 1935 since the 
Robaver was a shareholder. The ‘Tikkerdienst’ did not offer its service in 
Rotterdam. Yet, the Rotterdam office of Robaver could subscribe to the 
                                                 
10 HAAA, RB, inv. nr, 358, Brief van de Robaver, dd. 7 juni 1917 (A’dam) aan De Nederlandsche Bank 
(Letter from Robaver to Dutch Central Bank, 7 June 1917). 
11 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 93, Brief van Robaver (R’dam) aan het het Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en 
Telegrafie te ’s Gravenhage, dd. 9 april 1923 (Letter of RB office in Rotterdam to Board of Directors of 
to P & T, 9 April 1923) and Brief van Robaver (R’dam) aan het het Hoofdbestuur der Posterijen en 
Telegrafie te ’s Gravenhage, dd. 5 augustus 1925 (Letter of the of RB office in Rotterdam to Board of 
Directors of the P & T, 5 August 1925). 
12 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 730, 731, 734, Gespecificeerde balansbescheiden 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 (Specified 
balances over the years 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917). 
13 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 733, Brief aan directeur Mr. Dr. J.P. van Tienhoven, 1917 (Letter to director  Mr. 
Dr. J.P. van Tienhoven, 1917). 
14 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 525, Stukken betreffende de deelname van de Robaver in de NV Tikkerdienst, 
1930-1956 (Documents concerning the participation of the Robaver in the Tikkerdienst, 1930-1956). 
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telex service that the VvdE offered in co-operation with the Tikkerdienst as 
from 1938. 
It seems that departments related to securities trade were more 
privileged to the use and deployment of telecommunication technologies 
than others. For instance, as from the 1950s the RB had installed a separate 
department that arranged its telegraph traffic, the Code-department.15 The 
Code–department took care of telegraphic messages of every department 
except for the Securities-Arbitrage department. This department had the 
disposal of its own telex apparatus. In 1958, the employees of this 
department requested a second telex, especially for incoming messages, 
since the first telex was almost constantly in use for outgoing messages 
during the opening hours of the foreign stock exchanges. In the same year, 
the Exchange -, Issue- and again the Securities-Arbitrage department were 
furnished with brand new telephone tables whereas the remaining 
departments were not. Finally, the RB supplied their provincial branch 
offices, which contributed large volumes in securities orders, with telexes 
in 1958.16 Information transfer concerning the securities to the branch 
offices of the RB was regarded as an important issue. The employees of the 
Amsterdam Exchange department telephoned frequently to the provincial 
branch offices to pass on current price information, to receive orders and to 
notify the results of the orders. This Exchange department also daily made 
a tape on which the quotations of the most important securities were 
recorded next to important news that affected the quotations such as 
resolved mergers and so on. The branch offices of the RB dialled a special 
telephone number to listen to that tape.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 94, Globaal overzicht van de werkzaamheden in de verschillende afdelingen 
[1960] (Global overview of activities of the different departments, [1960]) pp. 9- 10.  
16 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 94, Verslag van de afdeling Organisatie betreffende op handen zijnde 
werkzaamheden 1958 en 1960 (Report department Organisation concerning upcoming operations, 1958 
and 1960) . 
17 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 94, Globaal overzicht van de werkzaamheden in de verschillende afdelingen 
[1960] (Global overview of activities of the different departments, [1960]) p. 13 and p. 19. 
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Table 7.1: Overview telecommunication 
technologies RB, 1882-1960. 
  
Year What/Who? 
1882  First telephone connection 
(communal) 
1905 Second telephone connection 
(communal)  
1911 Private trunk line connection 
between Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam office 
1915 Rotterdam office: fifth telephone 
connections  (communal) 
1916 Private trunk line between The 
Hague-Amsterdam and The 
Hague-Rotterdam 
1916 Private telegraph line Amsterdam 
office with Amsterdam 
Rijkstelegraafkantoor and 
telescripteur 
1920 Rotterdam office: twelfth 
communal telephone connection 
1920 Second private trunk line between 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam office 
1921 Private branch exchange 
1923 private automatic branch exchange 
1925 Cancellation trunk line The Hague- 
Rotterdam 
1929 Cancellation second trunk line 
Rotterdam-Amsterdam 
1931 Tikker at Amsterdam office 
1958 Second telex at Amsterdam office, 
for Securities-Arbitrage department
Telephone tables for Exchange -
Issue- and Securities-Arbitrage 
department 
1960 Telephone tape with information 
on securities trade for branch 
offices RB 
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7.3 Organisation securities trade RB/Robaver  
Before 1911, the RB had to contact an Amsterdam stockbroker to execute 
its and its clients orders at the ASE. We do not know if the RB made use of 
one or several stockbrokers. The situation for the RB is visualised in figure 
7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: Organisation securities trade RB before 1911 
 
 
In the years after the take-over in 1911, the Robaver obtained direct access 
to the ASE which changed its organisational structure as it came to their 
services in securities trade. The change is visualised in figure 7.2:  
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Figure 7.2: Organisation securities trade Robaver after 1911 
 
 
 
 
The Robaver built up a name in efficiently organising its activities.18 We 
know from an overview, made in 1918, which activities the Robaver 
performed, and thus, how this bank was organised. Since the amount of 
these activities was large (around sixty), only the ones that are related to 
the securities trade are mentioned here. The rest of the activities are 
displayed in a separate supplement. With the help of this list 
(unfortunately, no explanation of the activities was given, they were just 
summed up) and a short notice on the activities of Robaver’s stock 
exchange employees (without date), we can discern, although to a limited 
extent, how this Bank organised its services in relation to the securities 
trade. 
                                                 
18 O. de Wit and J. van den Ende (2000) ‘The Emergence of a New Regime: Business Management and 
Office Mechanisation in the Dutch Financial Sector in the 1920s’, Business History, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 87-
118.    
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A part of the employees of the securities department were daily 
present at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the rest stayed at the office. On 
the floor of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (in the Cuypers Stock 
Exchange building) the Robaver had the disposal of two stock exchange 
booths as from 1918.19 The manager of the Exchange department saw to it 
that the stock exchange employees called the first and second quotations of 
traded securities at the ASE, to the Amsterdam office as soon as possible. 
With these first quotations, clients were informed. They could call the bank 
themselves or bank employees would call clients.20 Probably, during these 
calls, some advice was given on what to buy or sell, however, there is no 
proof of this. With the Robaver, orders mostly came in by mail, telegram or 
telephone at the office of the Robaver in Amsterdam. These orders came 
directly from clients, from the main office in Rotterdam, or from branch 
offices in the rest of the Netherlands. If an order came in at the Amsterdam 
office during the official stock exchange trade hours, the employees of the 
Amsterdam office called to one of the stock exchange booths the Robaver 
possessed at the Cuypers Stock Exchange.21 Possibly, clients could also 
pass through orders to the stock exchange employees present at the 
trading floor. However, as we know from interviews with stock exchange 
employees who worked at the ASE in the 1960s, only specific (read: big) 
clients were allowed to do this.22 After an order had been executed, a stock 
exchange employee of the Robaver had to call the concerned client 
immediately to inform him about the outcome.23  
The Robaver tried to organise all its administrative paperwork very 
efficiently, seeing that its archive contains many documents that reflect on 
organising the Bank more adequately.24 The Robaver had discerned the 
                                                 
19 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 95, ‘Een wenk voor de wenkenbus’ , dd. 5 februari 1918 (A suggestion given by 
an employee, 5 February 1918). 
20 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 94, Eenige punten voor de heer P. Josso [Chef Beursafdeeling, JH], dd. 16 
december 1918 (Several points of attention for mister P. Josso [Manager Stock Exchange Department, 
JH], 16 December 1918). 
21 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 95, ‘Een wenk voor de wenkenbus’ , 5 februari 1918 (A suggestion given by an 
employee, 5 February 1918). 
22 Mr. G. van den Brink who worked on the ASE floor from 1958 to 1996 (interviewed 7 February and 
27 March 2001), Mr. J. Poelwijk who worked at the ASE floor from 1958 to 1967 (interviewed 17 
October 2001), and Mr. W. Wiegel who worked on the ASE floor from 1963 tot 1982 (interviewed 10 
and 18 January 2001). 
23 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 94, Stuk betreffende de activiteiten van beursmedewerkers, zonder datum 
(Document concerning the activities of the Robaver stock exchange employees, without date). 
24 These documents are especially kept in inventory number 94 of the Rotterdam Bank Archive in the 
Historical Archive of the ABN AMRO Bank; and see also De Wit and Van den Ende, ‘The Emergence of 
a New Regime’, pp. 87-118.   
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administrative processing in relation to the securities trade in the following 
activities (table 7.2): 
 
Table 7.2: Administrative activities securities trade 
Robaver 1918.25 
   
Nr Dutch English 
1 Beursboeken Exchange books 
2 Coupons  Coupons 
3 Effecten Administratie Securities Administration 
4 Effecten Controle Control Securities 
5 Fondsenbehandeling Handling securities 
6 Prolongatie ‘Prolongatie’ 
7 Uitlotingen  Drawings 
 
The stock exchange employees filled in the ‘beursboeken’ in which they 
wrote down the concluded orders. Concerning the coupons: a security itself 
consisted of several parts: a body (mantel), and a coupon sheet 
respectively, a dividend sheet, depending on the fact whether it was a 
bond or share. A coupon gave the owner the right to collect the interest of 
a bond. As a proof that a coupon was used to collect the interest, the 
coupon needed to be cut off. This was all done manually by the employees 
of the financial intermediary that stored the security papers. The ‘effecten 
administratie’ kept up the administration of the securities per client. Every 
client received regularly on overview of his securities account at the 
Robaver. With the ‘effecten controle’, the employees checked whether the 
executed orders were noted down correctly (against the correct prices), 
and the clients’ accounts were checked for its creditworthiness. The 
employees of ‘fondsenbehandeling’ checked if the actual security papers that 
were bought, came in, and were sold, got to the persons who were entitled 
to it. The employees responsible for ‘prolongatie’, handled the providing of 
prolongatie credits although the popularity of making use of prolongatie 
had lowered considerably since World War I. The temporary closure of the 
Exchange caused a stoppage of ‘prolongatie’ credits which resulted in a 
loss of confidence in ‘prolongatie’. Furthermore, large banks established 
themselves as safeguards of the Dutch economy during World War I 
which generated trust with the large public. After World War I, more and 
                                                 
25 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 440, Algemeene mededeelingen aan het personeel (General announcements to 
the personnel) (Amsterdam 1918) pp. 2-5. 
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more people left their spare money with banks instead of providing it as   
‘prolongatie’ credit.26 A buyer of bonds provided credit to the one that had 
issued the bonds. In return, the buyer received interest yearly. Apart from 
that, the credit needed to be paid off at a certain moment in time. In order 
to determine which bonds or series of bonds were paid off, lotteries were 
held regularly since each bond had a number. The employees that had to 
take care of ‘uitlotingen’, checked which numbers were selected in those 
lotteries.27 To store valuable possessions such as security papers, the 
Robaver offered the possibility to hire safes.28  
 As we see in the annual reports, the Robaver started to report the 
gained commission of the securities trade of the three most important 
offices, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague as from 1932. Not 
surprisingly, the securities trade generated more profits in Amsterdam 
than in Rotterdam and The Hague (table 7.3): 
 
 
Table 7.3: Commission rates of securities trade Robaver  as a 
percentage of the total returns of  provisions, 1932-1964.29 
     
Year Rotterdam 
commission 
securities trade 
as a percentage 
of the total 
provisions 
Amsterdam 
commission 
securities 
trade/total 
provisions 
The Hague 
commission 
securities 
trade/total 
provisions 
Totals  
(percentage of 
total 
commission) 
1932 10% 27% 28% 19% 
1937 18% 47% 33% 35% 
1942 18% 52% 34% 38% 
1947 9% 23% 18% 17% 
1952 8% 17%   
1964 9% 34%   
 
                                                 
26 Jan Luiten van Zanden (1997) ‘Old rules, new conditions, 1914-1960’ in: Marjolein ‘t Hart, Joost 
Jonker and Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.) (1997) A Financial History of the Netherlands (Cambridge 
University Press; Cambridge) pp. 124-151, p. 124. 
27 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 94, Overzicht afdelingen vestiging Amsterdam [1960 (Overview 
departments Amsterdam office, [1960]), idem, inv. nr. 1320, Beschrijving Effecten Administratie sinds 
1915 [1922] (Description Administration Securities since 1915, [1922]); Banklexicon, p. 184.  
28 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 440, Algemeene mededeelingen aan het personeel, Amsterdam 1918 (General 
announcements to the personnel, Amsterdam 1918) p. 5. 
29 HAAA, arvhive RB, Annual reports Rotterdamsche Bank/Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging 1932, 1937, 1942, 
1947, 1952, 1964. 
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If we look at the activities the RB/Robaver performed in the securities 
trade the big change took place in 1911. Before 1911 it received orders from 
its clients and passed them through to their Amsterdam intermediary, 
after 1911 the Robaver could execute the orders directly at the ASE. As a 
result of this, the Robaver could inform its clients much more directly than 
before since this Bank was no longer dependent on their intermediary. The 
Robaver could inform its clients on the current prices, immediately after 
their orders were concluded. Hence, the change in the organisational 
structure of the Robaver caused a change in the activities the Robaver 
performed in the securities trade. The immediacy of the services increased, 
not only because of the fact that the Robaver was directly present at the 
ASE as from 1911, but also with the help of information and 
communication technologies.  
 
7.4 Telecom facilities of the TB(V) 
The TBV belonged to one of the first subscribers to the NBTM network that 
opened in 1881. For a long time, the TBV only stuck to this one connection 
and also, to only one telephone. As from 1898 onwards, 
telecommunication technologies truly entered the Amsterdam office of the 
TBV. In 1898, Roelvink who was a member of the Board and also managed 
the securities department, initiated the purchase of a second telephone. 
The first telephone became solely the use of the securities department.30 
One year later, a telephone was bought to make trunk telephone calls. The 
costs for trunk connections were fl. 84 in the first year and fl. 60 in the 
subsequent years. In the same year, the TBV was linked to the main office 
of the Rijkstelegraaf in Amsterdam with a private telephone line, probably  
to pass through incoming and outgoing telegrams immediately.31 Also in 
1899, the TBV purchased a private branch exchange for eleven connections, 
keeping the option open for twenty connections. A switchboard operator 
was hired to operate this private branch exchange. She received a salary of 
fl. 300 per year.32 The private branch exchange was replaced by an 
                                                 
30 RAO, archive TB, inv. nr. 797, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen van het kantoor Amsterdam 2 maart 
1898 – 15 november 1898, dd. 10 november 1898 (Minutes board of directors Amsterdam office 2 March 
1898-15 November 1898, 10 November 1898). 
31 GAA, Archive Gemeentelijke Telefoondienst Amsterdam (Municipal telephone service), inv. nr. 159, 
Index op de indicateur en minuten van uitgaande stukken 1899 (index to indicator and minutes of outgoing 
documents 1899). 
32 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 798, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 16 november 1898-22 
augustus 1899, 14 april 1899, 10 mei 1899, 10 juni 1899 en 5 juli 1899  (Minutes board of directors 
Amsterdam office 16 November 1898-22 August 1899) 14 April 1899, 10 May 1899, 10 June 1899 and 5 
July 1899). 
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improved version in 1908. In the immediate years after 1899, the Board 
decided to take more local telephone numbers, adding up to four in 1905. 
Furthermore, a direct line was hired to connect the first branch office of the 
TB at the Prins Hendrikkade in Amsterdam to the Amsterdam main office 
in 1901. The costs for this line totalled fl. 95 per year. The Board even 
agreed to hire a direct local telephone line which connected the main office 
of the TBV in Amsterdam with the Berlage Exchange in 1905. 33 
 Despite the expansions of local and trunk telephone networks, 
these still did not function properly during the first decades in the 
twentieth century. Between 1910 and 1920 the board of the TB decided 
twice to install a special committee to research the complaints of clients 
and relationships in the province concerning malfunctioning telephone 
lines. As a reaction to the findings of the first committee in 1912, the board 
of the TB agreed to take three local telephone lines in addition to the three 
the Bank had already hired (additional costs fl. 180 per year), and to 
engage a second switchboard operator.34 In 1919, after the report of the 
second committee, the TB actually undertook the same actions as in 1912, 
namely, the hiring of more lines and the employment of a third 
switchboard operator. The TB installed an additional capacity of five trunk 
and four local connections; the extra switchboard operator came from 
within the company. However, her direct manager requested for her 
return. One year later, a third switchboard operator was attracted from 
outside the Bank. In 1922, the TB acquired a new private branch exchange 
which was connected to the services of the municipal telephone company 
for fl. 20.000. 35   
                                                 
33 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 800, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 12 juni 1900-17 mei 1901, 
16 maart 1901 (Minutes 12 June 1900-17 May 1901, 16 March 1901), inv. nr. 801, Notulen der 
bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 18 mei 1901-19 april 1902, 2 augustus 1901 (Minutes 18 May 
1901-19 April 1902, 2 August 1901), inv. nr. 806, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1 
juli 1905-18 september 1906,  12 oktober 1905 en 16 december 1905 (Minutes 1 July 1905-18 September 
1906, 12 October 1905 and 16 December 1905), inv. nr. 808, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor 
Amsterdam 23 september 1907-16 september 1908, 21 juli 1908 (Minutes 23 September 1907-16 September 
1908 , 21 July 1908), inv. nr. 810, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 16 november 1909-
15 november 1910, 14 juni 1910 (Minutes 16 November 1909-15 November 1910, 14 June 1910). 
34 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 812, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 6 oktober 1911-22 augustus 
1912, 30 mei 1912 (Minutes 6 October 1911-22 August 1912, 30 May 1912); inv. nr. 628, ‘De telefoon-
centrale van het hoofdkantoor’ (the telephone exchange in the main office), in: Bank Noten. Personeel-
orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 1952 (staff magazine of the TB), 6e jaargang, no. 1, pp. 6-7. 
35 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 821, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 29 augustus 1918-20 maart 
1919, 14 januari 1919, 14 februari 1919 (Minutes 29 August 1918-20 March 1919, 14 January 1919, 14 
February 1919), inv. nr. 822, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 21 maart 1918-8 
augustus 1919, 28 april 1919, 2 mei 1919 (Minutes 21 March 1919-8 August 1919, 28 April 1919, 2 May 
1919), inv. nr. 825, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 7 juni 1920-29 november 1920, 22 
juni 1920 (Minutes 7 June 1920-29 November 1920, 22 June 1920), inv. nr. 828, Notulen der 
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 As the Robaver, the TB also decided to hire a direct trunk line 
between the offices in Amsterdam – The Hague – Rotterdam although in a 
later stadium than the Robaver did. The TB requested the P & T for such a 
connection in 1919. Since the P & T suffered from a lack of materials, the P 
& T could not meet the TB’s request right away.36 It remains unclear since 
when the TB could make use of these lines. In any case, the TB still rented 
the lines in 1951.37  
 In spite of the extra lines and switchboard operators, complaints 
regarding the erroneous telephonic accessibility of the TB remained. In 
1930 the TB complained to the municipal telephone company on ill-
working telephone lines. Even twenty years later, the TB still faced 
problems with its telephone connections. Nevertheless, the TB 
unmistakably expanded its telecommunication facilities. Whereas the first 
private branch exchange of 1899 could facilitate 11 internal connections 
available, the private automatic branch exchange of 1951 could process 550 
connections. Despite the automation of telephone networks and private 
branch exchanges, switchboard operators remained necessary to put 
through incoming calls to the concerned persons.38 By 1959, the 
switchboard operators of the TB no longer needed to plug in the lines but 
the pushing of the right buttons sufficed.39 Around 250 telephones were 
connected to the internal private branch exchange of the main office of the 
TB in Amsterdam in the mid 1950s. The employees of this office had 2000 
to 2500 telephone conversations per day with persons outside these offices 
and around three times as much amongst each other, which came to an 
average of 10.000 daily telephone conversations. Not surprisingly, the TB 
attached great value to a proper and decent processing of its telephone 
traffic.40 In a large bank such as the TB, telephones were used for all kinds 
                                                                                                                           
bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 2 juni 1922-2 juli 1923, 11 juli 1922 (Minutes 2 June 1922-2 July 
1923, 11 July 1922). 
36 RAO, ATB,  inv. nr. 822, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 21 maart 1919-8 augustus 
1919, 28 april 1919 (Minutes 21 March 1919-8 August 1919, 28 April 1919). 
37 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 627, ‘De telefooncentrale van het hoofdkantoor’ (the telephone exchange in the 
main office) in: Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 1951 (staff magazine TB), 5e 
jaargang, no. 12, p. 2. 
38 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 833, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 19 March 1929-18 
November 1930, 19 August 1930 and inv. nr. 627, ‘De telefooncentrale van het hoofdkantoor’ (the 
telephone exchange in the main office), in: Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 1951 
(staff magazine TB), 5e jaargang, no. 12, pp. 2-5. 
39 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 635, ‘De effectenbeurs in de branding’, in: Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de 
Twentsche Bank N.V. 1959  (staff magazine TB), 13e jaargang, no. 9, p. 2-5. 
40 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 868, Stukken betreffende de reglementering van het gebruik van de telefoon in het 
bankverkeer  (1955) (Documents concerning the use of telephones in banktraffic, 1955).  
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of services. Yet, telephone traffic related to the securities trade was 
privileged over other telephone traffic, especially during the official stock 
exchange hours. In that period, the switchboard operators of the TB gave 
priority to all telephone calls related to the exchange department. Directly 
after the ASE had ended, the switchboard operators even had to keep open 
their own private lines with the The Hague and Rotterdam office for one 
quarter of an hour (from 14.15 hrs to 14.30 hrs) specifically for the 
exchange department so that the results of the executed orders could be 
passed on right away.41 
 The TBV also made use of several other telecommunication 
services. To accelerate the deliverance and reception of telegrams, TBV’s 
main office in Amsterdam was linked to the office of the Rijkstelegraaf by 
means of a pneumatic connection in 1909.42 Around ten years later, the TB 
purchased a ‘telescripteur’ with the same goal; to speed up the sending of 
telegrams. Yet, a telescripteur was also useful to send telegrams directly to 
the addressee if the latter also had the disposal of such a telegraph 
connection and a ‘telescripteur’. As we saw in chapter five, this possibility 
for communication existed around 1919. Such a telescripteur device cost fl. 
1500. 43 The TB acquired a receiving station for wireless telegraphy for the 
amount of fl. 4000 in 1920. 44 Via the trade company Seters & Co in 
Amsterdam from which the station was bought, the TB engaged a 
‘marconist’ who could handle this specific communication technology. 
Nevertheless, the Board of the TB decided to employ an own marconist in 
1922.45 Presumably, the arbitrage and securities department mostly used 
this receiving station for wireless telegraphy. The fact that an employer of 
the Arbitrage department advised who to hire as a marconist, strengthens 
this assumption.46 The question arises for what it was exactly used. Since 
arbitrage traders needed to know the quotations from securities and the 
                                                 
41 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 627, ‘De telefooncentrale van het hoofdkantoor’ (the telephone exchange of the 
main office), in: Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 1951 (staff magazine TB), 5e 
jaargang, no. 12, p. 5.  
42 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 809, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 16 september 1908-15 
november 1909, 17 maart 1909 (Minutes 16 September 1908 – 15 November 1909, 17 March 1909). 
43 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 825, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 7 juni 1920-29 november 
1920, 26 juli 1920 (Minutes 7 June 1920-29 November 1920, 26 July 1920). 
44 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 825, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 7 juni 1920-29 november 
1920, 24 augustus 1920 (Minutes June 1920-29 November 1920, 24 August 1920). 
45 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 828, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 2 juni 1922-2 juli 1923, 11 
juli 1922 (Minutes 2 June 1922-2 July 1923, 11 July 1922). 
46 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 828, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 2 juni 1922-2 juli 1923, 11 
juli 1922 (Minutes 2 June 1922-2 July 1923, 11 July 1922). 
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exchange rates of currencies, we assume that wireless communication was 
deployed to receive that type of information.  
In 1938, the TB obtained a telex apparatus. One of the advantages 
of a telex was the immediate realisation of a connection, which made the 
passing through of a message by telex cheaper than by phone. It could also 
have a cost advantage in comparison to the telegraph if the employee was 
a dexterous typist since a telegraph message was settled per time unit and 
a telegraph message per word. So the faster the typist, the more words 
were transmitted per time unit. 47  
In the same year, the VvdE had started its closed telex network 
which relayed information concerning the ASE to its subscribers. Hence, 
the purchase of the telex apparatus suggests that it was going to be 
deployed to subscribe to that service. Yet the question remains whether the 
main office of the TB in Amsterdam would subscribe to this service since it 
also had a subscription to the Tikkerdienst which relayed the same 
information as the telex information network of the VvdE. Furthermore, in 
the minutes of the Board of the TB no clear link between the purchase of 
this telex and the telex network of the VvdE was made. The telex was 
placed at the department of Domestic Correspondence. 48  
 
 
Table 7.4: Telecommunication technologies TBV, 1881-
1959. 
   
Year What/Who? Remarks 
1881 First telephone connection 
(communal) 
 
1898 Second telephone connection 
(communal)  
First telephone for 
sole use securities 
department 
1899 Separate trunk telephone  
1899 Instalment internal telephone 
system.  
 
1899 Private telephone line from main 
office to Rijkstelegraaf  
 
1899 Appointment operator for internal  
                                                 
47 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 626, ‘De telex’, in: Bank Noten. Personeel-orgaan van de Twentsche Bank N.V. 1950 
(staff magazine TB), 4e jaargang, no. 12, pp. 18-19. 
48 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 836, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 15 oktober 1935-17 januari 
1939, 25 oktober 1938 (Minutes  15 October 1935-17 Januari 1939, 25 October 1938). 
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telephone system 
1901 Third telephone connection 
(communal) 
 
1901 Direct telephone connection to 
Amsterdam branch office.  
First branch office 
Prins Hendrikkade 
(also at 
Amsterdam) 
opened in 1901. 
1905 Fourth telephone connection 
(communal) 
 
1905 Direct telephone connection to 
‘Beurs van Berlage’ 
 
1906 Telephone, especially for 
employee Hillerstrom.49  
Hillerstrom 
worked at the 
Arbitrage 
department.  
1908 Installation internal telephone 
system 
Probably 
replacement 
internal telephone 
system installed in 
1899? Although 
motivation for 
purchase was  
1909 Pneumatic connection from TBV 
office to ‘Rijkstelegraafkantoor’.  
To speed up the 
receipt of 
telegrams from the 
post office. 
1910 Fifth and Sixth telephone 
connection (communal). 
 
1912 Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
telephone connection (communal). 
 
1919 Five trunk telephone connections.  
1919 Direct trunk telephone connection 
Amsterdam-The Hague-Rotterdam
 
1919 Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and 
Thirteenth telephone connection 
(communal). 
 
1920 Appointment third operator. Not clear when 
second operator 
was appointed. 
                                                 
49 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 806, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1juli 1905-18 september 
1906, 19 januari 1906 (Minutes 1 July 1905- 18 September 1906, 19 January  1906). 
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1920 Installation ‘Verreschrijver’ (pre-
telex) 
To speed up the 
receipt of 
telegrams from the 
post office.  
1920 Installation receiving station 
wireless telegraphy (radio 
telegraphy). 
 
1922 Installation new telephone 
exchange 
 
1922 Employment marconist  
1930 Ticker(s)  
1938 Installation telex  
194? Installation new telephone 
exchange 
 
1959 Installation new telephone 
exchange 
 
 
 
7.5 Organisation Securities Trade TB(V) 
The TBV did not plunge into securities trade or the participation in 
syndicates right from the start. In the 1870s, a commission trader, Gerlings 
& Co, executed the securities orders for the TBV and its clients. This 
procedure of hiring an Amsterdam commission trader occurred more 
often. For instance, one of the largest bankers in the Netherlands in the 
nineteenth century, Hope & Co, hired Wed. W. Borski, a firm that really 
functioned as an intermediary, to execute its stock exchange operations. 
Both firms were from Amsterdam.50  
The TBV was certainly not the sole client of Gerlings & Co. The 
TBV demanded that its orders should be executed immediately at the ASE. 
The TBV made this plea while Gerlings & Co often tried to match received 
orders of clients itself, without bringing them to the ASE.51 The TBV was 
entitled to speak up since the relationship with Gerlings & Co was 
probably tighter than with its other clients. The fact that several servants of 
the TBV walked around at the ASE to assist Gerlings & Co demonstrates 
the tight relation. The stock exchange servants of the TBV received strict 
orders to pass on their orders to Gerlings & Co. Also, the office personnel 
of the TBV had to hand over the orders directly to Gerlings & Co and not 
                                                 
50 Jonker, Merchants, p. 201. 
51 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 774, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1876, 14 april 1876 
(Minutes 1876, 14 April 1876). 
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to their colleagues. This way of handling securities orders was a result of 
an agreement between Gerlings & Co and the TBV in order to streamline 
the flow of securities orders that came in via the TBV. If the stock exchange 
servants of the TBV tried to find a match for a certain order themselves, 
Gerlings & Co would loose the overview.52 Conceivably, Gerlings & Co 
pocketed commissions per executed order. The way the TBV organised its 
securities trade services is visualised in figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3: Organisation Securities Trade TBV before 1876 
 
 
 
 
The directors of the TBV considered the securities trade an important 
financial service. In a period that less securities orders came in, Blijdenstein 
touched upon the issue in a meeting of the board of the Amsterdam office. 
He ordered two other directors to draft a proposal that would have to 
bring about more securities orders for the TBV.53 In another meeting of 
board of directors, the two stated that if the securities branch of the Bank 
was to be reorganised, a totally different relationship with Gerlings & Co 
                                                 
52 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 773, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1875, 2 en 13 december 
1875 (Minutes 1875, 2 and 13 December 1875).  
53 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 773, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1875, 2 december 1875 
(Minutes 1875, 2 December 1875). 
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should be considered.54 Since the name Gerlings & Co, gradually 
disappeared out of the minutes of the board of directors (the last time they 
were mentioned, was 14 April 1876), the totally different relationship 
apparently resulted in a termination of the cont(r)act between Gerlings & 
Co and the TBV. Maybe the foundation of the VvdE in 1876, also played a 
role in the decision to end the relationship. Imaginably, the TBV wanted to 
be involved in the VvdE directly from the start although the VvdE’s formal 
power was very limited in its starting period. The new situation is 
visualised in figure 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.4: Organisation Securities Trade TBV after 1876 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 shows a ‘provincial financial intermediary’ in between 
‘provincial client’ and TBV because the TBV obtained several orders via 
                                                 
54 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 774, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1876, 22 februari 1876 
(Minutes office 1876, 22 February 1876). 
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their contacts outside Amsterdam. These local intermediaries functioned 
as correspondents, which means that they executed all kinds of financial 
transactions on the request of the TBV. For instance, they undertook 
collections of accounts for the TBV in the place where they were located. 
These local correspondents received an allowance for taking care of such 
financial transactions. Not surprisingly, provincial financial intermediaries 
offered to act as the TBV’s correspondents in a particular town.  In return, 
the TBV often demanded to receive securities orders.55 In Rotterdam wed. 
J. de Jongh & Zn functioned as a correspondent for the TB. Via this contact, 
securities orders came in on a regular basis. However, this firm got into 
great difficulties after some careless provision of credits in 1878. This 
implied the end of the TBV’s main correspondent in Rotterdam. Since the 
TBV certainly desired a trustworthy contact in Rotterdam, the TBV 
decided to start a limited liability company, bearing the name the Wissel- 
en Effectenbank.56 Apart from the contact with the correspondents, 
provincial clients could always contact the TBV directly in Amsterdam. 
Therefore, an arrow also directly runs from a ‘provincial client’ to the TBV 
in figure 7.4. 
It is not quite clear why the TBV not executed its securities orders 
itself from the beginning. It is imaginable that the directors of the TBV felt 
that not enough knowledge concerning the execution of securities orders 
was available within the TBV itself. By deploying Gerlings & Co and by 
letting its employees walk along, they could learn how to behave and 
perform in the Dutch securities trade. The board of directors of the TBV of 
the Amsterdam main office clearly felt confident enough to be responsible 
for the execution of securities orders themselves as from 1876. Roelvink 
took care of the securities branch of the TBV. In 1881 Roelvink was 
requested to bring forth every issue regarding the securities trade in the 
meetings of the board of directors.57 Roelvink apparently took effort in 
running the securities branch successfully. Blijdenstein appointed him as a 
managing partner of the TBV in 1884, since, so he motivated, it was 
                                                 
55 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 781, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 11 maart 1882-25 mei 
1883, 9 en 18 september 1882 (Minutes 11 March 1882-25 May 1883, 9 and 18 September 1882); idem, 
inv. nr. 782, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 16 mei 1883-16 december 1884, 9 juli 1883 
(Minutes 26 May 1883-16 December 1884, 9 July 1883); idem, inv. nr. 793, Notulen der 
bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 2 februari 1895-17 januari 1896, 15 juli 1895 (Minutes 2 February 
1895-17 January 1896, 15 July 1895). 
56 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 493, Annual Report 1878, pp. 8-11. 
57 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 780, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam  10 december 1880-11 
maart 1882, 1 februari 1881 (Minutes 10 December 1880-11 March 1882, 1 February 1881).  
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necessary that a managing partner represented the TBV at the ASE. 58 In 
literature, Roelvink is regarded as the brains behind the securities 
department of the TBV. As Wijtvliet stated, under the direction of 
Roelvink, the securities department became the ‘money maker’ of the 
TBV.59  
Roelvink actively managed the securities department. For instance, 
in a meeting in 1883, he announced that he proceeded to act as both a 
renter and a letter of securities packages. This implied that against interest 
or a commission rate Roelvink rented respectively let, a package of 
securities.60 The keeping of such let or rented security packages were called 
‘leendepots’ (‘security depositary’). In time of need, these packages were 
used to fulfil obligations with regard to the delivery of physical papers to 
other parties. If a third party was in default, and this would cause a 
shortage of physical securities with, the TBV could still deliver these 
securities by means of renting them. Hence, ‘leendepots’ raised the 
liquidity of banks while it gave them the possibility to pay off their 
‘securities debts’ right away.61 
A more fundamental change that Roelvink established was the 
involvement in syndicates, initial public offerings and share issues. Until 
1884, the TBV had strictly occupied itself with the provision of services 
that come with the execution of securities orders.62 According to 
Wintersteijn, the participation in syndicates was explicitly excluded in a 
description of the working of the TBV, dated in 1871.63 Syndicates and 
share issues were definitely seen as risky undertakings. A reflection on the 
decision to join syndicates as from 1884, was made in the staff magazine of 
the TB in 1961. Two motives were mentioned. On the one hand, amongst 
the clientele of the TBV eligible industrial and trade firms for issues were 
to be found. On the other hand, the TBV had built up a clientele which was 
sizeable enough to place shares and bonds that came along with a 
participation in a syndicate.64  
                                                 
58 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 782, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 26 mei 1883-16 december 
1884, 9 juni 1884 (Minutes 26 May 1883-16 December 1884, 9 June 1884). 
59 Wijtvliet, Expansie en Dynamiek, p. 165. 
60 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 781, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam  11 maart 1882-25 mei 
1883, 16 april 1883 (Minutes 11 March 1882-25 May 1883, 16 April 1883).  
61 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 637, Bank Noten. Staff magazine of the Twentsche Bank 1961, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 11.  
62 Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p. 30.  
63 Wintersteijn, Twentsche Bankvereeniging, p. 18. 
64 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 637, Bank Noten. Staff magazine of the Twentsche Bank 1961, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 11. 
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Roelvink paid visits to the province to keep in touch with local 
cashiers and to enter into new relationships.65 The traditional contacts in 
Enschede could also be used to tap new sources for securities orders. The 
board of directors thought it a good idea if some experienced stock 
exchange employees from the Amsterdam office, could be placed at the 
office in Enschede to animate the local interest for securities. However, the 
managing partners of the Enschede office did not see much to it. 
According to them, the local securities trade did not amount to anything. 
The few investors Enschede counted, settled their orders with Amsterdam 
commission traders directly. 66 The dependency of local intermediaries to 
obtain securities orders decreased as from 1906 when the TBV started 
actively to take over provincial intermediaries as we saw in chapter four. 
The dominant organisational structure for the TB as it came to execution of 
securities throughout the twentieth century is visualised in figure 7.5: 
 
                                                 
65 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 781, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 11 maart 1882-25 mei 
1883, 7 en 8 november 1882, 13 november 1882, en 30 november 1882 (Minutes 11 March 1882-25 May 
1883, 7  and 8 November 1882, 13 November 1882, 30 November 1882). 
66 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 788, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 10 juli 1890-14 mei 1891, 
14 en 18 februari 1891 (Minutes 10 July 1890-14 May 1891, 14 and 18 February 1891). 
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Figure 7.5: Organisation securities trade TB 20th century 
 
Banks received commission for all kinds of services. In financial overviews, 
these provisions were usually not itemised per banking activity. Kymmell 
therefore stated that it was no use trying to detect what the commissions 
yielded. However, as one of the few, the TBV had listed its returns on 
commissions obtained from executing orders in the securities trade, 
although it stopped after the TBV had become a limited liability company 
in 1916 (table 7.5).  
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Table 7.5 Returns commissions of securities trade TBV, 1877-1916.67 
    
Year Returns commissions 
of securities trade TBV 
in Dutch guilders 
Year Returns commission of 
securities trade TBV in 
Dutch guilders 
1877 57.340,48 1897 249.871,47 
1878 83.602,79 1898 288.382,36 
1879 92.355,53 1899 248.142,44 
1880 134.835,98 1900 235.173,68 
1881 113.486,78 1901 330.791,62 
1882 129.255,40 1902 318.234,08 
1883 152.246,15 1903 333.125,58 
1884 160.515,47 1904 363.922,00 
1885 141.150,32 1905 498.742,29 
1886 153.293,09 1906 392.235,14 
1887 175.307,18 1907 233.677,02 
1888 185.232,75 1908 485.759,09 
1889 207.650,56 1909 589.962,83 
1890 184.773,58 1910 362.792,01 
1891 157.599,75 1911 367.090,54 
1892 172.496,58 1912 393.950,69 
1893 180.718,08 1913 308.864,98 
1894 156.395,77 1914 320.766,58 
1895 166.463,28 1915 705.438,72 
1896 182.116,22 1916 990.813,14 
 
Out of this, we can picture how the TBV organised its securities trade 
outside the boundaries of its own firm. In the beginning, the managing 
partners of the TBV had hired Gerlings & Co to execute the securities 
orders of the TBV and its clients. After several years, the TBV started its 
own independent securities department, supervised by Adam Roelvink. 
From this period, the TBV acted as a full commission trader on the ASE. 
The securities orders came in via their clients, but also via the contacts of 
provincial cashiers. Indeed, the board of directors of the TBV encouraged 
the policy to actively bring in securities orders. The next step is to get 
inside the firm in order to detect the role of telecommunication 
technologies in the contacts of staff and employees in relation the way the 
TBV organised the execution of security orders and everything that comes 
with it.  
                                                 
67 Source: RAO, Annual Reports TBV 1877-1916. 
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7.6 Daily practice securities trade TB(V) 
Besides the actual execution of an order at the ASE, the TBV also offered 
other services in relation to the securities trade. The Twentsche 
Bankvereeniging published a weekly report for all their clients consisting 
of price quotes and relevant information on the securities trade.68 In 1877, 
the board of the directors decided to limit the frequency and circulation of 
this report. It was going to be published at irregular times and recipients 
were confined to clients who regularly sent buy and sell orders. The 
motives for this switch in frequency and recipients are not given but it 
seems that the directors did not want others to profit from their gathered 
information. Furthermore, one of the directors insisted that, at the foot of 
each securities account which was sent to clients, a note on the securities 
trade needed to be placed. The concerned director did not expand on the 
exact contents of this note. This was done since 1876, thus, in the same year 
that the contact with Gerlings & Co was broken. Two senior employees 
had to check whether the prices, written down in the securities accounts, 
were correct and needed to make ‘some remarks concerning the securities 
market’.69 
Certainly clients asked for advice. For instance, in 1877, a client 
from Arnhem wished to know how the senior staff of the TBV thought 
about the Eastern Issue (“Oosterse Quaestie”) and how a possible war 
would affect the securities trade. The TBV responded in very reluctant 
terms; that the TBV had no opinion about the Eastern Issue, that the 
feelings on the ASE were mixed, and that the TBV believed that it had 
taken sufficient measures in case war broke out.70 These vague answers 
did not remain unnoticed. Blijdenstein himself urged on to be more 
specific and more explicit when clients of the TBV asked for advice in 
relation to the securities trade as long as the public was not encouraged to 
speculate.71 Still, the TBV remained rather prudent in the distribution of 
information. For instance, in 1917 still, J.J. Th. Blijdenstein, a son of B.W. 
                                                 
68 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 773, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1875, 13 oktober 1875 
(Minutes 1875, 13 October 1875). 
69 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 774, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1876, 23 februari 1876 
(Minutes 1876, 23 February 1876); idem, inv. nr. 775, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor 
Amsterdam 29 december 1876-17 januari 1877, 2 januari 1877 (Minutes 29 December 1876- 17 January 
1877, 2 January 1877).  
70 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 776, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 18 januari 1877-27 
augustus 1877, 20 februari 1877 (Minutes 18 January 1877-27 August 1877, 20 February 1877).  
71 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 776, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 18 januari 1899-27 
augustus 1877, 28 juni 1877 (Minutes 18 January 1877-27 August 1877, 28 June 1877). 
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Blijdenstein, stated that the giving of information on securities might by no 
means degenerate in the providing of tips!72 The TBV also offered the 
possibility to their clients to stop by the office itself and ask questions 
concerning their investments. Their questions could then be answered in a 
more personal way.73  
 Until around the end of the nineteenth century, the orders for 
buying and selling securities came in at the main office of the TBV in 
Amsterdam mostly per mail or per telegram. Mostly, because probably 
some orders also came in via personal contacts. The official stock exchange 
hours ran from 13.30 to 14.45 hrs. If the order was received after 13.00 hrs, 
the clients were settled against the mid-rate. If orders were received before 
13.00 hrs, the orders could be executed, in accordance to the wishes 
(limited to a certain buy or sell price) of the client.74 A range of clients gave 
orders for buying and selling securities: private persons who owned a 
securities account with the TBV, financial intermediaries such as cashiers, 
and small bankers, financial intermediaries with whom the TBV 
maintained personal relationships such as the Wissel- and Effectenbank at 
Rotterdam, and later the branch offices of the TBV.75  
 The orders received at the office before 13.00 hrs were simply 
written down and taken to the Exchange. The stock exchange employees 
went to the Exchange building around 13.00 hrs or probably somewhat 
earlier. There, already some informal talks between stockbrokers, and 
amongst their servants, took place. Since the Zocher building had a 
telegraph, a post office and since 1884 also a telephone bureau, orders 
could also be sent directly to the Exchange. Errand boys of the P & T 
service walked around to deliver the telegrams and mail messages to the 
traders. Errand boys of the NBTM walked around to inform the traders if a 
call had came in for them. Errand boys of the TBV itself probably brought 
messages that came in at the office of the TBV after 13.00 hrs to the 
Exchange building. These errand boys also delivered messages at the 
Exchange building and back again to the TBV office. After the telephone 
had become more current, errand boys also became less necessary 
                                                 
72 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 819, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 31 mei 1917-4 januari 
1918, 27 september 1917 (Minutes 31 May 1917 – 4 January 1918, 27 September 1917).  
73 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 804, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 7 november 1903-3 
augustus 1904, 3 juni 1904 (Minutes 7 November 1903-3 August 1904,  3 June 1904). 
74 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 781, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 11 maart 1882-25 mei 
1883, 26 juni 1882 (Minutes 11 March 1882-25 May 1883, 26 June 1882). 
75 RAO, ATB, see  inv. nrs. 773-837, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 1875-1949 
(Minutes 1875-1949). 
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although these messengers remained useful for a long time. Especially 
within the cities, they were faster than the telephone connections. 
The clients received an overview of their securities account by mail. 
Some clients demanded to be informed earlier. In 1880, a client from the 
TBV requested whether his securities contract notes could be sent by the 
early mail service. Unfortunately, the TBV could not meet his request but 
the Bank was willing to send him a memorandum by the early mail 
service.76 Mispelblom Beyer, a bankers firm from the Northern part of the 
Netherlands (Leeuwarden), demanded to be informed on their concluded 
orders by means of a telegram immediately after the Exchange had 
closed.77  
Since the administration that came along with securities trade, 
appeared to be enormous, the TBV set up a separate limited liability 
company the ‘Twentsche Trust Maatschappij’ in 1901.78 This Twentsche 
Trust Maatschappij actually functioned as a bond administration office 
which function was explained in chapter three. Another service related to 
the securities trade was the obtaining and passing through of the physical 
security papers. The TBV even used a coach to deliver the securities. 
Unfortunately, an employee of this Bank once stumbled and fell when he 
got off the coach. The wind took the security papers and blew them across 
the street and in a canal. After a serious talk with his superiors, the man 
resigned.79 Just as the Robaver, the TBV offered to store the security papers 
in safe deposits. In 1901, room was made in the main office of the TBV in 
Amsterdam for small safes in which clients could leave their physical 
securities. The interest for these safes appeared to be large, as can be seen 
in table 7.6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
76 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 780, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 10 december 1880-11 maart 
1882, 21 december 1880 (Minutes 10 December 1880- 11March 1882, 21 December 1880).  
77 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 780, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 10 december 1880-11 maart 
1882, 13 december 1880 (Minutes 10 December 1880-11 March 1882, 13 December 1880). 
78 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 637, Bank Noten. Staff magazine of the Twentsche Bank 1961, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 11. 
79 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 792, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 10 april 1894-2februari 
1895, 28 december 1894 (Minutes 10 April 1894- 2 February  1895, 28 December  1894). 
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Table 7.6: Number of 
rented safes for 
securities and valuable 
possessions in the TB 
office.80 
  
Year Number 
1902 275 
1903 501 
1905 734 
1906 921 
1908 1309 
1909 1628 
1913 2384 
1914 2665 
1920 3452 
1946 19553 
1950 17703 
1960 25045 
 
Besides taking care of the execution of orders for their clients, the TBV also 
provided them with information related to securities. Just as with the RB, a 
change in providing securities trade services was seen after an 
organisational change. After the TBV had broken with Gerlings & Co, it 
started to execute orders itself. However, this change had a less direct 
impact on the organisation of the TBV than was the case in RB. The 
difference in impact results from the situation that the TBV did not have to 
move to another city, as was the case with the RB, and the TBV had 
already some experience and know-how in house concerning the practice 
at the trade floor due to their servants who helped Gerlings & Co. The 
change in services was thus less immediate as with the RB. Another 
activity was that the TB informed its clients on the results of their orders. 
Some clients received a telegram directly after the ASE had ended. So the 
existing services were speeded up by means of ICT. After the execution, 
the TB took care of the administrative part which consisted of keeping up 
the account overviews, delivering and receiving of the traded papers, and 
as from 1900 the storing of securities in safes against a monthly rent.  
 
                                                 
80 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 494, Annual reports 1903, 1906, 1909, 1914, 1920; and idem, inv. nr. 495, Annual 
Reports 1946, 1950, and 1960.  
Services and ICT in the Dutch Securities Trade  
 193
7.7 Securities trade with commission traders 
A specific interesting group of study form the provincial financial 
middlemen since they had to maintain contacts with Amsterdam to 
execute their stock exchange operations and with their clients in the 
province. The problem is to figure out how these communication lines 
exactly ran and worked. Some information of provincial middlemen and 
their procedures is known which will be discussed below. Yet, this 
information is not as complete as we had on the RB and TB. 
W. Laane, a bankers firm from Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom 
founded in 1860, with a branch office in Oudenbosch, maintained contacts 
with Lippmann Rosenthal & Co who took care of Laane’s securities 
orders.81 Vlaer & Kol, founded in 1691 in Utrecht, acted as a provincial 
financial middlemen, at first as a cashier but later this firm started to focus 
on the securities trade and also on the providing of credits. Another part of 
the Kol family was active in Amsterdam in the same branch, first as Kol & 
Boissevain (Boissevain died in 1879), as from 1885, under the name Jan Kol 
& Co, and since 1913 as Kol & Co while in this year, Jan Kol left the firm.82 
For convenience sake, I will refer to this firm as Kol & Co. Kol & Co and 
Vlaer & Kol worked closely together. They even used joint notepaper to 
stress their co-operation.83 Not surprisingly, Kol & Co functioned as Vlaer 
& Kol’s intermediary at the Amsterdam Exchange. Hence, for these 
provincial intermediaries, one of the figures out of chapter four applies 
perfectly. In figure 7.6, we see how a provincial intermediary contacts who 
to execute the securities orders he received via his clients. 
                                                 
81 C.F. Scheffer (1979) Van Bank naar Bank. Herinneringen aan het bankwezen. (Cooperatieve Centrale 
Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A.; without place) p. 21.  
82 Het Utrechts Archief (HUA), Archives of the Kol family, of the bankersfirms Vlaer & Kol, Kol & Co 
and of the N.V. Crediet en Deposito Kas, entrance number 715-1, inv. nr. 413 Minuten van brieven van 
de firma Jan Kol, resp. Kol & Co, 1879-1922 (Minutes of letters of the firm Jan Kol, resp. Kol & Co, 1879-
1922), Circulaire, 31 december 1879 (Circular 31 December 1879) and circulaire 31 oktober 1913 
(Circular 31 October 1913); idem,  inv. nr. 425, Akten van oprichting van de firma Vlaer & Kol 1888. 
(Memorandum of Association of the firm Vlaer & Kol 1888).  
83 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 454, Gezamenlijk briefpapier uit 1902 Jan Kol & Co te Amsterdam en 
Vlaer & Kol te Utrecht (Joint note-paper Jan Kol & Co at Amsterdam and Vlaer & Kol at Utrecht 1902). 
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Figure 7.6: Organisation securities trade provincial intermediary 
 
 
Kol & Co executed Vlaer & Kol’s stock orders at the ASE and it kept its 
colleagues in Utrecht informed with regard to news which may affect the 
prices on the stock exchange. For instance, Kol & Co sent copies of their 
financial transactions for Vlaer & Kol several times per week by mail. On 
the back of these copies, notes concerning the Exchange were written 
down. These notes varied from ‘today nothing happened’ to ‘rumours go 
that something is wrong with a cashier firm in Groningen’.84 If news was 
very important and sudden, Kol & Co would try to contact Vlaer & Kol by 
phone immediately. For example, one day it became known that a firm 
(owned by a certain ‘De Goeyen’) had ceased to exist. Apparently, the 
person or firm in question, had sold large packages of dollars without 
having received the payments for it. This message hit the Exchange hard. 
Jan Kol had tried to call Vlaer & Kol but he could not get to a phone since 
it was too crowded at the telephone bureau.85  
The supply of information did not work as a one-way street. Kol & 
Co sometimes asked Vlaer & Kol for information on persons or firms that 
were probably known to Vlaer & Kol or maybe lived in Utrecht or its 
                                                 
84 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 454, Afschriften financiële transacties, 24 januari 1903 en 17 augustus 1903 
(Copies financial transactions, 24 January 1903, and 17 August 1903). 
85 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 454, Afschriften financiële transacties, 7 oktober 1903 (Copies financial 
transactions, 7 October 1903).  
Amsterdam 
financial 
intermediary 
Provincial 
vendor 
 Provincial 
 financial   
 intermediary
 
Amsterdam 
financial 
intermediary
   
  Specialist 
 Provincial 
 financial   
 intermediary
Provincial
   buyer 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange 
Services and ICT in the Dutch Securities Trade  
 195
surroundings.86 The type of information Kol & Co wished to receive from 
Vlaer & Kol, laid in the area of a person’s or a firm’s financial situation, 
now and in the past, and its reliability. Vlaer & Kol supplied that type of 
information also to other business relations as the bankers firm R. Mees & 
Zoonen from Rotterdam.87 Hence, we see here the existence of a network 
of financial intermediaries who stood in contact with each other to supply 
each other with information.  
How was information provided to clients of these provincial 
intermediaries? According to Mr. E.P. Bloembergen, director of a broker’s 
office at The Hague in the 1930s, a small intermediary was pre-eminently 
fit for the supply of relevant information to clients. Bloembergen especially 
stressed hereby the amount and quality of information his office obtained. 
For instance, his office received all types of information such as the course 
of events at the ASE after 13.30 hrs, the opening prices of Wall Street after 
15.30 hrs and, if there was any, sudden unexpected news. Any interested 
person was cordially invited to call Mr. Bloembergen’s firm and he or she 
would receive the desired information.88 Although it is imaginable that the 
supply of information, and probably foremost the advisory part, occurred 
on a more personal basis than with a large bank, the types of information 
Bloembergen mentioned here, were also available to clients of large banks. 
Hence, the advantage of a small intermediary, as it comes to information, 
is not that obvious.  
Branch offices of Amsterdam commission traders perhaps even 
possessed ‘better’ information than an independent provincial middleman 
such as Bloembergen while they stood in direct contact with the main 
office in Amsterdam. Louis Korijn & Co, a stockbroker from Amsterdam 
had a branch office in Rotterdam. With the coming of the telephone, the 
employees of the Rotterdam office stood almost continuously in contact 
with the main office in Amsterdam, the ASE and their clients to receive 
and pass on information. Besides, the employees kept their knowledge up 
to date by gathering as much as relevant information concerning listed 
                                                 
86 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 454, Afschriften financiële transacties 13 februari 1903 (Copies financial 
transactions, 13 February 1903).  
87 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 456, Diverse brieven van effectenafdeling van R. Mees & Zoonen te 
Rotterdam 1915-1916 (Various letters from Securities Department R. Mees & Zoonen Rotterdam 1915-
1916).  
88 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 979, ‘Het bestaansrecht van particuliere kassiers- en effectenkantoren’ 
door E.P.Bloembergen te Den Haag, 1932 (The right of existence for private cashiers- and brokers 
offices by E.P. Bloembergen, The Hague, 1932).  
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firms. This relevant information came from studying financial newspapers, 
reports, and all other kinds of news.89        
Vlaer & Kol advised their clients personally on their investments. 
Either Mr. Vlaer or Kol even warned clients who took too much risk. A 
special room at the office of Vlaer & Kol was reserved for these talks. One 
client could not bear to live with the consequences of his speculations; he 
committed suicide in this special room after a reprimand of Mr. Kol.90 
Also, the board of directors of Lissa & Kann, a bankers firm from The 
Hague, and specialised in the trade in stocks and shares, maintained very 
personal contacts with its clients.91 
 If the orders were received before 13.30 hrs at the Exchange itself, 
Kol & Co guaranteed execution against the mid-rate. Note that the TBV 
acted the other way around. The TBV had as a rule that orders received 
after 13.00 hrs were executed against the mid-rate while the orders 
received before 13.00 hrs. and with a limit to the minimum and/or 
maximum buy or sell price were concluded against its proposed limits. Kol 
& Co made the reservation that this only applied to orders for active stocks 
in normal times.92 This condition can be explained from the knowledge 
that trade in inactive securities only occurred at irregular times. This could 
result in a situation that you should almost be thankful if a buyer or seller 
of a certain security appeared and thus, the height of the price became less 
important. Also, in more chaotic times or even a crisis, in general, people 
wanted to sell against each price that came forth. The question arises what 
Vlaer & Kol did with orders received during the official stock exchange 
hours. It is not very likely that these were limited orders although I assume 
that ‘bestens’ orders formed the majority that were passed on during stock 
exchange hours. The reason why this assumption is made, is that ‘bestens’ 
orders need to be executed right away, irrespective of the current price. If 
someone would pass on a limited order he or she could not be sure if the 
order might be executed that day while that was depended on the limits 
the client had given. So, since a limited order is in any case less urgent than 
a ‘bestens’ order, I assume that more ‘bestens’ orders were given during 
the official trade time than limited orders are. Remember that trade time 
                                                 
89 Scheffer, Van bank naar bank, pp. 36-37.  
90 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 983, “Het oude kantoor”. Herinneringen van N.C. Haksel aan de tijd toen 
hij bij de firma Vlaer & Kol in dienst trad (1 juli 1886). (“The old office”. Memories of N.C. Haksel to 
the time he started to work at Vlaer & Kol. 1 July 1886. Memories were written down in 1947).   
91 Geljon, Een zeer persoonlijk effectenhuis, p. 107. 
92 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 454, Afschriften financiële transacties, 24 augustus 1903 (Copies financial 
transactions, 24 August 1903).  
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only covered one hour and a quarter of an hour. Before interurban 
telephony was possible (so before around 1900) Vlaer & Kol sent their 
securities orders to Kol & Co in Amsterdam by mail and telegram. These 
concerned orders assigned before trade time.93 What was done with 
orders, given during trade time, is not mentioned. Vlaer & Kol also used 
the telephone to inform their clients about the executed orders.94  
 Out of this we can conclude that provincial middlemen mainly 
dealt with one fixed Amsterdam correspondent to execute their securities 
orders and that they gathered information concerning the securities trade, 
supplied their clients with this information, and advised their clients on 
their securities orders. It remains however unclear what information- and 
communication technologies they had in-house, and for what purposes 
these provincial intermediaries deployed ICT. From the archive of Vlaer & 
Kol, we know in any case that telegrams were used to pass on orders to 
Amsterdam. From the moment interurban telephony belonged to the 
possibilities, Vlaer & Kol also used the telephone to pass on the orders. We 
also learned that Vlaer & Kol deployed the telephone to inform their 
clients about the results of their executed orders.  
 
7.8 Schematic overview in securities trade and the use of ICT in contacts between 
intermediaries and their clients 
Hence, a client needed a stockbroker for several purposes of which the 
main purpose existed in the execution of orders. Yet, it must have been 
possible to execute your own orders at the beginning of active Dutch 
securities trade, thus as from 1602 (establishment VOC). Still, the execution 
of orders by intermediaries is the dominant picture throughout the 
seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century. On the basis of 
the information about the two banks and provincial middlemen that we 
discussed above, we can state that intermediaries performed more 
activities than the execution of orders alone. In this section, a general 
overview of steps, taken before, during and after the actual execution of an 
order, is drafted.  
First, an investor needed to know what went on at the stock 
exchange. A private investor must have had a hard time obtaining relevant 
information. Not until 1795 did a regular appearing securities price journal 
                                                 
93 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 983, “Het oude kantoor”. Herinneringen van N.C. Haksel aan de tijd toen 
hij bij de firma Vlaer & Kol in dienst trad (1 juli 1886). (“The old office”. Memories of N.C. Haksel to 
the time he started to work at Vlaer & Kol. 1 July 1886. Memories were written down in 1947).   
94 HUA, archive Kol, inv. nr. 432, Memorandum Kol & Co te Amsterdam aan Vlaer & Kol te Utrecht, 27 
mei 1920 (Memorandum Kol & Co ,Amsterdam, to Vlaer & Kol, Utrecht, 27 May 1920).  
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exist.95 Accordingly, the private investor mainly relied on financial 
intermediaries. The latter group attained their data from the actual trade 
and from what they heard amongst their fellow traders although many 
deliberate false gossips and rumours circulated. This type of information 
was certainly not exclusive since anyone could visit the Exchange building. 
Certainly, an investor could inform himself by studying the newspapers 
that published stock exchange quotations but he could also ask a 
stockbroker for information.96 A financial intermediary tried to keep his 
knowledge concerning listed companies up to date by reading professional 
literature, financial newspapers, weekly news reports and so on. With the 
help of this information, stockbrokers could inform their clients.97 from 
The TBV for example published weekly a report for its clients which 
provided information concerning the stock exchange. Information could 
also be transferred more personally. If client and commission trader lived 
in the same town, they could meet each other at the office or at home. 
Telecom technologies made it possible that information became available 
on a real time basis, especially with the introduction of the telephone. 
Clients of commission traders could be informed during official opening 
hours of the Exchange building.98   
Second, an investor could ask for advice. However, most 
commission traders were reluctant in giving explicit advice. They were 
willing to provide relevant information but declined to give a strong view 
on securities to their clients. The reason why most stockbrokers adopted 
this attitude was that they did not want to urge speculation.99 Speculation 
contains the selling respectively buying of securities, (foreign) currency, 
gold etcetera in order to repurchase them against a lower price at a 
subsequent moment respectively selling against a higher price. The buying 
of securities and shortly after, selling the same securities against a higher 
price is called a bull transaction. Persons who execute this type of trade are 
called bull operators. The selling of securities that are not in one’s 
                                                 
95 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 19.  
96 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 112; Willem Schürmann [1912] Speculanten. Een kluchtig spelletje van de beurs. 
(De Maatschappij voor goede en goedkoope lectuur; Amsterdam) p. 25. 
97 Scheffer, Van bank naar bank, p. 37. 
98 Note that for a long time (until the 1980s) the official stock exchange hours were one and a quarter of 
an hour per day, except for Sundays, from 13.30-14.45, 1947; 13.20 - 14.30 hrs. 1959: 13.15-14.30 As from 
??, 13.00-15.15 hrs.., 1967: 11.30 - 14.15 hrs., 1985: 10.00-4.30, 1992: 9.30-16.30. Before and after these 
official opening hours deals were also concluded.  
99 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 776, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 18 januari 1877-27 
augustus 1977, 28 juni 1877 (Minutes 18 January 1877- 27August 1977, 28 June 1877); Geljon, Een zeer 
persoonlijk effectenhuis, pp. 107-108. 
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possession and buying them at a moment that the buying price is lower 
than the selling price, is called a bear transaction. A person that executes 
bear transactions is called a bear operator.100 Speculation stood in bad 
odour in Dutch society. For instance, in a farce, performed for the first time 
in 1906, speculation was depicted as something decent people did not take 
part in and as a disgrace to the family.101  
Third, after having been informed and/or advised, the client had to 
make a decision and indicate whether he wanted to buy or sell. The 
decision-making process altered since telecommunication technologies 
became available, especially due to the telephone, while it meant that with 
the help of up to date information, investors could, in theory, make 
decisions on a real time basis. Fourth, a client had to send word to his 
stockbroker about his orders. In doing that, he had to point out whether he 
would like to place a limited order or a ‘bestens’ order. Besides, a client 
needed to indicate the time span of their orders: day-orders or good-till-
cancelled orders.102 A client could pass on his orders by means of mail, 
telegraph or telephone.  
The fifth activity consists of passing on the orders to the employees 
on the floor of the Stock Exchange. Normally, a client sent his orders to the 
office of his personal (provincial) financial intermediary. Then, the staff of 
the stockbroker’s office contacted the employees or the stockbroker himself 
at the Exchange building. Large clients could communicate directly to a 
stockbroker in the Exchange building by means of the telephone. An 
Amsterdam client could visit the Exchange building and could have a 
small talk with his commission trader at the gate that closed off the trading 
floor.103 By means of the telegraph and the telephone, investors could 
notify their orders during the official trading hours. 
Sixth is the negotiating part. Hopefully the financial intermediaries 
tried to obtain the best prices for themselves and for their clients. 
Hopefully, because not all commission traders appeared to be that honest 
or competent.104 On the other hand, the question is, strangely enough, 
whether that much room was left for negotiating. Often, it was merely a 
question of who accepted what was offered.  
The actual execution of the order on the ASE can be considered to 
be the seventh activity. This activity was the domain of specialists. They 
                                                 
100 Mendes da Costa, Het A.B.C. van de Amsterdamschen effectenhandel, p. 17. 
101 Schürmann, Speculanten.  
102 Mendes da Costa, Het A.B.C,. pp. 16-17. 
103 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 95. 
104 De Vries, Een eeuw, p. 107.  
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gathered the buy and sell orders and tried to match these orders. Until the 
1970s, no telecom technologies were involved with this activity. As we saw 
in chapter five, specialists took the initiative to install an internal telephone 
system that connected stock exchange booths with each other. In this way, 
stockbrokers could, from their stock exchange booth, inquire for current 
information with a specialist or pass on an order by phone instead of 
crossing the stock exchange floor. Despite its convenience, the VvdE 
decided to prohibit this internal telephone system in 1974 because it 
favoured the stockbrokers that had a connection over the stockbrokers that 
were not connected to this internal telephone system.  
Eighth, a client could be informed in several ways concerning the 
result of his order. Every client received an overview of his account by 
mail. A client only heard a few hours to a few days after closing time 
which of his transactions were concluded against what prices. Due to use 
and deployment of telecommunication technologies a client could be 
informed right away concerning the results of his or her orders.  
The ninth service was to keep up the administration of the clients. A 
classical certificate consists of two parts: a body of a security, and a coupon 
sheet respectively, a dividend sheet, that depending on the fact on whether 
it is a bond or share. A stockbroker administrated who had bought and 
sold what securities and collected the dividends and coupons for their 
clients. Every time dividend or coupons were paid, a part of the coupon 
sheet or a dividend coupon needed to be cut off. The cutting off appeared 
to be a very time-consuming activity. As soon as became clear what a 
financial intermediary had bought and sold, the exchange of the physical 
security papers commenced.  
The obtaining and passing through of the physical security papers is 
distinguished here as the tenth activity of a financial intermediary in the 
trade in stocks and shares. Every day, messengers ran or cycled through 
the city to other financial intermediaries to deliver the physical security 
papers. Not surprisingly, some of these messengers got robbed.105  
As an eleventh service to their clients, some financial 
intermediaries offered to store the security papers in safe deposits. Figure 
7.7 lines up all the above discussed activities. Between these activities 
transactions take place because the activities imply that contact has to be 
made with clients or other intermediaries. Since such a contact is 
                                                 
105 RAO, ATB, inv. nr. 782, Notulen der bestuursvergaderingen kantoor Amsterdam 26 mei 1883-16 december 
1884, 5 augustus 1884 (Minutes 26 May 1883- 16 December 1884, 5 August 1884). 
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transferred from technologically separable interfaces, we regard these 
contacts as transactions. 
 
 
 
The schema is presented here as a sort of timeless situation. Indeed these 
eleven activities still exist. In the course of time, a change was not seen in 
the fact that new activities were added or existing activities disappeared 
but they did change in the way they were executed such as the acceleration 
of services in which information is exchanged. Also, the administrative 
part became increasingly more carried out with the help of administrative 
machines (‘ponskaartmachines’), counting machines for coupons, and later 
of course, computers. Also, the obtaining and passing through of the 
physical securities and their storage in safes has been automated since the 
establishment of the ‘Effectenclearing N.V.’ in 1961. The VvdE established 
the ‘Effectenclearing N.V.’ in order to do away with the, rather risky, 
practice of errand boys running around the city with very valuable 
papers.106  
 
7.9 Discussion 
In this chapter we have discussed the way joint stock commercial banks 
and commission traders organised their services related to the securities 
trade. In the last section an all-round overview of activities in the securities 
                                                 
106 De Vries, Een eeuw, pp. 153 and 250.  
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trade was formulated which forms the answer to subquestion (b) what are 
the separate activities of the intermediaries in the securities trade? The number 
of activities remained more or less the same throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth century. What did change was the way they were performed. 
For instance, a client needs to be informed on the execution of his orders. 
In 1790 the client received an overview of his account the following day, in 
1950 the client received a phone call right after his order was concluded. 
We also learnt the different information sources (subquestion h) of the 
different actors. The traders, whether they were large joint stock 
commercial banks or small provincial commission traders all had 
telephones, tikkers (depended on the residence since the Tikkerdienst only 
provided services via the tikker in Amsterdam and The Hague) and telexes 
in-house. A difference was that the RB and the TB also possessed a 
telegraph connection to the Rijkstelegraaf which the smaller stockbrokers 
did not have. Another difference was the scale of employed ICT facilities. 
The joint stock commercial banks simply had more means to install large 
ICT facilities. A consequence of this greater scale was also that joint stock 
commercial banks hired direct trunk lines to link their branch offices with 
the main office in Amsterdam. If a small commission trader had a branch 
office at all, he probably did not link up these offices by means of direct 
telephone lines due to high costs. A ‘small’ stockbroker would more likely 
have had a relationship with a local intermediary to obtain orders, or vice 
versa to execute the orders for him at the ASE. It would impose too great a 
risk to have a direct telephone line with only one stockbroker, whatever 
the location of both stockbrokers. A private investor did not have these 
wide facilities. He or she could have a telephone connection and, in theory, 
a telex or tikker connection also belonged to the possibilities. However, in 
reality most subscribers to these services were professionals. If a private 
investor owned or hired these telecom facilities, he or she must have been 
very wealthy. Other information sources for these people were 
newspapers, reports of their stockbroker and the stockbroker himself. For 
what purposes were those information sources deployed? Or in other 
words how did the involved actors deploy ICT in the securities trade? 
(subquestion f). In this chapter, we learnt that the information sources 
were necessary to gather and provide information on securities (as well as 
before as during official trade hours), to pass on orders (from client to 
stockbroker, from stockbroker to ASE, or directly from client to the ASE), 
and to pass on the results of the concluded orders.  
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Intermediaries performed the distinguished activities (figure 7.7). By 
performing these activities, intermediaries created value for their clients 
and for their colleague intermediary. The question now arises of how 
much value intermediaries created (subquestion (c) what value do 
intermediaries in the Dutch securities trade create?). What could be done to 
determine ‘value’ is to take the amount of money which clients pay to their 
intermediaries for these services. The payment is represented in the 
commissions: a fixed percentage of the concluded order. Yet, we can doubt 
whether the commission fee represents the value that is at stake here. For 
instance, what if a commission trader is renown for the fact that he offers 
high quality information. Since the commission fees were fixed in 1903, the 
value for providing good information is not represented in the commission 
fee. After all, another stockbroker who gives information of lesser quality 
to his clients, receives the same commission fee. Hence, value is created in 
the way the activities are performed and not in receiving a commission fee. 
We want to know if ICT influenced this performance. Therefore, it is 
necessary to focus on the activities by which the impact of ICT should be 
most obvious. These activities clearly relate to the obtaining, relaying, and 
receiving of information. As was made clear in this chapter, the timing of 
information advanced due to ICT. What also became clear is that different 
types of information have different ‘time-values’. In other words, some 
information is more valuable if it is transferred immediately after it 
becomes known. Other information may preserve its value whether it is 
relayed directly or after a few hours. Most certainly, value is created in 
securities trade if one learns from relevant information in an early stage. If 
one can profit from this information, the created value is thus also 
appropriated. ICT can significantly speed up the process of obtaining and 
receiving of information and thus enhance the ability to create value. The 
ability to create value thus relates to the timing of information, and thus 
with subquestions (i) at what time (during trade hours, the same day, the day 
after?) did actors receive information and (j) did the timing of transfer of 
information change over time? In order to adequately answer these questions, 
first we have to make a division between the different types of information 
that are of importance to the securities trade (subquestion g).  
The most valuable information is information of which its value 
decreases or even disappears if it is not relayed and received 
instantaneously. Its value increases if it is transmitted quickly and 
obtained earlier than others. The questions arise what types of information 
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are at stake and what the most time valuable types of information are. We 
distinguished the following types of information:  
- price information 
- information on the micro level, thus on the level of the firm (for 
instance, on mergers, or on fraud of bookkeepings) 
- information on the industry level (meso-level) 
- information on a macro economic level (for instance on 
(un)employment, foreign direct investments, gross national 
product) 
- political news (resignation of a government or an announcement 
for going to war) 
- natural disasters (floods, virus outbreak)  
Information on prices most directly influences the prices itself. If an active 
investor sees prices fluctuating, he or she probably reacts by selling or 
buying securities even though the reasons for the fluctuations are not clear. 
The reasons for price fluctuations may be various. It could be based on one 
of the other types of information or it could be just for emotional reasons; 
based on a rumour or on the fact that others sell or buy securities for 
reasons you do not know. Since prices change more often than the other 
types of information, and the fact that they are only valuable within the 
period of the trade hours, prices are highly time valuable. Therefore, we 
regard price information as the most valuable type of information.  
The second type of information that influences trade in securities is 
information on the firm level. This concerns information on the financial 
situation of a firm, its operational activities and its strategic activities. If 
news comes out that a firm has decided to integrate vertically, which 
means that a firm extends its activities, this usually positively influences 
the price of its shares. If a firm appears to be unprofitable, the value of its 
shares decreases. This type of information appears less ‘frequent’ than 
information on prices; a firm does not merge every day. This type of 
information can be made known at every moment of the day and is most 
valuable at that moment. The value of price information is specifically 
related to the fixed trade time, and therefore more time specific than 
information on the micro level. 
The third type of information relates to the industry level. A good 
example for this sort of information forms the ‘ICT-hype’ at the end of the 
twentieth century. At first, every ICT firm, whether it concerned 
production type firms or service type firms, could count on a huge interest 
with an initial public offering for its shares if the concerned firm was 
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already listed. The interest concerned the ICT sector and not so much the 
positive results of individual firms. As soon as it became clear that ICT 
activities did not yield any profits, the hype collapsed. The prices of shares 
of ICT firms decreased dramatically. This type of information has an 
impact on a whole sector. Eventually, it influences the share value of 
individual firms but not so directly and fast as information on the level of 
the firm. Therefore, industry level information is regarded as less valuable 
than micro level information. 
 Information on a macro economic level is regarded here as the 
fourth type of information. The sort of information at which we aim here is 
information that gives insights into the general economic situation of a 
country, a continent or the world. For instance, investors would like to 
know if the economy in general flourishes or is in crisis, or what the 
interest rates are for credits. At the moment, world economy is in a 
recession. As a consequence, investors are less active on the securities 
market. The interest rate is of importance since it is seen as a stimulator for 
investments. Information on the macro economic level thus reflects the 
economic situation which affects the buying and selling behaviour of 
investors. This type of information has a less direct impact on the securities 
trade than price information, and information on both the micro and meso 
level. Thus, we regard this type of information less valuably than the first 
three types. 
 The fifth sort of information concerns political news. For instance, if 
a new government needs to be installed, a liberal administration is 
considered to be more advantageous to trade than a left wing government. 
Such news can positively influence the atmosphere in the securities market 
but not so directly as the above mentioned types of information. The same 
counts for the sixth type of information. News on an area that has been 
afflicted by an earthquake or another type of calamity certainly affects 
economic activity, and thus also indirectly influences the trade in valuable 
papers. Yet, it has not such a direct impact on the rates of securities as the 
first four information types.  
Obviously, most value is created if one is well acquainted with the 
current trend in prices. ICT can be a means to improve the process of 
creating value from information. But, just as different types of information 
exist, different means of information and communication technologies are 
available. It is very well conceivable that for the relaying of different types 
of information, different types of ICT are used. Price information needs 
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quick conveying so it is logically transmitted by an ICT mode that is 
equipped with such abilities.  
We now return to subquestions (i) and (j). As concerns current 
price information, this type of information was to be found at the stock 
exchange floor, in particular with the specialists of the listed securities. The 
specialist received the buy and sell orders of the stockbrokers. On basis of 
these orders, the specialist formed a rate. Since a specialist reviewed all 
orders, he had the best insights in the market of a particular security. How 
would you obtain this information if you were not a specialist or a 
stockbroker who had access to the stock exchange floor? 
Before telecommunication technologies entered the scene, thus 
before 1852, price information circulated among the stockbrokers during 
the official stock exchange hours. As from 1723 a price list was drawn up 
which was disseminated after stock exchange hours. Yet, the liability of 
this list did not stand. Another possibility to obtain such information, as a 
client of a stockbroker, was to pay a visit to the Exchange building and 
maybe ask your personal stockbroker for the current rates. This was easier 
if you lived in or nearby Amsterdam than if you lived further away. In the 
latter case, a provincial client had to depend on the price list and on the 
information he obtained via his stockbroker by mail or by word of mouth. 
Such a price list could be with the provincial client in the evening. Around 
1880, a large part of the Netherlands was covered  was accomplished.107 A 
face-to-face conversation with his personal stockbroker, if that stockbroker 
visited the Exchange himself, could thus take place in the evening after the 
stockbroker had returned from Amsterdam.  
The other types of information that played a role became known 
per newspaper which is a ‘public’ information medium so, in theory, 
available to anyone. Yet, we could think of some factors restricting 
familiarity with newspapers: too expensive, or illiteracy. On the other 
hand, people who could not afford or read a newspaper, probably did not 
have any spare money to invest in securities. Did stockbrokers also have a 
lead as it came to this type of information? That could be the case if they 
had maintained contacts with a company that was listed at the ASE, or if 
they received information from both national as international contacts. 
Furthermore, some of this general news circulated amongst stockbrokers 
earlier than it appeared in the newspapers.  
                                                 
107 J.W. Schot e.a. (2002) ‘Concurrentie en afstemming: water, rails, weg en lucht’, in: J.W. Schot e.a. 
(red.) Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. Dl. V Transport en Communicatie (Walburg Pers; 
Zutphen) pp. 19-43, pp. 24-24. 
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After the telegraph came into use in the Netherlands, information 
could be transmitted much faster than before. Since the Rijkstelegraaf 
manned an office at the Exchange building, information could be relayed 
during trade time. This implies that for the first time, information, 
especially price information, became available on a real time basis. Let us 
take a closer look at how the telegraph was used in the securities trade. An 
Amsterdam stockbroker deployed the telegraph to relay information that 
he regarded important for the recipient of the telegram. The type of 
information sent by telegram should have been information that needed 
quick relaying, thus current price information. This Amsterdam 
stockbroker obviously expected a reaction, thus an order, to that telegram. 
Yet, given the time-consuming surrounding activities for sending a 
telegram, we can ask ourselves whether the provincial correspondent or 
client had enough time to react to the telegram within the official stock 
exchange hours of the Amsterdam Exchange. Keeping in mind this rather 
complicated way of sending telegrams, it is more likely, that, in the initial 
phase of the telegraph service at the Amsterdam Exchange, provincial 
correspondents and clients used the telegraph to send late orders. So, the 
telegraph was especially used to receive orders at the Exchange building 
and not so much for sending telegrams from the Exchange building by the 
stockbrokers themselves to pass on current price information. Considering 
the fact that the stockbrokers experienced the telegraph as an important 
device for the securities trade, it became, to an increasing extent, a means 
to pass on orders. The way other types of information were received, 
remained the same namely via mail and newspapers although the 
telegraph was probably used in cases of sudden news that affected trade in 
securities. The telegraph was also used, for instance by the Twentsche 
Bank, to inform clients about their concluded orders, immediately after the 
official securities trade hour had closed. 
The telephone opened doors to a more immediate contact though 
not directly from the start. As from 1881 telephony became available in the 
Netherlands. The first telephone networks were local and independent 
which implied that a resident from Rotterdam could not make a phone call 
to Amsterdam. Opportunities to have direct contact with a stockbroker on 
the Exchange floor increased for Amsterdam inhabitants in 1884, since as 
from that year, the Amsterdam Exchange building had the disposal of a 
telephone bureau. Near the end of the nineteenth century, the same 
possibilities widened due to interurban telephony. We see that other types 
of information are still transmitted via mail, such as the reports of the 
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Twentsche Bank and the notes by Kol & Co written down on the back 
sides on the account overviews for Vlaer & Kol. For news that is sudden, 
the telephone becomes an increasingly more useful device. This is showed 
by the petition from 1905 in which stockbrokers protest against the 
malfunctioning of local and trunk telephone connections and from the fact 
that Kol & Co tried to reach Vlaer & Kol in vain by phone after it had 
became known that a firm went bankrupt in 1903. The telephone was not 
only used to pass on price information and sudden information on a 
micro-level; it was also deployed for other purposes, such as to inform 
clients on the concluded orders.  
The domain of price information and information on the micro-
level became increasingly more transferred via an information technology 
instead of via a communication technology, the telephone, as from the 
1920s. This development started as from 1920, when the VvdE started with 
a radio telephone service which transmitted price information via a radio 
transmitting station to subscribers who had a radio receiving station. 
Although a person made the price rates known by speaking, in code, into a 
microphone, we regard it as an information technology since a two-way, 
interactive communication was not possible. This characteristic was even 
more applicable to technologies as the tikker and the telex since the 
information these devices transmitted was printed on paper and not via a 
voice. The fact that ‘costly telephone calls’ to Amsterdam were no longer 
necessary to receive information on prices or any other sudden news on 
the micro-economic level was indeed a way to attract stockbrokers as a 
subscriber to the tikker service. For instance, the board of the Rotterdam 
stockbrokers association attempted to persuade its members to become a 
subscriber to the Tikkerdienst by using that argument. Also, the early 
adopters, seated in Amsterdam, mentioned this advantage over the 
telephone in a newspaper article in 1931. The services of the Tikkerdienst 
remained limited to Amsterdam and The Hague. However, the 
information the Tikkerdienst transferred to its subscribers, went ‘national’ 
with the installation of a telex distribution network in 1938. The telephone 
stayed in use to have contact before, during and after stock exchange 
hours. The telephone remained very useful to pass on orders. With the 
help of information technologies such as radiotelegraphy, the tikker and 
the telex, clients could inform themselves, instead of making use of the 
information provided by their stockbrokers. A few reservations are in 
place here. The subscribers to the radio and tikker were institutions and 
firms such as banks and stockbroker organisations. We do not have 
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information on the subscribers to the telexservice that started in 1938 but 
probably the majority also consisted of professional organisations. If a 
small investor wanted to keep track of the information transmitted by one 
of these three specific telecommunication services, he or she could pay a 
visit to his bank or a public space in which such a device was installed. 
After World War II, the possibilities for smaller investors to inform 
themselves on prices and news on the micro-level increased, but still, this 
type of information did not spread throughout every household. Hence, 
especially price information stayed, during trade time, amongst a select 
group, namely stockbrokers on the stock exchange floor and subscribers to 
the tikker and telex service. The telephone remained a useful device to 
inform clients on current prices and to receive and pass through orders 
during stock exchange hours.  
The VvdE adopted technologies as radiotelephony, tikker and telex 
with the purpose to reach a larger public, in order to obtain more orders. 
Obviously, current rates needed to become known to more people. 
Information technologies formed a means to reach that goal. As a result, 
we gradually see the development of an opening up again of the Dutch 
securities trade.  ‘Again’, because the Dutch securities trade had started as 
a branch trade that was ‘physically’ open to anyone, meaning that any 
interested person could pay a visit to the Exchange building in which 
traders of different kinds of goods gathered. After the professionalisation 
of the Dutch securities trade, the stockbrokers started to seclude ‘their’ 
trade. This development accelerated with the establishment of the VvdE in 
1876.  
Since the knowledge on rates remained amongst a small group, 
clients of stockbrokers did not have the disposal of this type of 
information. Hence, no tool or mechanism was present to control whether 
the amount of money a client paid to his stockbroker represented the 
actual price and commission fee, against which the order was concluded. 
Surely, the fact that this information did not become known, was 
advantageous to certain people but apparently, the majority of the 
stockbrokers aimed at a more reliable standing of their branch of trade. 
The VvdE succeeded in publishing a reliable price list that was drawn up 
daily after trade time was over. The VvdE set up a Commission for the 
Quotations to which the stockbrokers had to report their concluded orders. 
Employees of the ‘Guidebank’ wrote the results down on notice boards 
and disseminated the information to the editors of the official price 
newspaper after exchange time. By the time information technologies such 
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as the radio telegraphic radio station, the tikkers and the telexes entered 
the scene, the guides also passed on this information to their operators. 
With the coming of these technologies information on prices could reach a 
large public, during stock exchange hours. So, the Dutch securities trade 
experienced a development from physically open to physically secluded, 
and from a closed trade to an open trade on the level of information 
through the dissemination of price information by means of ICT. So, if we 
take to the eleven activities, we have to conclude that especially the first 
activity is essential and creates the ‘most’ value. ICT is especially of 
importance to this first activity which has an effect on the activities until 
the administrative parts (from the ninth to the eleventh activity) begins. 
The effect is shown in the aspect of time. Because a client could receive real 
time information with the coming of telecommunication technologies, he 
can also receive real time advice (which is the second activity). This also 
applied for the decision to buy or sell, the taking and passing through of 
orders. The point of time of these activities moved up from before to during 
stock exchange hours. So, an intermediary created value for his client to 
actually make use of these increased possibilities to be more actively 
involved in the securities trade. And, although clients could perform the 
activity of gathering information much more themselves, they needed 
intermediaries to actually perform the execution of the order since the 
Amsterdam intermediaries had a monopoly on that specific activity due to 
the VvdE.  
The last subquestion that needs to be answered concerns the issue 
of asset specificity. In the second chapter, we have tried to find a way to 
determine how asset specificity in case of ICT in relation to securities trade 
can be determined. We came to the conclusion that (l) the investments in the 
capacity of ICT, such as infrastructure (just the lines and cables), devices 
(telephonic apparatus) and personnel has to be studied. Especially if this 
capacity is purchased to maintain a particular relationship in securities trade. 
With the cases of the RB and the TBV, the investments in ICT were 
described. Joint stock commercial banks offered a wide variety in services 
in which ICT could be used. There is no clear evidence that extra 
investments were made in the capacity of ICT, specifically to facilitate 
services in the securities trade. Clearly, the departments related to 
securities trade, more than the other departments, used ICT extensively. 
However, this is no proof for asset specificity. Asset specificity implies that 
the investments made to provide a service, cannot easily be redeployed for 
alternative uses or by alternative users.  
Services and ICT in the Dutch Securities Trade  
 211
This only applies to the tikker. De tikker was solely used for the 
securities trade. Other modes of ICT were less obviously asset specific. 
Some indications suggest a slight asset specificity of ICT meaning that they 
were especially purchased and used to provide services in the securities 
trade. An example is the investments made in the direct trunk lines 
between the offices of the TB and the RB located in Amsterdam, Rotterdam 
and The Hague. These lines could be used for all types of communication 
but the impression exists that they were more used for the securities trade 
than for other services. Another example is the TB hiring a direct local 
telephone line from its main office to the Berlage building in 1905. This line 
can be regarded as slightly asset specific since this line could also be used 
for the commodities and grain trade that were accommodated in the 
Berlage Exchange next to the securities trade. The same goes for the 
purchased receiving station for wireless telegraphy in 1920 and the telex 
bought in 1938. The receiving station could be used to receive quotations 
from Stock Exchanges from all over the world, but it could also be 
deployed to receive messages from their international correspondents. The 
TB  acquired a telex device in the same year that the VvdE started an 
information service, in co-operation with the Tikkerdienst, passed on via a 
closed telex network to which interested persons and companies could 
subscribe to. So the telex was probably deployed to take a subscription to 
that service. On the other hand, the same telex could also be used to sent 
and receive messages with a different content than information on 
securities trade. Yet, what can be concluded from the case studies is that 
the departments related to the securities trade were given priority in 
relation to ICT in several ways because they obviously used these 
technologies more than the other departments. For instance, the priority 
shows in case new means of ICT were purchased or the fact that the 
securities department solely used the TB’s telephone lines for one quarter 
of an hour immediately after the official trade hours ended. Hence, the 
investments in ICT are slightly asset specific because they were used for 
various services but most certainly they were more used for services 
related to the securities trade than to facilitate other services.  
Finally, (m) to what extent uncertainty is present? and (n) how many 
transactions have taken place? needs to be explored. To these subquestions 
no clear answer is possible. In TCE, uncertainty relates to not being certain 
of the actions of a contracted partner or of the prospects of a market in 
which economic activities are performed. The TBV ‘accused’ Gerlings & Co 
of matching orders without bringing them to the market but the TBV did 
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not know when or on what scale that happened. Not long after the 
accusation, the TBV decided to become directly active at the ASE as a 
commission trader and thus integrated the service Gerlings & Co normally 
provided. In this case, uncertainty concerning the contracted partner, 
Gerlings & Co, led to integration. In the other cases, the influence of 
uncertainty is less clear as a factor for (dis)integration. We know the 
overall movement was towards integration. If we reason from the TCE 
assumption that high uncertainty leads to integration, uncertainty thus 
must have been present. The actors could have been uncertain on the 
activities of their contracted partner, both in the province as in 
Amsterdam, or the volatile nature of the securities trade could have played 
a role.  
The number (frequency!) of securities orders, can vary dependent 
on the fluctuations in prices. If these fluctuations are sudden, the number 
of orders can also rise acutely. In such a case, an intermediary, that has no 
direct access to the ASE, wants to be sure that its orders are executed. If 
such an intermediary cannot rely on its Amsterdam contact, integration 
might take place. This line of reasoning highly relates to two other 
attributes of TCE, frequency of transactions and asset specificity. If a 
financial intermediary without access to the ASE receives many securities 
orders and has to engage his Amsterdam contact quite often, it pays to 
integrate this specific service since the Amsterdam intermediary receives a 
fee for executing orders. On the other hand, integration of that service is 
accompanied by other costs such as establishing and maintaining an office 
in Amsterdam. In this phase, asset specificity of investments starts to play 
a role. Here, we come to the core of this thesis. This issue will be dealt with 
in chapter 8.  
 
7.10 Conclusion 
By studying the activities of the Rotterdamsche Bank, the Twentsche Bank 
and several smaller commission traders such as Vlaer & Kol at Utrecht, an 
image was drawn that shows the daily practice of the Dutch securities in 
the period 1860-1970. This image shows the activities that intermediaries 
performed to execute a securities order and their contacts with other actors 
in the value system of the Dutch securities trade. The two larger joint stock 
commercial banks started to hire Amsterdam intermediaries that executed 
their securities orders and they ended by concluding orders themselves at 
the trading floor of the ASE. The smaller commission traders from the 
province also engaged Amsterdam intermediaries but did not end up 
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performing the whole range of activities themselves. Another difference 
appears to be that large joint stock commercial banks possessed more 
means to adopt and use telecommunication technologies that enhanced 
and accelerated the execution of services. The ability of joint stock 
commercial banks to rent trunk lines that connected offices of the same 
bank in different cities formed an advantage.  
Intermediaries in securities trade thus basically performed the same 
activities for over the whole studied period. What did change was the way 
the activities were performed. For instance, the administrative part was 
probably done more extensively and thoroughly in the twentieth century 
than in the seventeenth century, which can be explained from the fact that 
bond administration offices were specifically established to take care of the 
administrative part in the nineteenth century. Another change is that 
activities, especially those related to informational services, accelerated 
due to the introduction of information and communication technologies. 
Actors obtained and received information on prices or concluded orders 
much more quickly than before. With the coming of the telephone, direct 
interactive contact with the floor of the ASE became possible during trade 
time. By exploring the activities of intermediaries in the securities trade 
and their use of ICT, the remainder of the subquestions could be answered. 
With these answers, we can now deal with the theoretical issues that were 
raised in chapter two. The theoretical issues will be discussed in the next 
and last chapter.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 In summary 
Now that the organisation of the Dutch securities trade and how its actors 
made use of ICT has been discussed, we need to return to the first two 
chapters of this thesis. The key question of this thesis was: how did the use 
and deployment of telecom technologies affect the daily practice of firms in relation 
to the goods and services these firms produce, and consequently how did that affect 
the industrial organisation of a sector? We focussed on the Dutch securities 
trade in the period between 1860 to 1970 to find an answer to the key 
question of this thesis.  
Before this question could be answered, a general overview of the 
Dutch securities trade was given in order to provide background 
information. From the period Dutch securities trade started (round 1600) 
trade literally took place in the open air in the streets of Amsterdam. As 
from 1611 the Exchange building of Hendrik de Keyser was opened in 
which practitioners of different branches of trade gathered. Trade in 
general had an open and public character meaning that everyone had 
access to the Exchange building. One of the consequences of this open 
character was that impostors could mingle quite easily with traders and 
that the curious public hindered the traders, which could lead to chaotic 
situations. As from the end of the eighteenth century several stockbroker 
organisations were established that strived for a more orderly arranged 
securities trade. One of the main issues that needed proper arrangements 
was the way rates were disseminated to the world outside the Exchange 
building.  For a long time, this type of information was, only known to the 
stockbrokers and not to the public. In that respect, the Dutch securities 
trade had not always been that open. Attempts were undertaken to come 
up with a reliable price list in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
Only with the establishment of the VvdE in 1876 did trade became more 
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transparent. The VvdE made it one of its spearheads to establish a reliable 
price list. The reason why transparency was regarded as an important 
issue was related to the standing of the securities trade and its 
practitioners. Trade in securities had always been surrounded by an air of 
deceit and great losses. The non-transparency of the rates only 
strengthened that image. The VvdE indeed energetically took up the task 
of bringing more order to the Dutch securities trade. The VvdE was the 
first stockbroker organisation in the Netherlands that represented the vast 
majority of the Amsterdam stockbrokers. The VvdE used strict rules for 
membership. In this way, provincial stockbrokers were excluded from the 
ASE as well as several Amsterdam stockbrokers. In other words, the VvdE 
tried to obtain complete control over the Amsterdam, and thus Dutch 
securities trade.  This became reality when the VvdE obtained its own 
securities trade floor that could be closed off by means of a gate, in the 
newly opened Exchange of Berlage in 1903. Only members of the VvdE 
could enter the stock exchange floor in the Berlage building. Strangely 
enough, the City Council of Amsterdam and the Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce did not foresee this ‘coup’. After several complaints of 
Amsterdam stockbrokers who were not members of the VvdE, the City 
Council and the Chamber of Commerce realised what had occurred. The 
VvdE had secluded a branch of trade, which should be publicly accessible. 
A public stock exchange was established besides the “VvdE’s stock 
exchange” at the Berlage building but that did not work out since the 
majority of the Amsterdam stockbrokers was a member of the VvdE. The 
monopoly, and thus the ‘physical seclusion’, was completed as from the 
end of 1913 when the Stock Exchange building of Cuypers, solely destined 
for trade in securities, opened its doors. 
After having provided background information on the Dutch 
securities trade, we have discerned the value system(s) and the value 
creating activities in the Dutch securities trade. A value system consists of 
the actors involved in producing a good or service. The actors in the value 
system of the Dutch securities trade are clients, banks, commission traders, 
sworn brokers, merchant bankers, and specialists. All these actors, except 
for the clients, are financial intermediaries who make possible the 
execution of securities affairs. All these separate parts of the value system 
have their own activities and each creates value in its own way.  
In chapter four, we have seen that several value systems existed 
side by side and that they changed over time. Hence, it is virtually 
impossible to speak of the value system of the Dutch securities trade. The 
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changes that were seen were; first, that intermediaries started to form a 
hatch between buyer and seller; second, that as from 1876 and especially as 
from 1903 it mattered whether you lived in or outside Amsterdam as it 
influenced the route taken to execute an order at the ASE; third, that as 
from the end of the nineteenth century market makers arose as new 
intermediaries who were specialised in particular securities; and fourth, 
that joint stock commercial banks became the dominant group of 
stockbrokers throughout the twentieth century. The most important 
change was that we saw a development from individual stockbrokers 
(commission traders, merchant houses, sworn brokers) as the dominant 
group of intermediaries to joint stock commercial banks. A fifth 
development shows the trend towards integration. Both joint stock 
commercial banks and merchant bankers who were also active as 
commission traders, integrated by taking over other financial 
intermediaries or start activities themselves that were formerly engaged 
with another financial intermediary.  
Since this thesis set out to find an explanation in changes in value 
systems from the angle of ICT, chapters five and six were completely 
devoted to that aspect. Chapter five described the moment of introduction 
of the telegraph, the telephone, wireless telegraphy and telephony, and the 
telex in the Netherlands. In chapter six, an enquiry was made after the 
available means of ICT at the Exchange buildings. Stockbrokers not only 
made use of the existing services offered by the PTT but also tried to shape 
existing ICT facilities to their own ends. For instance, in the 1840s when the 
electromagnetic telegraph was not yet introduced in the Netherlands, a 
private courier service of Rotterdam stockbrokers ran up and down to the 
nearest Belgium telegraph terminal to pass on the quotations of foreign 
stock exchanges. Another example stems from 1920. In that year, a group 
of Amsterdam bankers tried to realise a direct telegraph connection to 
Emden in Germany from which a telegraph connection ran via the Azores 
to New York. The Amsterdam bankers were not satisfied with the existing 
telegraph connection to New York via Londen. In the same year, the VvdE 
started a wireless radio service to which interested persons and firms 
subscribed. The VvdE was the one of firsts in the Netherlands to introduce 
such a wireless communication service in co-operation with the NSF. The 
service had to end because the PTT decided to concentrate all radio 
services in their own hands. In 1926, the PTT cancelled the VvdE’s 
concession. This formed the impetus to look for alternatives which 
eventually led to the introduction of the stockticker in the Netherlands. 
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The services of the Tikkerdienst that officially started in 1931 remained 
limited to Amsterdam and The Hague. A national coverage was reached in 
1938 when the same information relayed by the ticker, was transmitted via 
a telex network to which, as for the ticker, one needed to subscribe to. 
Thus, a specific group of users used and set up telecommunication 
technologies services to fit their own needs. 
With the help of these information and communication 
technologies relevant information was relayed, especially information with 
a high ‘time value’. Information with the highest time value is price 
information. The examples mentioned here of stockbrokers deploying ICT 
in their own way, all revolve around the receiving and passing through of 
price information as quickly as possible. Price information became known 
to more people in real time. In this way the closed character of the Dutch 
securities was somewhat opened up. ‘Somewhat’ is deliberately used here 
because the means of ICT that were discussed in the examples mainly 
remained reserved for the professionals or the very well-to-do.  
Intermediaries such as bankers, banks and  commission traders 
performed a number of activities that were discussed in chapter seven. 
These activities consisted of providing information (1), advice (2), buy or 
sell decision (3), taking orders (4), passing through of orders (5), 
negotiating (6), execution of orders (7), notification results (8), 
administration (9), obtaining and passing through of physical securities 
(10) and storage of physical securities (11). The client gave a buy or sell 
order to his financial intermediary and paid a certain percentage to his 
financial intermediary after an order was concluded. The specialist or 
market maker performed the actual execution of the order for which he 
received a certain percentage of the stockbrokers. The specialist appeared 
at the end of the nineteenth century. Before, stockbrokers arranged the 
orders with each other. It is not exactly clear since when this intermediary 
obtained a distinct status. A market maker was specialised in the trade of a 
particular security. The market maker gathered all buy and sell orders of 
that specific security. On the basis of these gathered orders, the market 
maker formed a price. So, a market maker had the best insight into the 
demand and supply of a particular security and into the bid and asked 
prices. 
The discerned activities appeared to be quite ‘timeless’. All these 
activities, except for the storage of physical securities, were provided by 
financial intermediaries active in the securities trade, to a more or lesser 
extent, throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth 
Conclusion 
 219
century. The number of activities and the contents of the activities 
remained the same. The transformation is in the way these activities were 
performed. Especially the services that dealt with the gathering, selecting, 
transferring and receiving of information were speeded up due to the use 
and deployment of ICT. These historical conclusions correspond with 
Fischer’s observations although these related to social and not to economic 
life. Fischer concluded that due to the telephone, Americans deepened and 
widened social patterns rather than altering them. The same holds for the 
organisation of services in the Dutch securities trade. Thus statements of 
authors like Chandler, Jones and Jonker and Sluyterman that ICT led to 
significant changes in economic life, need to be differentiated. Indeed, ICT 
speeds up transactions, widens the geographical scope of markets, and 
makes it possible to adjust to needs of local needs. However, the use and 
deployment of ICT does not lead to radical new unknown services. It 
merely speeds up the provision of existing services. 
This thesis set out to discern the changes in both the value system 
and the activities. We were interested whether ICT had played a role in 
these changes. As concerns the activities, we already concluded that ICT 
did not lead to new services but to an acceleration of these services. As 
concerns the composition of value systems of the Dutch securities, we have 
seen a movement towards integration. To explain these developments we 
proposed two types of theoretical approaches in the second chapter that 
we specifically related to ICT. The first related to the early possession of 
relevant information by means of ICT with which an intermediary creates 
extra value for its customers. The second was based on transaction costs 
economics which states that ICT will lower transaction costs and therefore, 
a trend towards market transactions is to be expected.  
  
8.2 Information 
From the ‘information’ view we discerned that ICT can lead to changes in 
services. We aim here at a different type of changes as we already 
discussed in the previous section. We have established that the value 
creating activities have basically remained the same in due time but that 
changes show themselves in the way they were executed. The changes 
relate to an acceleration of the provided services by means of ICT. 
Financial intermediaries can inform their clients more immediate on 
current prices and the results of their orders with the help of a telegram 
and a telephone call. Information could be disseminated during trade 
hours with the help of information and communication technologies. The 
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changes to which we refer in this section, should occur from the existence 
of information asymmetry that can appear and disappear as a result of 
ICT. In the initial phase of a new ICT, information asymmetry should 
especially be present because then these new ICT are not yet available to 
everyone. In the phase that ICT is widely used and adopted, information 
asymmetry should disappear. In this phase, we expect that clients start to 
perform a number of the services themselves because through ICT they 
can inform themselves instead of making use of an intermediary.  
To determine information asymmetry, a study was made of the 
available means of ICT with the different stages of the value system of the 
Dutch securities trade. A difference in available means of ICT could be an 
indication for information asymmetry. Although ICT facilities widened 
and were used by more people over time, current price information 
remained the ‘domain’ of stockbrokers with access to the trade floor of the 
ASE and with subscriptions to the radio service of the VvdE (1920), the 
Tikkerdienst (1931) and the closed telex network of the Tikkerdienst and 
the VvdE (1938). Indeed, due to high costs, subscribers to these services 
were financial, both Amsterdam and provincial, intermediaries, and not 
small private clients. Unequal availability of information gradually 
disappeared, but a client remained dependent, when it came to current 
price information, on his stockbroker.  
The obtaining and passing through of price information is a value 
creating activity. The question arises whether a difference exists between 
financial intermediaries in providing this service. If a closer look is taken to 
the available means to gather information, large joint stock commercial 
banks seemed to have an  advantage over smaller stockbrokers. The 
advantage is a result of the means these banks had, to hire quite expensive 
direct trunk lines through which the different offices could have contact. 
These lines could be used for passing through current price information, 
for passing through orders and for notifying the results. Surely, the 
employees of these offices had to transfer this information to their clients 
but the direct trunk line avoids at least, slow interurban telephone 
connections that occurred via regular telephone traffic. An Amsterdam 
commission trader who had to contact a provincial commission trade 
during trade hours by phone regularly had to wait too long before a 
connection was established. The advantage diminished with the coming of 
information technologies such as the radio service, the Tikkerdienst, and 
the price telex network of the VvdE and the Tikkerdienst. These 
technologies gave provincial financial intermediaries the opportunity to 
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obtain the price information themselves without the mediation of an 
Amsterdam intermediary. Still, traders at the ASE floor continued to have 
a slight lead because information transmitted via ICT was always 
somewhat delayed. Information asymmetry thus existed between 
stockbrokers and clients but also between Amsterdam and provincial 
stockbrokers.  
Although information asymmetry diminished over time, it did not 
disappear, despite ICT. The explanation seems to originate from the 
institutional environment of the Dutch securities trade. The VvdE had a 
monopoly on price information and thus determined how and when it was 
disseminated. This situation could also be the reason for the fact that no 
changes are detected as concerns the appearance or disappearance of 
services. Since clients remained dependent on their stockbrokers for price 
information, in spite of growing possibilities in the area of ICT, this specific 
service persisted. In chapter two, the suggestion was raised that clients 
probably will start to inform themselves by means of ICT in order to lift 
information asymmetry. Here we have to make a distinction in clients. We 
have seen small private clients that place orders with intermediaries. We 
have also seen provincial stockbrokers who were both intermediary and 
client: intermediary, because they took care of orders in name of their 
clients; and client, because they had to place their orders with a member of 
the VvdE. Provincial stockbrokers took subscriptions to the radio service, 
the Tikkerdienst and the private telex network of the VvdE. As already 
established, private persons did not. Thus, provincial stockbrokers could 
much more inform themselves on current price information and became 
less dependent on their Amsterdam contacts. However, this did not apply 
for private clients.  
Another phase in the services schema, the buy or sell decision, did 
become increasingly more the domain of private clients themselves. From 
the moment that clients could be informed during trade time, the decision 
to buy or sell thus moved from before to during the stock exchange hours 
and became much more a client’s decision instead of a stockbroker’s 
decision. Clients could thus better influence the price they wanted to have 
or pay for a share or bond. Naturally, this applies for a certain type of 
client: the active investor who had knowledge of the securities trade. 
Presumably, these clients appreciated the possibility to be involved more 
directly in the securities trade.  
It thus proved worthwhile to be directly active at the ASE since 
obtaining and transferring current price information to clients was a very 
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valuable activity. Therefore, the conclusion seems to be that an integrated 
firm had wider possibilities to be well informed and thus had an 
advantage over a disintegrated provincial intermediary. This explains the 
move towards integration in the Dutch securities trade of which especially 
provincial financial intermediaries fell prey to. Why did provincial 
stockbrokers not, en masse, take over Amsterdam stockbrokers to lift 
information asymmetry? Apart from some exceptions, for instance 
Heldring & Pierson from The Hague took over Broekman’s 
Effectenkantoor from Amsterdam in 1922, provincial stockbrokers did not 
follow the example of, the RB. It was rather the other way around; most 
provincial stockbrokers were taken over by Amsterdam intermediaries.  
Maybe, the answer to that question is ‘just’ a matter of scale. Smaller 
provincial stockbrokers probably wanted to be directly active at the ASE 
but did not have the means to either take over an Amsterdam stockbroker 
or hire a direct trunk line.  
The conclusion is that information asymmetry lessens but remains 
present despite ICT, particularly as it comes to price information. 
Information asymmetry is not simply lifted if everyone has access to the 
same tools. In the case of the Dutch securities trade, institutional factors 
(VvdE) played a large role. The expectation that clients would take over 
services of intermediaries related to the gathering of information due to 
ICT, applies for the provincial intermediaries who were dependent on 
Amsterdam intermediaries for current price information but not to small 
private clients. The latter group remained dependent on their 
intermediaries for current price information. The expectation that services 
would change has also come true, but not in the sense that it has led to 
new or fewer services. The services remain the same but the character of 
the services changes due to ICT.  
 
8.3 TCE 
The attributes for explaining (dis)integration processes according to the 
TCE perspective are asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty. Of these 
attributes, asset specificity is regarded as decisive (see chapter two). As we 
established in chapter seven, the factor of frequency is hard to determine 
since no information is available on the number of transactions. In 
securities trade the number of orders can vary depending on the 
fluctuations in prices. If these fluctuations are sudden, the number of 
orders can rise or fall quite acutely. The frequency of transactions vary per 
day, or even per minute. Frequency is thus not a decisive factor in the 
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decision to integrate or disintegrate because one cannot rely on 
expectations in the future. This variance in frequency clearly leads to 
uncertainty. Yet, the factor of uncertainty is used in a different perspective 
in TCE. Uncertainty should specifically relate to the transaction. In our 
case, the extent of uncertainty is best discussed in relation to asset 
specificity.  
According to TCE, integration takes place if an economic 
transaction is characterised by high asset specificity. If an economic 
transaction is characterised by low asset specificity, it is likely that 
disintegration will take place. An economic transaction takes place 
between two parties. In order to determine the extent of low or high asset 
specificity, the way a relationship between those two parties is organised 
needs to be assessed.  
It is useful to discuss the alternatives the actors had for integration. 
Let us take the case of the RB, as a provincial financial intermediary. First, 
the RB could have established its own office in Amsterdam. In that case, 
the RB could have applied for membership with the ‘Vereeniging’ since it 
possessed an office in Amsterdam, a prerequisite for membership. 
However, this would not have guaranteed direct entrance to the ASE. 
Within the ‘Vereeniging’ a growing antipathy against large banks was to 
be noted. Stockbrokers such as commission traders feared a loss of 
securities orders since joint stock commercial banks became increasingly 
more dominant players in the Dutch securities trade. In 1911, the 
‘Vereeniging’ refused membership to the ‘Nederlandsch-Indische 
Handelsbank’ and the ‘Javasche Bank’ although these banks held office in 
Amsterdam. Not surprisingly, the RB did not take this road to Amsterdam.  
The second alternative for the RB was to make use of its contacts in 
Amsterdam that had executed its orders in the past. The RB could have 
made arrangements that current price information was transmitted to the 
RB by one or several of these intermediaries. However, much time could 
elapse before a telephone connection came about since several switchboard 
operators need to be passed. After the relevant information had reached 
the RB, the RB employees had to contact their clients. In the meantime, the 
time value of the information could have been lost.  
A variation to the second alternative was to conclude an 
arrangement with one single Amsterdam member of the VvdE to pass 
through orders, to receive ‘real-time’ information, and for notifying the 
results of the concluded orders. A direct trunk line between the RB office 
in Rotterdam and the Amsterdam intermediary could be installed to 
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minimise loss in time. Because of the large costs, the RB would need strict 
assurance that this Amsterdam intermediary would inform the RB 
adequately and that its orders would be executed according to its 
requirements. If that was not the case, the RB could not serve their clients 
as well as possible.  
If such a direct trunk line was installed between the RB and an 
Amsterdam commission trader, high transaction costs would be involved 
in comparison to a hierarchical relation. Especially monitoring costs would 
be large since uncertainty was involved. The RB needed to be sure that its 
securities orders were executed against the best prices and that the 
information it received was real time and accurate. The RB had to monitor 
whether the services the Amsterdam stockbroker provided, were worth 
the price and whether the Amsterdam stockbroker did not behave 
opportunistically. The RB had to be certain that its orders were executed as 
well and as soon as possible because this Amsterdam stockbroker also 
served other clients. In other words, the RB surely wanted the contracted 
party to have enough capacity in personnel, means and infrastructure for 
communication to serve the RB under all circumstances. The RB could 
have made use of more than one Amsterdam stockbroker in order to 
reduce the extent of opportunism although that would have entailed high 
monitoring costs. Such a situation would thus be profitable if the reduced 
costs of opportunism were larger than the increased monitoring costs. 
Apparently, in case of the RB, the increased monitoring costs were higher 
than the reduced costs of opportunism. The option of concluding a 
contract with an Amsterdam stockbroker and the installation of a direct 
trunk line between the RB office in Rotterdam and the office of the 
Amsterdam stockbroker situation would probably lead to integration in 
the end, because the investment in a trunk line solely used for the 
securities trade would be a highly asset specific one.  
As concerns the Twentsche Bankvereeniging, a different TCE 
argument plays a role. Although employees of the TBV worked closely 
together with Gerlings & Co, the TBV was not their only client. This 
becomes clear out of one of the board meetings in which the fear was 
expressed that Gerlings & Co would not bring all the orders of the TBV to 
the open market but matched some of the orders ‘in-house’. This practice 
occurred more often since it was convenient; it saved a lot of paperwork, 
and thus Gerlings &. Co performed fewer activities for the fee they 
received.  Yet, the Board of the TBV was concerned that they and their 
clients did not pay or receive market prices. Hence, the TBV worried that 
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Gerlings & Co did not perform the sixth (negotiating) and seventh activity 
(execution of orders) that well. So, a conceivable solution to that problem 
might be to conclude a contract in which these services were well 
arranged. On the other hand, the TBV then needed to monitor whether 
Gerlings & Co kept its promise which entailed transaction costs. If the 
costs of concluding a contract, monitoring the contract, and the fees paid to 
Gerlings & Co, exceeded the ‘production costs’ of the provided services in 
case the TBV performed them itself, than vertical integration is likely.    
On the integration process of smaller stockbrokers taking over 
other small (provincial or Amsterdam) stockbrokers, we are less informed. 
Although not much is known on their investments in ICT, the argument 
that a direct trunk line involves an asset specific investment also applies to 
them. The fact that these smaller stockbrokers did not regularly take over 
other stockbrokers, suggests a lack of means to make such investments in 
the first place (as we already concluded).  
In chapter two, we posed that in a early phase of a new technology, 
the choice for hierarchy was more likely. In the phase a new 
communication technology was widely used, hierarchy should be replaced 
by market. This hypothesis stemmed from the expectation that in a initial 
phase of a new technology, uncertainty is present to a large extent. In 
order to reduce uncertainty, firms integrate the necessary means and 
knowledge concerning that new technology. In the case of the Dutch 
securities trade, the trend towards integration seems to be isolated from 
the introduction of a new ICT. The Dutch concentration process in the 
financial sector started in 1911. The telegraph was already in use since 
1852, and the telephone since 1881. It is hard to see a connection between 
the two developments. If our line of reasoning is followed, then financial 
intermediaries must have taken over providers of information and 
communication technology services in order to reduce uncertainties. In its 
starting period, both the telegraph and the telephone were exploited by 
private companies. However, such a take-over would be extraordinary 
since an ICT company did not belong to a financial intermediary’s vertical 
nor its horizontal chain. If such a situation had occurred, a financial 
intermediary would have been responsible for a city’s telecommunication 
infrastructure. More realistic would have been to hire technical staff to take 
care of the information and communication technologies of a firm. 
However, most devices were rented and this technical staff could have 
done nothing to improve the lines and connections; these fell under the 
responsibility of the concerned telegraph and telephone company.  
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The main result of our assessment of TCE in relation to ICT is that a 
combination of asset specificity (due to investments in dedicated ICT such 
as trunk lines) and uncertainty (in relation to the aspect of monitoring) has 
led to a vertical integration process in the Dutch securities trade. The 
vertical integration process specifically relates here to the movement of 
financial intermediaries (both from the province and Amsterdam) that 
were not directly active at the ASE floor. This TCE argument thus does not 
apply to the horizontal integration process of the Dutch financial sector in 
the twentieth century which is characterised by the development that 
banks only become bigger banks. The attribute of frequency is less 
pressing as an explaining factor. The frequency of transactions can 
fluctuate that much that a firm could, in theory, change its decision for 
integration or disintegration per day or by the minute. Thus, with business 
sectors in which transactions are subject to sudden variations in volatility, 
frequency plays no role in the ‘make-or–buy’ decision.  
 
8.4 Economic and historical explanations  
What are the results of the attempt to apply economic static theories to 
historical empirical material? Indeed, most economic theories aim at being 
quantifiable. We knew that beforehand. By formulating a specific set of 
questions, an attempt is made to make the theories suitable for historical 
research. The specific set of questions is formulated by reasoning from 
theory. These questions are not a general, already used and verified set of 
questions. We have formulated these questions on the basis of factors that 
determine the ‘explanation part’ of a theory. With the ‘information view’ 
the explanation was based on ICT and information asymmetry. With TCE, 
these factors were asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty. We have 
identified and discussed what the factors comprehend and on that basis, 
we have formulated the specific questions. Answers to these questions 
were searched for in archives. Most of the questions could not be answered 
in a straightforward way because the archives lacked the necessary 
information. The result is that answers are based on ‘circumstantial 
evidence’.  We take the example of how to determine the available means 
of ICT in the securities trade to show what we mean by ‘circumstantial 
evidence’. The answer is based on documents that provide information on 
purchased means of ICT. Yet, no document exists in which this 
information is listed. It was found in the minutes of board directors, out of 
maps of the trade floor and drafts of the architects of the Exchange 
buildings, requests with the PTT for telegraph and telephone connections 
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and so on. Thus, pieces of evidence are found. On the basis of these pieces, 
we sketch our picture, which will probably be not the complete picture. 
However, a complete picture is not necessary. It is necessary to establish a 
fairly representative overview of what the different actors had in-house as 
it came to ICT. Secondary sources that provide information on the general 
availability of ICT in the Netherlands function as a reference point on what 
actors can possibly make use of.  
With help of the answers to the subquestions, it should be possible 
to build up an explanation for changes in the Dutch securities trade in line 
of the two theories. Still, an uncomfortable feeling seizes the researcher. 
The feeling stems not so much from for instance, the fact that TCE is a 
comparative static theory and should therefore not be suitable for 
historical (process) research. Yes, we can safely state that ICT has 
enormously accelerated the flow of information. Yet, we cannot safely state 
that, because of this acceleration (time specificity of services) temporal 
specific investments were necessary thus integration is a logical result. 
There are other factors that, at least also, play a role here. Is the fact that 
the VvdE tried to monopolise the Dutch securities trade not enough reason 
to explain the integration movement of the RB towards Amsterdam, the 
financial centre of the Netherlands? Is the fact that banks wanted to keep 
up with growing (in)ternational economics, bigger credit requests, and 
maybe above all, with each other, not enough reason to explain the overall 
integration movement (horizontal and vertical) in the Dutch financial 
sector? These guesses can be doubted as much as the theoretical 
explanations. The uncomfortable feeling thus comes from the law-like 
explanations which leaves no room for other factors that could have 
played an evenly large or larger part in explaining certain phenomena. 
Particular circumstances can thus be as valid as general explanations. 
Thus, to paraphrase Hodgson, a general theory has no attention for the 
‘particular’.   
 
Hence, can historians use economic theories? Yes, they can for formulating 
questions with which to ‘attack’ the pile of archival documents and 
structure the outcomes. Can historians use them to explain phenomena in 
history? Only partly, because much more historical specific factors often 
form the explanation to a phenomenon. This latter observation relates to 
the circumstance that theories (and not only general economic theory) 
approach reality from one particular point of view. When studying 
historical phenomena and processes, a researcher is in the position to 
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study the complete picture. One thus sees that often several factors play a 
role that cannot be fit into one theory because then no justice is done to 
reality. Economic theories are generally drawn up on the basis of the 
present or ‘near history’ with the aim of predicting the future. Such a 
theory can even be established in the middle of an ongoing process. The 
‘inventors’ of that theory do not have the complete picture and thus some 
factors that also play a role might be missed. That could be the reason why 
general economic theories only partly fit to explain historical phenomena 
and developments.   
 
8.5 Suggestions for future research  
On basis of the results of this thesis several fields for future research can be 
formulated. On the meta-level the issue to what extent general economic 
theories are applicable to historical studies, needs more ‘cases’. By 
collecting a set of studies in which the issue is explored, more general 
conclusions can be drawn on how to apply a general theory on historical 
empirical material. It is an important issue because it can give history as a 
science a deeper theoretical basis. We not only urge historians to explore 
the issue, but above all, practitioners of general economic theories such as 
TCE.  Since these practitioners should have experience with making the 
parameters, factors that matter in these theories, they would know what 
type of data is necessary in order to fully apply such theories. In relation to 
the subjects discussed in this thesis, we can think of collecting a set of 
factors that has led to mergers and acquisitions (vertical and horizontal 
integration) in the past. These should be compared with factors that should 
play a role according to a theory such as TCE or other theories on 
integration processes. Of this set of factors, we would be curious whether 
ICT is among them. Has ICT played a significant or even a decisive role in 
the decision of firms to integrate or disintegrate in the past? And, more 
importantly, how to asses the influence of ICT when those processes took 
place in the past? We indeed experienced a hard time establishing the role 
of ICT in firms in the past since little primary documentation on the subject 
was left.  We would suggest studying other business sectors in a historical 
context with a focus on the use and deployment of ICT in order to 
establish the significance of ICT in business, both on the industry and firm 
level. 
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8.6 Comparison with the present or epilogue  
If a closer look is taken to the developments in the Dutch securities trade, 
we see several striking phenomena. First, all trade in valuable papers, 
including trade in options, has turned into screen trade. The open outcry 
system has disappeared. This is certainly caused by ICT, or more, 
computers and its accompanying software and infrastructure. The 
spectacular images of screaming traders belong to the past. Apart from the 
fact that these were amusing scenes, some traders feel that the magic of 
trading has disappeared. Open outcry traders picked up a lot of non- 
printed and unspoken information by listening to the rumours than arose 
from the trade floor, the faces and movements of other traders and from 
who spoke with whom. This type of information, to which we did not pay 
attention in the analysis since it is so intangible, has disappeared with 
screen trade since stockbrokers now sit in dealing rooms of the separate 
firms.  
 Another development has been the disappearance of the 
‘hoekmannen’ or specialists in the Dutch securities. This is due to the fact 
that the Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris Stock Exchanges have merged into 
one stock exchange which is Euronext. Euronext has adopted the French 
trading system that does not know ‘hoekmannen’. These ‘hoekmannen’ 
should transfer to the profession of ‘animateurs’ who acted under the 
orders of listed companies, to keep trade in securities of those companies 
going.  
 The third development is the continuing spread and public 
availability of information that influence the securities trade. By means of 
internet, this information has nearly become ubiquitous. It has become 
very hard to keep important information silent. Still, current price 
information remains a service for which one has to pay. Price information 
that is publicly published on websites, always shows prices with a certain 
delay. For instance, the quotations on the Euronext website, are delayed by 
fifteen minutes. If one wants current price information, one has to be either 
a stockbroker or a client of a stockbroker. In that sense, nothing has 
changed! 
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Appendix A: Costs telephony, 1881-1970 in real prices in Dutch 
guilders (1970=100).1 
 
Annual subscription rates Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague for business activities, 1881-1941.  
     
Year Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague  
1881 610,23    
1882 610,23 638,32   
1883 610,23 638,32 651,6  
1896 610,86 610,86 651,6  
1903 610,86 610,86 410,41  
1914 610,86 610,86 488,7 (max. 1500  inc. and 
outg. conv. per 
month. More than 
1500, obliged to take 
2nd subscription). 
1919 610,86 610,86 457,26  
1920 492,62 385,35 560,51  
1923 492,62 385,35 751,85  
1925 492,62 385,35 729,06  
1928 492,62 385,35 782,93 (max. 750;more than 
750, 2nd 
subscription) 
1930 589,3 385,35 732,42  
1930 303,07 385,35 914,53 (max. 850;more than 
850, 2nd 
subscription). 
1931 303,07 385,35 914,53  
1933 285,79 385,35 914,53  
1935 285,79 385,35 271,5  
1938 285,79 385,35 257,21  
1941 182,27 182,27 182,27  
                                                 
1 Data Appendix A is derived from: Hoofddirectie der Posterijen, Telegrafie en Telefonie (1967) De 
ontwikkeling van het abonnementstarief, de kosten van aansluiting en de gesprekstarieven van de telefoon in 
Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s Gravenhage) and Staatsbedrijf der Posterijen, Telegrafie en 
Telefonie (1969) De ontwikkeling van enkele telefoontarieven in Nederland (Staatsbedrijf der PTT; ’s 
Gravenhage). 
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Subscription rates trunk telephony (annually) Amsterdam-
Rotterdam.  
  
Year 
Amsterdam Rotterdam 
1886 568,26  
1896 67,86 Included in local subscription 
rate.  
1920 Included in local 
subscription rate  
 
 
 
 
Connection charges (non-recurrent), 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, 1896-
1941. 
  
Year Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague
1896 158,85 135,75  
1903 158,85 135,75 157,85 
1914 158,85 135,75 108,6 
1918 108,08 135,75 108,6 
1919 124,13 135,75 120,02 
1920 136,83 145,97 160,56 
1923 136,83 145,97 170,87 
1925 178,47 145,97 170,87 
1927 178,47 126,28 147,33 
1928 178,47 126,28 105,23 
1929 178,47 126,28 44,19 
1931 71,45 126,28 170,87 
1932 71,45 126,28 57,15 
1935 71,45 59,53 47,63 
1936 71,45 59,53 35,72 
1939 71,45 59,53 33,34 
1941 22,78 22,78 22,78 
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Tariffs trunk phone calls, 1897-1970. 
      
Year less than 
15 km 
more than 
35 km 
urgent 
less than 
15 km 
urgent 
more than 
35 km 
local call 
charges 
1897 3,35 3,35 6,7 6,7  
1904 1,87 1,87 6,24 6,24  
1910 1,16 1,75 1,75 5,6  
1916 1,05 1,47 2,74 4,21  
1918 1,04 1,38 3,11 4,32  
1919 1,11 1,42 3,18 4,29  
1920 1,02 1,46 2,9 4,37  
1925 0,76 1,9 2,28 5,7  
1930 0,63 2,1 1,26 4,1 0,11 
1934 0,57 1,91 1,14 3,82 0,1 
1935 0,57 1,91 1,14 3,82 0,1 
1937 0,47 1,91 0,94 3,82 0,1 
1940 0,63 2,53 1,26 5,06 0,13 
1949 0,69 1,79 1,38 3,58 0,13 
1954 0,49 1,26 0,98 2,52 0,07 
1955 0,42 1,12 0,88 2,24 0,07 
1960 0,42 1,12 0,88 2,24 0,06 
1964 0,34 0,9 0,68 1,8 0,07 
1967 0,48 0,8 0,96 1,6 0,08 
1970 0,42 0,7 0,84 1,4 0,07 
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Costs Rijkstelefoon networks, 1920-1969. 
  
Year Size network (number 
connections) 
Subscription rate 
in real prices in 
Dutch guilders 
per year. 
(1970=100) 
Connection charges 
in real prices in 
Dutch 
guilders.(1970=100) 
1920 4001 - 6000 233,55 145,97 
1922 more than 4000 with 
a max. Of 750  
conversations per 
month 
569,58 145,97 
1930 more than 4000 202,04 105,23 
1932 more than 10000 257,21 119,08 
1935 more than 10000 257,21 28,58 
1939 more than 20000 257,21 28,58 
1941 more than 4000  182,27 28,58 
1946 more than 4000 152,24 28,58 
1950 more than 4000 152,24 50,09 
1954 more than 4000 152,24 69,17 
1957 more than 4000 113,98 118,73 
1957 more than 4000 113,98 158 
1961 more than 4000 109,77 109,77 
1964 more than 4000 114,11 131,16 
1965 more than 4000 132,4 122,57 
1966 more than 4000 142,58 142,58 
1967 more than 4000 174,3 167,59 
1969 more than 2000 180 167,59 
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Appendix B : Data N.V. Tikkerdienst 
 
 
Subscribers NV Tikkerdienst  Amsterdam 19352 
  
Algemeen Effectenkantoor + branch office Damrak 
Amsterdamsche Bank + branch office Van Baerlestraat 
Bank-Associatie  
Bankvereeniging Lodewijk Korijn  
Continentale Handelsbank  
De Twentsche Bank (two tickers)  
Dunlop & Philips  
Engelenberg & Co  
Arnold Gilissen’s Bank  
Theodoor Gilissen  
Incasso Bank + branch offices Adm. De 
Ruyterweg; Ceintuurbaan; Dam, 
Haarlemmerplein; Nieuwmarkt; 
Weesperplein; Van Woustraat 
Louis Korijn & Co  
Leidner & Co  
Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co  
Nederlandsche- Handel Maatschappij  
Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto 
Maatschappij 
 
Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsbank  
Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank  
Pierson & Co (two tickers)  
Proehl & Co  
Rijkstelegraaf- en telefoonkantoor  
Firma B. Sanders Ezn.  
Transandine Handel maatschappij  
Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel 
(three tickers) 
 
Vermeer & Co  
Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging  
Hoofdkantoor Tikkerdienst  
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Profits N.V. Tikkerdienst in Dutch 
guilders (nominal value) 1931-19413 
    
Year Profits Year Profits 
1931 763,34 1943 -/- 2.311,584 
1932 875,69 1944 12.533,46 
1933 1.223,25 1945 29.328,77 
1934 4.155,32 1946 6.237,60 
1935 4.931,24 1950 4.879,84 
1936 9.726,22 1951 -/- 5.629,085 
1937 17.479,99 1952 6.437,05 
1938 25.0006 1954 -/- 6.764,88 
1941 23.3836,46 1955 -/-8.746,08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
2 Source: Archive Euronext, Records ‘Tikkerdienst and Telex’, inv. nr. 818 II 131, Subscribers 
Amsterdam per 10 May 1935. 
3 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, Jaarverslagen N.V. Tikkerdienst (Annual reports) 1934, 1935, 1937, 
1941, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1954, 1955. 
4 Due to concluding of a collective pension scheme for all employees of the Tikkerdienst.  
5 Due to heavy drop in prices of its own holding of securities.   
6 No data for this year so this amount is the estimated profit.  
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Profits and losses operation costs 
(‘saldo exploitatie’), in Dutch 
guilders (nominal value) 1934-1955 7
 
  
Year Balance exploitation 
1934 3.048,82 
1935 4.030,12 
1937 16.305,92 
1941 15.432,26 
1943 14.111,02 
1944 11.160,86 
1945 12.241,30 
1946 1.377,99 
1950 3.386.62 
1951 1.507,70 
1952 2.617,96 
1954 -/- 13.435,30 
1955 -/- 5.296,09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 HAAA, archive RB, inv. nr. 525, Jaarverslagen N.V. Tikkerdienst (Annual reports) 1934, 1935, 1937, 
1941, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1954, 1955, profit and loss accounts. 
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Appendix C:  Tables Chapter 7 
 
 
Table 7.1: Company Expenses Robaver Rotterdam Office, 1914-
1917 8 
     
Year Telephones 
& 
maintenance 
Telephone 
lines 
Total 
expenses 
Robaver 
(excl. 
Salaries) 
Total 
telephone 
costs as a 
percentage of 
the total 
expenses  
1914  3.820,85 5.632,35 511.115,97 1,85 
1915  3.599,95 5.632,35 578.550,71 1,60 
1916  2.302,60 11.097,07 676.035,64 2,00 
1917  2.703,59 10.820,30 666.884,52 2,03 
 
 
 
Table 7.2: Company Expenses Robaver Amsterdam Office, 1914-
1917 9 
     
Year Telephones 
& 
maintenance 
Telephone 
lines 
Total 
expenses 
Robaver 
(excl. 
Salaries) 
Total 
telephone 
costs as a 
percentage of 
the total 
expenses 
1914  2.911,93 5.632,35 570.534,57 1,50 
1915  4.444,40 5.632,35 589.459,43 1,70 
1916  6.674,92 11.334,77 780.713,55 2,31 
1917  6.026,02 10.820,35 847.151,92 2,00 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 730, 731, 734, Gespecificeerde balansbescheiden 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 (Specified 
balances over the years 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917). 
9 HAAA, RB, inv. nr. 730, 731, 734, Gespecificeerde balansbescheiden 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917 (Specified 
balances over the years 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917). 
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Summary (in Dutch) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In de tweede helft van de jaren negentig van de twintigste eeuw 
ontwikkelde zich een ware informatie- en communicatie technologie (ICT) 
hype. Allerhande ICT en de bijbehorende software werden aangeschaft die 
het productie- en dienstverleningsproces efficiënter zouden doen laten 
verlopen. Met deze ontwikkeling kwam meer aandacht voor effecten van 
ICT voor een bedrijf en voor een gehele sector. Men begon in te zien dat de 
rol van ICT veranderde van een ondersteunende naar een meer 
strategische. De reden hiervoor is dat ICT kostenverlagend kan werken 
omdat, heel algemeen gezegd, communiceren en het uitwisselen van 
informatie sneller en efficiënter gaat dan voorheen. Ook het vinden van 
geschikte partners kost minder tijd, en dus minder geld. Sommige auteurs 
beweren dat als gevolg van deze ontwikkelingen bedrijven zich steeds 
meer gaan richten op hun kern competentie en andere onderdelen van het 
bedrijf zullen verkopen. Deze andere onderdelen kunnen immers 
goedkoop worden ingekocht op ‘de markt’.  Andere auteurs beweren het 
omgekeerde; bedrijven gaan juist meer integreren omdat ICT de 
mogelijkheid biedt om controle uit te oefenen op alle onderdelen van een 
productieketen. In de betreffende literatuur bestaat dus duidelijk geen 
overeenstemming over de gevolgen van de inzet en het gebruik van ICT in 
bedrijven. Leidt het nu tot integratie of juist tot desintegratie? Deze 
kwestie zal in dit proefschrift onderzocht worden vanuit een historisch 
perspectief. Een historisch perspectief biedt het voordeel dat processen al 
zijn afgerond en de uitkomst dus bekend is. Onderzoekers die een 
hedendaags fenomeen als gevolgen van ICT bestuderen, moeten het doen 
met de eerste tekenen van het betreffende fenomeen en de 
toekomstverwachtingen daaromtrent. Een historische benadering levert 
een longitudinale studie op waardoor huidige ontwikkelingen in 
perspectief geplaatst kunnen worden.  
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In dit proefschrift is er voor gekozen het gebruik en inzet van ICT 
in de Nederlandse effectenhandel te bestuderen om uitspraken te kunnen 
doen over de gevolgen van ICT in de periode 1860-1970. Deze keuze is 
gemaakt omdat de effectenhandel bij uitstek een sector is waarin nieuwe 
ICT in een vroeg stadium wordt ingezet om het proces van 
informatievergaring te versnellen. Immers, als je iets eerder weet dan 
anderen, kun je winst maken. Wij hebben ons daarbij vooral gericht op 
telecommunicatiemiddelen zoals de telegraaf, de telefoon, de beurstikker 
en de telex. In dit proefschrift is geanalyseerd hoe deze technologieën 
werden ingezet in de dagelijkse praktijk van de Nederlandse 
effectenhandel en welk effect dat heeft gehad op de organisatie van een  
bedrijf en dus, de organisatie van deze sector.  De hoofdvraag van het 
proefschrift luidt dan ook: hoe heeft het gebruik en inzet van telecommunicatie 
technologie de dagelijkse praktijk beïnvloed van bedrijven in relatie tot productie 
van diensten en producten, en dus ook hoe telecommunicatie middelen de 
structuur van een gehele sector hebben beïnvloed? Meer specifiek: hoe heeft het 
gebruik en inzet van telecommunicatie technologie de dagelijkse praktijk beïnvloed 
van bedrijven die diensten verlenen op het gebied van de handel in effecten en dus 
ook hoe telecommunicatie middelen de structuur van de Nederlandse 
effectenhandel in de periode 1860-1970 hebben beïnvloed?  
Deze vraag is bestudeerd aan de hand van twee theoretische 
perspectieven: het ‘informatie’ perspectief (gebaseerd op informatie 
economie) en de transactiekosten theorie. Het informatie-perspectief wordt 
gebruikt om aan te tonen dat ICT leidt tot een verandering in het 
dienstverleningsproces van een bedrijf. Dit theoretisch perspectief wordt 
dus gebruikt om het eerste deel van de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden. Het 
gaat bij het informatie-perspectief om het creëren van waarde door er voor 
te zorgen dat je relevante informatie eerder weet te verkrijgen dan een 
ander (informatie-asymmetrie). Als je dus als bedrijf ervoor zorgt om deze 
informatie zo snel mogelijk te verkrijgen, creëer je waarde voor je klanten. 
Afgezien van het feit dat een bedrijf de juiste contacten moet hebben om 
informatie te verwerven is het ook noodzakelijk om er voor te zorgen dat 
je over moderne informatie en communicatiemiddelen beschikt om 
informatie te zoeken en te krijgen. Als gevolg daarvan, kan de 
dienstverlening en het dienstverleningsproces van een bedrijf veranderen. 
De dienstverlening kan sneller en meer ‘real-time’ plaatsvinden.  
De transactiekosten theorie verklaart voornamelijk waarom 
bedrijven verticaal integreren dan wel desintegreren. Deze theorie wordt 
dan ook gebruikt om het tweede deel van de hoofdvraag te beantwoorden, 
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te weten het deel dat gaat over verandering in de structuur van een sector.  
Drie factoren spelen daarbij een cruciale rol: ‘asset specificity’, frequentie 
en onzekerheid. Om het heel algemeen te zeggen: wanneer een zakelijke 
relatie tussen twee partijen wordt gekenmerkt door een hoge mate van 
asset specificity, hoge frequentie en hoge mate van onzekerheid dan zal 
dat uitmonden in een hiërarchisch contract (integratie). Wanneer een 
zakelijke relatie tussen twee partijen wordt gekenmerkt door een lage mate 
van asset specificity, lage frequentie en lage mate van onzekerheid dan zal 
dat uit monden in een markt contract. Wanneer dus één van beide 
omstandigheden aanwezig is, kan dat leiden tot een meer of minder 
geïntegreerde structuur van de Nederlandse effectenhandel. 
Deze twee theoretische perspectieven zijn economische empirisch- 
statische theorieën. Dit plaatst ons dus ook voor een methodologisch 
dilemma. In hoeverre is het mogelijk om dergelijke theorieën te gebruiken 
om ontwikkelingen in het verleden te bestuderen en te verklaren aangezien 
empirisch-statische theorieën uitgaan van een bepaalde situatie op een 
bepaald moment.  
 
De Nederlandse effectenhandel kreeg steeds meer vorm in de zeventiende 
eeuw. Aan het begin van deze eeuw werd de Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie opgericht die aandelen (actiën) uitgaf om zo kapitaal  te 
vergaren. In de VOC aandelen ontstond een levendige handel. Het 
centrum van deze handel was Amsterdam. In 1611 werd het eerste 
beursgebouw in Amsterdam geopend waar handelaren in allerlei 
goederen onderdak vond. De handel in goederen maar ook aandelen had 
destijds een open karakter. In principe kon iedereen handelen in wat dan 
ook alhoewel er natuurlijk wel specialisten zijn. Ook kon je als gewone 
burger een kijkje nemen tijdens handelsuren van de beurs.  Vanaf de 
negentiende werd de Nederlandse effectenhandel meer en meer 
georganiseerd binnen institutionele kaders. In 1876 wordt de Vereeniging 
voor den Effectenhandel (VvdE) opgericht die dé representant van de 
Amsterdamse effectenhandelaren werd. Een ingrijpend gevolg was wel 
dat effectenhandelaren van buiten Amsterdam meer en meer geweerd 
werden van de Amsterdamse beursvloer. Met de opening van de Beurs 
van Berlage in 1903 waar de effectenhandel een eigen handelsvloer had, 
kan geen enkele provinciale effectenhandelaar nog rechtstreeks zelf 
handelen in Amsterdam. Zij dienden een Amsterdamse commissionair in 
de arm te nemen om hun orders te doen laten uitvoeren.  Aan het einde 
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van 1913 opent de VvdE zelfs een eigen gebouw waarmee het monopolie 
van de VvdE op de Nederlandse effectenhandel compleet was.   
 De structuur van de Nederlandse effectenhandel verandert dus in 
de loop der tijd. De meest basale vorm was een transactie tussen koper en 
verkoper van een aandeel of obligatie. In de loop der tijd wringen zich 
daar een aantal tussenpersonen tussen. Ten eerste is dat de handelaar in 
effecten, ook wel commissionair genoemd. Vanaf de tweede helft van de 
negentiende eeuw, wanneer de handel in aandelen toe gaat nemen, komt 
de ‘hoekman’ op. De hoekman is gespecialiseerd in een specifiek aandeel 
(bv. Philips). Deze hoekman verzamelt alle in- en verkooporders met  
betrekking tot Philips en probeert deze aan elkaar te koppelen (te 
‘matchen’). Vanaf 1876 ontstaat dus langzaam de ontwikkeling dat 
provinciale commissionairs, een Amsterdamse commissionair inhuren om 
orders op de Amsterdamse beursvloer te laten uitvoeren. De meest 
uitgebreide keten van de Nederlandse effectenhandel ziet er (vanuit het 
perspectief van een klant buiten Amsterdam) rond 1905 dus zo uit: klant - 
provinciale effectenhandelaar - Amsterdamse effectenhandelaar – 
hoekman -Amsterdamse effectenhandelaar - provinciale effectenhandelaar 
- klant.  Deze structuur verandert in de loop van de twintigste eeuw echter 
weer. Vanaf het begin van de twintigste eeuw zijn de algemene 
handelsbanken in opkomst die ook optreden als tussenpersoon in de 
effectenhandel. Deze handelsbanken groeien en verkrijgen vestigingen 
(veelal door overname van lokale bankiers of commissionairs) door het 
hele land. In dit geval zit er dus maar één partij tussen de klant en de 
hoekman in plaats van twee. Alhoewel er meerdere naast elkaar blijven 
bestaan, wordt de structuur waarbij een handelsbank als tussenpersoon 
fungeert, de dominante in de twintigste eeuw. De vraag is nu welke rol 
ICT in dit proces heeft gespeeld.  
 In de jaren 1840 krijgt Nederland te maken met 
telecommunicatiemiddelen waarbij elektrische stroom aan te pas komt. In 
deze periode worden de eerste telegraafverbindingen gelegd, veelal op 
particulier initiatief. In 1852 kwam daar verandering in toen de 
‘Rijkstelegraafdienst’ werd opgericht. Enkele jaren later krijgt het 
Amsterdamse beursgebouw een eigen Rijkstelegraafkantoor waar dus 
telegrammen afgeleverd of verstuurd konden worden. In 1881 opent het 
eerste publieke telefoonnetwerk in Amsterdam. In 1884 wordt het 
beursgebouw op het telefoonnetwerk aangesloten zodat handelaren onder 
beurstijd konden bellen of gebeld worden. In het beursgebouw dat 
geopend in 1913 is de handelsvloer omgeven met nissen waarin telefoons 
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hangen. In 1920 start de VvdE met het uitzenden van actuele beurskoersen 
door middel van een eigen beurszender waarop geïnteresseerden zich 
konden abonneren. De toepassingen van radiotechniek zijn dan nog maar 
schaars in Nederland. Aangezien de VvdE met deze beurszender moest 
stoppen in 1926, ging de VvdE op zoek naar een alternatief. Die werd 
gevonden in de ‘tikker’, een telegraafapparaat dat en smalle papieren 
strook de actuele beurskoersen in code print. De Tikkerdienst gaat in 1931 
van start. Dezelfde informatie is vanaf 1938 ook te krijgen door zich te 
abonneren op een gesloten telex distributienetwerk. Gezien de kosten 
wordt vooral door ‘professionals’ in de effectenhandel gebruik gemaakt 
van deze diensten.  
Het wordt dus mogelijk sneller informatie te zoeken met behulp 
van ICT. Bovendien wordt ook mogelijk om onder beurstijd geïnformeerd 
te blijven over de actuele beurskoersen. Klant en handelaar kunnen onder 
beurstijd overleg plegen over ver- en inkooporders. ICT heeft in dit geval 
niet zozeer nieuwe diensten opgeleverd maar heeft het het 
dienstverleningsproces enorm gedynamiseerd zoals vanuit het 
informatieperspectief verwacht kon worden.  
Een klant kon dus ook steeds beter zichzelf informeren. Vanuit het 
informatie-perspectief redenerend, zouden tussenpersonen op den duur 
dus niet meer nodig zijn als het gaat om de dienst van 
informatieverstrekking. In andere woorden, informatie asymmetrie zou 
moeten verdwijnen. Dit is echter niet het geval. Degenen die gebruik 
konden maken van telecommunicatiediensten waren toch nog altijd de 
beter bedeelden en voornamelijk, de financiële intermediairs. De abonnees 
op specifieke diensten als de beurszender, de Tikkerdienst en de 
telexdienst, waren partijen die actief waren als tussenpersoon in de 
effectenhandel. Ook het contact tussen klant en de handelaar die op de 
beursvloer rondliep was veelal weggelegd voor de grote, actieve klanten. 
Daarnaast kon een telefonische verbinding nog al eens op zich laten 
wachten omdat er een aantal telefonistes aan te pas moest komen die de 
verbinding handmatig tot stand brachten. Bedrijven hadden wel de 
mogelijkheid om de duur van het tot stand brengen te verkorten door een 
rechtstreekse huurlijn te nemen maar dat was erg kostbaar.  
Al met al verruimden dus wel zeker de mogelijkheden om 
informatie te vergaren, zowel voor handelaar als klant, maar voor wat 
betreft de meest tijd specifieke, en dus meest waardevolle informatie, te 
weten prijsinformatie, bleef een klant dus afhankelijk van zijn of haar 
tussenpersoon die daadwerkelijk zelf op de beursvloer rondliep. 
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Aangezien je als handelaar alleen op die beursvloer kon rondlopen als je 
lid was van de VvdE, werd informatie asymmetrie dus voor een groot deel 
in stand gehouden door een institutionele factor. Een provinciale 
handelaar werd overigens wel degelijk minder afhankelijk voor wat betreft 
prijsinformatie van Amsterdamse commissionairs aangezien die wel 
gebruik kon maken van diensten als de beurszender, de beurstikker enz.. 
Informatie asymmetrie blijft dus bestaan ondanks alle mogelijkheden op 
het gebied van ICT.  
 Om te bekijken of ICT een rol heeft gespeeld bij 
structuurveranderingen in de Nederlandse effectenhandel in de twintigste 
eeuw, wenden we ons tot de transactiekosten theorie. Zoals al eerder 
gezegd leidt een transactie, gekenmerkt door een hoge mate van ‘asset 
specificity’, hoge frequentie en hoge mate van onzekerheid tot integratie 
volgens de transactiekosten theorie. Als partij vanuit de provincie wilde je 
er uiteraard zeker van zijn dat je orders goed en adequaat worden 
uitgevoerd. Naast een contract, zou het hebben van direct contact door 
middel van een huurlijn met een Amsterdamse partij er in ieder geval voor 
kunnen zorgen dat de orders snel konden worden doorgegeven. Een 
huurlijn was echter een prijzige aangelegenheid waarbij jezelf erg 
afhankelijk maakt van één partij die ook nog andere klanten bediende. 
Daarmee zou een relatie dus gekarakteriseerd zijn door een hoge mate van 
asset specificity waarbij toch nog onzekerheid zou bestaan of de ander alle 
orders adequaat uitvoert. Een provinciale partij zou dus logischerwijs 
overgaan tot overname van een Amsterdamse partij. Dit gebeurde in het 
geval van de Rotterdamsche Bank die het Amsterdamse Determeijer, 
Weslingh & Zn overnam en zo zich direct toegang verschafte tot de 
Amsterdamse beursvloer. Na overname werd er direct een huurlijn tussen 
het Amsterdamse en Rotterdamse kantoor aangelegd. Provinciale 
effectenhandelaren volgden echter niet massaal het voorbeeld van de 
Rotterdamsche Bank. De reden daarvoor lijkt hem simpelweg te zitten in 
de omvang van de bedrijfsvoering. Provinciale commissionairs bleven 
afhankelijk van het openbare telefoonnetwerk en hadden  niet de middelen 
om een andere partij over te nemen waarmee dan een geavanceerde ICT 
infrastructuur kon worden aangelegd.   
Ook de Twentsche Bank, alhoewel al gezeteld in Amsterdam, ging 
er rond 1876 toe over om zelf direct op de beursvloer te gaan handelen. Tot 
dan toe voerde een andere partij hun orders uit. Ook hier speelt het 
argument dat de Twentsche Bank er zeker van wilde zijn te allen tijde goed 
bedient te worden door Gerlings & Co. Afgezien van het feit dat de TB ten 
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tijde van het contract met Gerlings & Co wel eigen werknemers op de 
beursvloer had rondlopen die Gerlings & Co konden controleren (zonder 
dat daar dus informatie- en communicatiemiddelen voor nodig waren), 
twijfelde de TB er toch aan of hun orders adequaat werden uitgevoerd 
door Gerlings & Co. We hebben hier dus te maken met een relatie die 
gekarakteriseerd wordt door een hoge mate van afhankelijkheid (‘asset 
specific’) en onzekerheid. In het geval van de TB speelt dus wel degelijk 
een transactiekosten argument een rol om de dienst van het uitvoeren van 
effectenorders te integreren, maar is niet te herleiden tot de inzet en 
gebruik van ICT. Bovendien speelde dit in de periode (ca. 1876), waarin 
wel de telegraaf volop in gebruik was maar telefonie als publieke dienst 
nog niet beschikbaar was.  
 Over het hoe en waarom van het integratieproces van de kleinere 
effectenhandelaren zijn we minder goed geïnformeerd. Uiteraard speelt 
ook voor hen het argument dat wanneer investeringen worden gedaan in 
ICT middelen om er zo zeker van te zijn dat men te allen tijde contact kan 
hebben met een Amsterdamse commissionair met toegang tot de 
beursvloer en dat deze zelfde investeringen gebruikt kunnen worden om 
deze Amsterdamse partij te controleren, erg ‘asset specific’ zijn. Het feit 
dat niet veel kleinere commissionairs uiteindelijk de stap van integratie 
hebben gezet, suggereert een tekort aan financiële middelen.  
In bovenstaande bespreking van toepassing van transactiekosten 
theorie op het onderwerp van deze dissertatie is de factor frequentie niet 
aan bod gekomen. De rol van frequentie heeft in het geval van volatiele 
omstandigheden, een ambivalente rol. De frequentie van transacties kan in 
de effectenhandel enorm fluctueren. Het heeft dan weinig zin om 
frequentie te laten meewegen in de beslissing om al dan niet te integreren 
omdat die beslissing dan ook, bij wijze van spreken, dagelijks zou kunnen 
veranderen. Echter, juist omdat de frequentie van transacties zo kan 
fluctueren, bestaat er wel onzekerheid over deze frequentie. De factor van 
frequentie zit in het geval van volatiele markten dus verwerkt in de factor 
onzekerheid. 
 Concluderend kunnen we stellen dat ICT tot op een bepaald hoogte 
een invloed heeft gehad op structuurveranderingen in de Nederlandse 
effectenhandel.  We hebben gezien dat ICT de mate van asset specificity 
kan beïnvloeden door de hoogte van investeringen in ICT die nodig zijn 
om een contract tussen twee partijen ten uitvoer te brengen.  
De gebruikte theorieën hebben deels de bestudeerde historische 
processen kunnen verklaren. Voor een daadwerkelijke verklaring van de 
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veranderende dienstverlening en de veranderingen in de structuur van de 
Nederlandse effectenhandel spelen meer factoren mee dan de gebruikte 
theorieën vereisen. De theorieën zijn echter in de beginfase van het 
onderzoek wel erg bruikbaar gebleken om vragen te formuleren om zo 
meer helderheid en structuur te krijgen in het vergaarde empirisch 
materiaal. Op deze wijze wordt de historicus gedwongen het empirisch 
materiaal op analytische wijze in kaart te brengen. Het feit dat het hier 
empirisch-statisch theorieën betrof is niet echt een probleem gebleken. De 
reden daarvoor lijkt hem te zitten in het feit dat deze historisch studie zich 
voornamelijk heeft gericht op statische situaties in het verleden. De studie 
heeft zich gericht op het punt van het verticaal integreren van een 
specifieke dienst uit de effectenhandel, te weten het zelf kunnen uitvoeren 
van orders.  
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ICT in Information Services
Traditionally, information and communication technologies (ICT)
have been considered as technologies that support business
processes. With the hype of the ‘new economy’ at the end of the
1990s ICT is increasingly more seen as a strategic asset. The question
arises what effects ICT really has had on firms. This thesis analyses
the use and deployment of ICT in the Dutch securities trade in the
period 1860-1970. It shows the role ICT has had on the level of the
firm and on the industry level. This is done by studying the range of
services which financial intermediaries provided and by studying the
structure of the Dutch securities trade. Concerning the first, ICT has
made the provision of  services enormously more dynamic. Only
think of the possibility to inform clients during trade time on the
current rates by means of ICT. Concerning the second, ICT has had a
less apparent effect. We see the rise of large of joint stock
commercial banks that control almost completely the chain of steps
necessary to execute a securities trade order. Before, several
intermediaries were involved to execute such an order. The fact that
these large players had the means to provide themselves with the
most modern and fast ICT of that time, and thus to lower transaction
costs, seems to be of overriding importance.
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the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working
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